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This thesis is about impairment, disability and health.  Placed in the context of 
Disability Studies, it engages with the theoretical debates about how disability and 
impairment should be conceived.  In doing so it pays particular attention to the 
embodiment of impairment and its relation to health matters.  It also identifies and 
discusses the reasons for the apparent reluctance of Disability Studies to engage with 
health issues.
The main source of data is interviews with 28 disabled people from Edinburgh and 
the Lothians.  Using semi structured interviews, participants were encouraged to talk 
about their experiences of using healthcare including the access barriers they faced, 
the expertise they developed to manage their health care encounters and how these 
encounters mediated and were mediated by their lived experience as disabled people.  
A secondary source of data is autoethnographic writing.  Through reflexivity, an 
assessment is made of the value and validity of using this method to explicitly 
incorporate the researcher’s own experiences in to the data and its analysis.  
Similarly reflexivity is deployed to consider the methodological issues that arise 
from the researcher being disabled and encountering access barriers during the 
research process.
There were three sets of findings from the research.  First, participants’ body talk 
suggested that in everyday life impairment and maintaining good health can be 
understood as something which is done by the embodied self to the body.  This doing 
is often a taken-for-granted activity.  It is also mediated through a number of factors 
including emotions, disabling barriers and broader social and economic structures.  
Second, participants’ accounts of the access barriers they faced when using the NHS 
suggested that there are two categories of access needs, the macro and micro.  While 
macro needs such as ramped or flat access to premises were anticipated and routinely 
met without participants having to take any action, participants often felt they had to 
take the initiative to ensure their micro needs, such as the need for a hoist, were met.  
Some micro access needs were particular to a healthcare context and often emerged 
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during diagnostic tests or treatment procedures.  Healthcare professionals had to have
sufficient skills and confidence to respond effectively to these clinical micro needs. 
The third set of findings was that some participants developed expertise to enable 
them to access the appropriate services to meet their needs and form a high quality 
relationship with healthcare professionals.  However, other participants recalled 
situations where their expertise was not respected and felt abandoned by the NHS.
The first set of findings has implications for theoretical development in Disability 
Studies. More work is needed to connect the doing of impairment to theoretical 
approaches found in sociology of the body and to empirically explore the nature and 
scope of impairment doing,  The second and third set of findings have implications 
for current healthcare practice particularly in the context of the NHS’ responsibility 
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INTRODUCTION 
As a disability activist in the heady period of the late 1980s and early 1990s, the 
social model of disability became deeply embedded in my psyche.  As we shall see, 
this model posits that the problems disabled people face are rooted in the way society 
is organised rather than in their bodies, as suggested by the individual model of 
disability.  The seeds of this thesis were sown during an acute illness and protracted 
recovery when neither the social nor the individual model of disability had much to 
say that was pertinent to my experiences.  How then could I make sense of this at a 
political or sociological level?
The possibility of an answer to this came when I had the great fortune to stumble 
across an advertisement for The ECAS Centenary PhD Scholarship on the theme of 
disability and health.  Informed by personal experiences, my application proposal 
focused upon three questions:
 Why hadn’t health issues figured on the disability movement’s agenda?
 Is there always a difference between being ill and being impaired?
 Could the social model of disability be applied to healthcare settings?
Variations on these three questions have been the dynamic of this PhD and are 
reflected in the goals and structure of this thesis.  Simply stated, the aim of this thesis 
is to understand the social factors that shape disabled peoples’ use of healthcare 
services in Edinburgh and the Lothians and to consider what this tells us about 
disability and impairment.  To achieve this, my first objective was to review how
disability and impairment have been conceptualised and their theoretical 
relationships with concepts of health, illness, biomedicine and medicalisation.  My 
second objective was to undertake an empirical study of disabled people’s health 
care experiences.  I hoped the first objective would be a valuable contribution to the 
literature and provide the context within which to place the study.  In turn, I hoped 
my research findings could be used to comment on the conceptual debates.
To achieve my aims and objectives this thesis proceeds as follows.  Chapter one uses 
the question about the disability movement and health as a way to explore the 
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ongoing debates on how the experience of disability and impairment should be 
conceptualised and theorised.  It is, I think, fair to say that this debate has also 
involved acknowledging that, while the social model of disability just about remains 
the perfect campaigning tool, for the purposes of academia something more is needed 
to capture the detail and diversity of disabled people’s experiences.  Throughout the 
life of this PhD, I too have had to make this acknowledgement which has been easier 
at some times than at others.  This probably helps to explain that at numerous points 
in this thesis I talk about the need to hold the tension between competing ideas and 
interpretations.  
At the end of the first chapter and in the second I begin to unpack my second 
question, the relationship between illness and impairment, and try to bring health in 
to that equation too.  In doing so, I want to highlight the similarities and differences 
between these concepts.
Chapters three and four seek to understand what the social model profoundly 
challenges: medical interpretations of disability and impairment. Chapter three looks 
at the meanings of disability and impairment embedded in medical knowledge, while 
chapter four considers how these meanings have been woven into the fabric of 
society through the processes of medicalisation.
Chapter five tells the story of the struggle to turn my three questions outlined above 
into a viable empirical research project and the thinking behind the journey from 
research proposal to data analysis.  Chapters six to eight present the fruits of this 
process.  At times during the research I regretted not limiting my research to one 
particular group of disabled people or aspect of the health service.  However, with 
heartfelt thanks to my participants and the rich and diverse experiences they shared 
with me, in the end I saw this as a strength which enabled me to engage with a range 
of issues which shed light on the questions above.  Specifically, chapter six uses the 
concept of “doing impairment” to make sense of what disabled people have to do to 
live through an impaired body in a disabling world.  It provides another, non 
medicalised way of exploring what is usually called managing impairment.  It does 
so by turning around a question which has stayed with me for nearly thirty years. 
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This was posed in a Disability Arts In London magazine, alas long thrown away: 
what, Sian Vasey asked, do non-disabled people do all day if they don’t have to 
arrange for a Personal Assistant to come and get them up, if they don’t need to make 
half a dozen calls to get what was then a rare beast a wheelchair accessible taxi to 
take them to work, if they don’t have to explain to a work colleague why they need a 
hand off with their coat and so forth?  
By using the concept of doing impairment, I want to look at what it is that disabled 
people do that says neither “poor me” for having to do this nor discounts it as 
nothing in a bid to claim equality with non-disabled people.  This theme is continued 
in chapter seven and eight.  The former looks at one particular form of doing 
disability that is handling access barriers in healthcare contexts.  Chapter eight then 
looks at participants’ expectations of support from the NHS and how they do 




Disability, Impairment and Illness 
Introduction
In this chapter I want to provide the academic context within which this thesis seeks 
to understand disabled people’s experiences of health care.  To do this it will give an 
overview of ongoing debates within Disability Studies about conceptualising and 
theorising disability and disabled people’s experiences.  Particular attention will be 
paid to how this theorising and conceptualisation has given rise to a noted reluctance 
(DeJong & Basnett, 2001, Begum, 1996, Shakespeare, 2005) on the part of Disability 
Studies scholars to engage with health issues.  This reluctance, I will suggest, has 
emerged from the need to challenge dominant medical views of disability.  Finally I 
will consider the similarities between impairment and illness. 
Two Models of Disability
To begin, I want to sketch the origins of the social and individual models of 
disability.  This will provide the foundation for considering debates about theorising 
disability and impairment in greater depth.  
Disability Studies was founded upon an understanding of disability as a social and 
political issue, not a medical one.  The basis for this was the thinking of the Union of 
the Physically Impaired Against Segregation (UPIAS), which in the 1970s was one 
of the first political organisations of disabled people.  It regarded disability as ‘the 
disadvantage or restriction of activity caused by a contemporary social organization’ 
which was imposed upon impaired people (Oliver, 1990a:11).  For UPIAS, disability 
was a social phenomenon which could be distinguished quite clearly from 
impairment, which it defined as ‘lacking part of or all of a limb, or having a defective 
limb, organism or mechanism of the body’ (11).  The purpose of making this 
distinction was political rather than theoretical, it was to highlight the ‘need for 
urgent change’, instigated by the state, to enable disabled people to live 
independently and gain employment (Oliver, 1996a:24) and so be able to participate 
in society.  
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As a means of clarifying the UPIAS distinction between impairment and disability 
and underlining its significance, Oliver (1996a) proposed two models of disability, 
the social and the individual (the latter is also known as the medical model).  The 
social model embraces the split between impairment and disability and conceives 
disability in terms of socially created barriers which systematically exclude disabled 
people from mainstream society.  The whole thrust of the disability movement has 
been to identify and campaign for the removal of these barriers.  Taking this stance 
was a deliberate rejection of the individual model of disability which was the 
pervasive or ‘natural’ view.  That model regarded disability as a problem caused by 
the ‘functional limitations or psychological losses’ of the individual (Oliver,
1996a:32).  From this perspective, disability was seen as a personal tragedy and state 
action in the form of welfare was required to compensate for it.
Both of these models now  contribute to public discourses of disability (Jolly, 2003),
yet the social model was only intended to provide a starting point for discussions of 
the social forces which lay behind disabled people’s exclusion from mainstream 
society (Tregaskis, 2002).  A major and founding contribution to this discussion was 
the theoretical work of Oliver (1990a) who sought to provide an account of how 
disability was (and is) produced by the social and economic relationships 
characteristic of capitalism.  To do this, Oliver draws upon a materialist framework 
which seeks to explain social phenomena with reference to, on the one hand, the 
historically evolving relationship between the social and cultural environment, and 
on the other, the mode of producing and distributing goods to meet human needs.  
Using Finkelstein’s (1980) idealised model of historical shifts in the mode of 
production, Oliver argues that with the emergence of industrial production in the 19th
Century, disabled people were no longer able to contribute to economic production.  
This was because the new industrial production process was physically arranged to 
be used by the standard male, unimpaired worker (Gleeson, 1999): disabled people 
were excluded from the workplace because their impaired bodies literally didn’t fit in
to this process Oliver (1990a).  This contrasted with the former, agricultural mode of 
production, where the productive unit was the family, not the individual.  This mode 
could accommodate those disabled people who worked at a slower pace or could 
fulfil part of the productive task.
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According to Oliver (1990a) this exclusion was controlled by medicalising disability.
The emerging medical profession took on the role of certifying those unable to work.  
It did so by ascribing the cause of this inability to the pathology of the individual, not 
to the inaccessibility of the workplace.  In other words, this was the origin of the 
individual model of disability: the cause of workplace exclusion was seen to lay with 
the individual and the medical profession assumed a position of power over disabled 
people to define those who could not work and to control access to the limited poor 
law relief for those considered the ‘deserving poor’.
This medicalisation of disability and the biomedical views of disability which 
underpin it will be explored in more detail in following chapters.  Here, even from 
this sketch of the founding theoretical underpinnings of the social model, two points 
can be made about Disability Studies' reluctance to engage in health issues.    First, 
in effect, Oliver implicates the medical profession as instrumental in the continuing 
reproduction of disability which occurs through the practice of medicalisation.  In the 
context of this argument, engaging with health issues is seen as risky because it 
reinforces the idea that impairment is a health issue (Barnes, 2003).   Second, from 
Oliver’s (1996a) account of the production of disability, we can begin to see how he 
has claimed, albeit somewhat polemically, that ‘disablement has nothing to do with 
the body’ (35).  The detail or nature of the impaired body is of no interest to Oliver’s 
theorising: the problem of disability is the social and cultural response or lack of 
response to the needs and abilities of those citizens who have an impaired body.  
From this view, as Shakespeare (2006) points out, impairment is little more than a 
pre-condition of encountering disabling barriers.  Without a body, or at least, some of 
its parts, it is difficult to talk about health issues as health, along with impairment and 
illness, are inter alia, bodily states.
However, it is perhaps useful to point out there are traces of the impaired body in 
Oliver’s work. The social model is all about bodies in relation to social space.  This 
politicised the concept of space, showing it to be contingent upon social relations 
rather than something given, neutral: as we saw above, disabled people’s exclusion 
from the industrial workplace rested upon it being inaccessible to those with an 
impaired body.  The problem, however, is that in Oliver’s theory the body is too 
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abstract to allow detailed analysis of the relationship between particular impaired 
bodies and the particular disabling spaces that form the backdrop to disabled 
people’s everyday experiences (Freund, 2001). Further, as Thomas (1999) has 
pointed out, Oliver does acknowledge the bodily reality of impairment but splits it 
off from the political and consigns it to the ‘private’ realm of personal experience.  
This is politically expedient on two counts.  First, the priority for Oliver is the 
collective struggle for barrier removal which is well served by the simple and 
unambiguous slogan ‘we are disabled by society not our bodies’ (Shakespeare & 
Watson, 2001) which has made for good and perhaps necessary political rhetoric.  
Second, Oliver sees little point in considering impairment because nothing can be 
done about it.  Hence impairment is ‘nothing less than a description of the physical 
body’ (Oliver, 1996a:35).
Yet this description is ultimately a biomedical one (and originally excluded mental 
health survivors and those with learning difficulties).  It talks about impairment in 
terms of what the body lacks.  Hence the social model and Oliver’s materialist 
theorising has ‘conceded impairment to medical hegemony’ (Hughes, 2002a:67), 
thus making it harder to engage with health and illness issues outwith a medical 
framework.  However, the social model and theorising disability has been 
substantially developed over the nearly twenty years since Oliver published his 
seminal work The Politics of Disablement (1990).  Have these developments
facilitated an examination of disability and health?  I will explore this next question 
by charting the shifts in thinking about the disability/impairment dichotomy which is 
at the heart of the social model.  Doing this will provide insight into understandings 
of the impaired body, which, as Shakespeare (2005) has argued, is a pre-requisite of 
exploring health and medical issues within Disability Studies.
Challenging the Impairment/Disability Dichotomy
Feminist Challenges                                                                                                                             
The precursor of direct challenges to the impairment/disability dichotomy came from 
disabled feminists who argued that disabled people’s situation could not be explained 
adequately with reference to disability alone (Crow, 1992, French, 1993, 1999b, 
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Morris, 1991): the subjective experience of the impaired body also contributes to this 
situation.  For example, Morris (1991) has argued 
‘…there is a tendency for the social model to deny the experience of our 
bodies, insisting that our physical difficulties are entirely socially created. 
While environmental barriers and social attitudes are a crucial part of our 
experience of disability…to suggest that this is all there is to it is to deny the 
personal experience of physical or intellectual restrictions, of illness, or fear of 
dying’ (10).
The reference to denying personal experience is part of Morris’ challenge to the 
materialist positions on the place of subjective experience in disability politics.  That 
position, articulated most clearly articulated by Finkelstein (1996), that exploring 
subjective experience distracts from political work of identifying social barriers 
which are external and exist independent of individuals. Second, Morris suggests that 
disabled people’s experiences cannot be understood with reference to disability 
alone: impairment too has an influence.  These points are both demonstrated in 
Morris’ work which is usually rooted in first person accounts (see, for example, 1989 
& 1991).  However, Morris (2001) has also bemoaned the fact that disabled people 
are still loth to talk about their experiences of impairment for fear of non-disabled 
people turning around and saying, ‘"there you are then, we always knew that your 
lives weren't worth living."’ (17).  It is not clear what evidence Morris draws upon to 
argue that disabled people are loth to talk: does she refer just to those with a 
particular political understanding of disability and impairment or disabled people 
generally?  This point aside, pertinent to my purpose is that Morris goes on to say 
that if disabled people 
‘…don’t confront what we need as a result of illness, pain, chronic conditions 
which inhibit our lives, then health services and support services will continue 
to be run in ways which disempower us’ (21)
So what is it that stops disabled people confronting what is needed by talking about 
their impairment?   Morris indicates three related issues.  First, she says the 
reluctance to talk is because impairment cannot easily be distinguished from 
disability.  But why is it necessary to be able to separate disability and impairment 
before talking about the latter?  This question can be answered by Thomas’ (1999) 
observation that Morris assigns impairment to the private sphere and so talking about 
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it won’t undermine the political project of barrier removal.  But what of those who 
don’t or can’t separate their experiences of disability and impairment, what stops 
them talking?  The second barrier to talking about impairment is that it would 
involve drawing upon and reinforcing negative cultural and medical views about 
impairment.   Morris is not alone in this view (see also, Finkelstein, 2001a, Marris,
1996).  In addition Linton (1998) makes the point that there is no neutral language 
available to describe impairment.  But by the same token, it is only when people feel 
sufficiently empowered and support to talk about impairment that such a language 
will be developed.  
The final barrier to impairment talk is the difficulty of addressing the actual 
experiences of impaired bodies.  For Morris, the source of this difficulty is the fear
that addressing those experiences detracts from the political project.  However, I 
think this difficulty is also conceptual: there is still much to do to capture what role 
disability and impairment play in ‘the actual experiences of the body’.  For example, 
is impairment ever ‘simply’ an integral part of bodily experience or at times does it 
feel like a bounded entity within the body?  Nonetheless Morris’ work has 
highlighted that without insight into impairment, it is difficult for Disability Studies 
to engage with health and illness issues.
To go back to the disability/impairment dichotomy, French’s work (1993, 1999a)
calls for the inclusion of impairment related issues in the social model.  However, her 
basis for doing so is that not all social barriers can be removed by social change.  To 
illustrate this point, French analyses her experience of moving into a new 
neighbourhood.  Being visually impaired, French explained to her new neighbours 
that she would be unable to recognise and greet them in the street.  Having explained 
this, at first neighbours took the initiative and identified themselves whenever they 
met her but after a while this stopped.  French concluded that this difficulty is 
‘…not entirely due to my impairment for it involves other people’s responses 
but neither is it easily modified by social or environmental manipulation: it 
occupies a middle ground’ (18).
This ‘middle ground’ points to the importance of naming social interaction as one of 
the key sites of disabling barriers, for it is through interaction that most of the 
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business and pleasure of life is done. As Watson (2003) points out, it is through 
interaction that we experience the sociological abstractions of social structures, 
relationships and processes.  It can also be argued that it is through interaction that 
we come to learn how others interpret our bodies, and this in turns influences the 
experience of health and illness (see chapter two).
Phenomenological Challenges 
Paterson & Hughes (1999) provide another way of analysing social interaction 
between disabled and non-disabled people.  Drawing upon both phenomenology and 
post structuralism, they argue that there are embodied carnal norms of 
communication which structure social encounters with strangers.  These norms are 
predicated on the functioning of non-disabled bodies.  Applied to the scenario 
described above, French’s initial discussion with neighbours can be construed as an 
attempt to disrupt norms of conversation.  This disruption was short lived as the 
neighbours quickly slipped back into using non-disabled embodied norms.  Paterson 
& Hughes’ analysis of embodied norms shifts attention from the impaired body and 
the somewhat nebulous concept of social attitudes to the underlying structures which 
govern everyday communication.  This is a reminder of the significance of the non-
impaired body and how its ways and modes of function are interwoven into social 
structure and interaction.
Moreover, Paterson & Hughes also pay attention to the way disability and 
impairment interact and how both are embodied.  They do this by using Leder’s 
(1990) concept of dys-appearance.  In everyday life, Leder argues, we are unaware of 
our bodies, we take for granted that our bodies have to act to enable us to be in the 
world.  However, circumstances can arise where one does become conscious of one’s
body or certain aspects of it: hence the ‘body appears as a thematic focus of 
attention, but precisely in a dys-state’ (Leder, quoted in Paterson & Hughes,
1999:602).  The prefix ‘dys’ here is both from the Greek meaning ‘bad’, ‘ill’ and
from the Latin meaning ‘away, apart or asunder’ (Leder, 1990:84-7).  So bodily dys-
appearance can occur when there is something ‘wrong’ or ‘bad’  going on in one’s 
body, for example pain or illness.  In this state the body demands attention and in 
doing so may be experienced as something alien, away from the normal state of 
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bodily being.  Applying this to disability, Paterson & Hughes (1999) argue that one 
of the circumstances in which impaired bodies dys-appear is when they confront 
disabling barriers:
‘When one is confronted by social and physical inaccessibility one is 
simultaneously confronted by oneself: the external and internal collide in a 
moment of simultaneous recognition… The impaired body …is stunned into its 
own recognition by its presence-as-alien-being-in the world.’ (603).
I take this to mean that the experience of moments of disability is embodied; the 
external world is experienced internally.  At the same time there is recognition that 
the environment is designed in a way which excludes and disregards one’s impaired 
body.  Paterson & Hughes stress that in the case of impairment and disability, dys-
appearance is not a biological phenomenon but a social one.  It is through 
engagement with the social world that one becomes aware of having a different, 
impaired body.  For Hughes & Paterson then, impairment isn’t a precondition of 
disability; rather awareness of impairment emerges through experiencing disability. 
So while impairment may be a quality of embodiment, it is not always nor 
continuously experienced.  The value of Paterson & Hughes work is that it offers a 
way of describing the embodiment of impairment which is intimately and always 
experienced in relation to other people and/or the environment.  Hence, as Paterson 
& Hughes point out, disability becomes impairment and vice versa.  The dichotomy 
is smashed.
Impairment and Psycho-Emotional Effects
Using a very different approach to Hughes & Paterson, disabled feminist Carol 
Thomas (1999, 2004, 2007) also considers how disabled people’s lived experiences 
‘are shaped fundamentally by the interaction of disability and impairment effects’ 
(1999:125).  To accommodate this within the social model, she makes two 
theoretical moves.  First, she revisits the UPIAS definition (see above), and 
reinterprets disability as a social relationship between impaired and non impaired 
people within which restrictions of activity are imposed upon the former by the 
latter.  Hence:
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‘Disability becomes a particular form of unequal social relationship which 
manifests itself through exclusionary and oppressive practices - disablism - at 
the interpersonal, organisational, cultural and socio structural levels in 
particular social contexts.’ (40).
What Thomas doesn’t say is why or how this unequal relationship arises and what 
role, if any, impairment or the body, plays in generating it.  Nonetheless by 
interpreting disability as a relationship, Thomas provides scope for exploring 
disabled people’s agency, particularly how they handle and resist disabling 
encounters.  Thomas (1997, 2001) has also used this approach to explore empirically 
the disablism in the relationship between disability, women and healthcare 
professionals.  So one way of explore disability and use of health services is to 
conceived of disability which influences social practices due to an unequal social 
relationship.  
Thomas (1999) has also developed the concept of ‘psycho-emotional effects’ to alert 
us to the affect of disability on one’s subjectivity and identity, making the point that 
social barriers do not only affect what disabled people  are able to do but also who 
disabled people can be. Perhaps, however, the concept should be renamed ‘psycho-
emotional dimensions’ to recognize that there is an emotional component not just as 
an outcome of disabling encounters, but also to the handling of access problems.  In 
other words the emotional dimension is not just an effect but also can influence the 
encounter itself.
Thomas goes on to make a second theoretical move which is of most interest here. 
Having defined disability as the imposition of restrictions, Thomas argues that this 
does not preclude conceptualising impairment as also imposing restrictions.  Thus 
she expands the social model to include impairment related restrictions which she 
dubs “impairment effects”.  Such effects, Thomas suggests, include pain, fatigue and 
her situation of being unable to grip a saucepan or spoon in one hand.  What is 
shown is how easily impairment effects slide into disability.  So, with the example of 
not being able to hold a kitchen implement in a conventional way, it is noted this 
could become a disability if it were used as a marker for disability: for instance, if the 
authorities used it to decide she was an unfit mother.  
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In her early work Thomas (for example, 1999) does little to draw out the interaction 
of the social and the biological which, she argues, shapes impairment effects.  
Essentially, impairment effects become a residual category for all the restrictions that 
cannot be understood with reference to disability.  Moreover, in effect, Thomas’ 
equates the social with disability and the biological with impairment, so fails to 
consider how the biological may be socially mediated. Hence N. Watson (2000) 
argued that the concept of impairment effects fails to present ‘an analysis that 
embodies the experience of disability/impairment’.  This, Watson goes on, can only 
be provided by ‘the inclusion of the phenomenological experiences of living with an 
impairment’ (56), something which is also called for by disabled feminist Wendell 
(2003).  I would argue that it is only by doing this that we can get to grips with the 
nature of disability and impairment in terms of bodily and emotional sensations and 
capture how these are played out in lived experience. 
Thomas’ later work (2007) does acknowledge that being one-handed is a bodily 
experience and goes on to consider the complex ways that the social and biological 
interact.  Again, using the example of being one-handed, she shows this is at once 
biologically and socially contingent: in the West there is a cultural expectation that in 
domestic situations ‘pouring boiling water from an electric kettle into hand held 
domestic containers is an everyday activity’ which requires two (steady) hands.  
Similarly, in a capitalist society, a missing hand is constructed by medicine as 
abnormality and this ‘carries tremendous weight’ (137).  This begins to demonstrate 
the socially and culturally influenced ways in which bodies are interpreted and 
evaluated.  However, it is difficult to know whether Thomas’ examples are 
describing impairment affects, disability or, perhaps more promisingly, what she 
dubs as the ‘bio-social phenomena’ of impairment (137).  This moves Thomas a step 
closer to abandoning the disability/impairment dichotomy because, if impairment is 
bio-social, isn’t it the same as disability?  However, to do this Thomas would need to 
let go of her materialist framework which posits that the barriers are still “out there”
even while exploring the way they influence and are influenced by the body and 
emotions.
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A Continuum between Impaired and Non-Impaired Embodiment
If Thomas sought to expand the social model to take account of impairment, 
Shakespeare & Watson (2001) aim to do the same by moving away from the model 
altogether.   Their starting point is that the split between impairment and disability is 
unsustainable because it fails to capture the lived experience of disabled people.  The 
social model, they argue, has led to ‘the denial of difference’ between impaired and 
non impaired people (14).  As a result there is scant recognition that ‘the different 
major groupings of impairment, because of their functional and presentational 
impacts, have differing individual and social implications’ (15).  So recognising the 
salience of impairment is also a process of recognising the differences between 
disabled people.  These arise from the complexity of impairment and the social 
relations which surround it.  While Shakespeare & Watson make clear that they are 
not arguing for the disaggregating of the disability category nor for ‘referring solely 
to clinical diagnoses’ (15), it is not clear what conceptual  tools they would use.  
While it is true policies and practices aimed at barrier removal often overlook the 
needs of particular groups - that is they fail to take on the range and complexity of 
impairment – it is also the case that the use of the over-arching term “disability” does 
provide some leverage for excluded groups to claim entitlement.  De Wolfe (2002) 
illustrates this by acknowledging that, without the success of the disability 
movement, her struggle to get the doors of her library made accessible would not 
have been successful.  Thus the challenge will always be to find ways to make claims 
for barrier removal that embrace most people’s needs whilst putting structures in 
place to enable people to respond to individual and particular needs (see chapter 
seven).  
Shakespeare & Watson also highlight the fact that overlooking the impairment 
related differences amongst disabled people contributes to the disability movement’s 
antagonistic attitude towards both maximising functional abilities and medical 
attempts to cure impairment.  Shakespeare (2006) develops this point in a later work, 
arguing that the disability movement overlooks the diversity and complexity of 
people’s impairment experiences and their life situation. Yet these factors influence 
people’s inclinations for or against impairment related medical interventions. 
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However, Shakespeare does acknowledge that part of the movement’s objections 
stem from the media hype surrounding cutting edge curative treatments and from
healthcare professionals who downplay the risks and limitations of such treatments.  
This line of argument highlights further reasons why Disability Studies has avoided 
engaging with health issues.  Even where the effects of impairment are recognised, 
there is no theoretical space to consider the experience of impairment related bodily 
sensations or what disabled people have to do in order to live through an impaired
body in a disabling world.
A further argument that Shakespeare & Watson make to break the 
impairment/disability dichotomy is that it is often impossible to see where 
impairment ends and disability begins.  It is possible to identify three strands of this 
argument.  The first is that some dimensions of disabled people’s experiences 
involve the interaction of impairment, disability and something else beside.  To make 
this point, Shakespeare & Watson draw upon the work of Corker & French (1998).  
The latter argue that pain is a feature of many impairments but that pain itself is not 
‘the sole creation of our anatomy and physiology’ but emerges at ‘the intersection of 
bodies, minds and cultures’ (Morris, quoted in Corker & French, 1998:6).  So pain 
can be a unique and added dimension of disability/impairment. Of course, the 
experience of pain is not unique to disabled people (Swain & French, 2000) so there 
is overlap between the health and illness experiences of impaired and non impaired 
people (see chapter two).  A further dimension becomes apparent in the ‘huge 
difference’ between ‘a Deaf person who uses sign language and/or has ‘deaf speech’ 
and a deaf person who uses hearing aids and communicates well orally’ (5).  Here, 
the impairment may or may not differ by degree but the disabling barriers 
encountered will be mediated by biographical and cultural characteristics such as the 
age of onset of deafness, the availability and desirability of medical treatment such as 
cochlear implants and whether other family members are deaf or use sign language.  
The second strand of the argument that disability and impairment are not 
dichotomous is that the two continually interact so ‘disability may itself create 
impairment’ (Shakespeare & Watson, 2001:18) as well as impairment leading to 
disability.  This can be illustrated using an aspect of my own experience: the effect of 
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disability in the form of inaccessible toilets and insufficient help to use the toilet over 
a sustained period has led to additional impairment, incontinence, which is not 
usually associated with my condition.  Thus disability imprints itself on the body 
which then gives rise to new impairment effects and new forms of disability.  This is 
expressed by the post structuralists Shildrick & Price (1998) who argue that social 
categories such as impairment and indeed the binary between impaired and non 
impaired people are fluid, ‘always provisional and insecure, never entirely distinct’ 
(236).  
This prefigures Shakespeare & Watson’s third challenge to the impairment / 
disability dichotomy, that impairment is always social and interpreted from a 
particular point of view.  Impairment is neither (just) biological nor experienced pre-
culturally.  It ‘is only ever viewed through the lens of disabling social relations’ (18). 
Hence identifying and categorising a body state as impairment depends upon cultural 
interpretations which are contested and change over time. From this, Shakespeare & 
Watson conclude ‘that there is no qualitative difference between disabled people and 
non-disabled people, because we are all impaired’ (24, italics in original).   This, the 
authors argue, is not the facile argument that ‘we are all impaired really’ but an 
empirical observation that we are all vulnerable to bodily limitations especially, but 
not only, as we age.  Thus there is a continuum not (just) between impairment and 
disability but between impaired and non impaired embodiment on which all human 
beings are placed.  Disability then marks off the point where ‘people experience the 
additional disabling processes of society’ (25).  
Shakespeare & Watson’s analysis offers my work two key insights.  First they make 
it possible to reclaim the impaired body (and perhaps other bodies) from its dominant 
biomedical interpretations through their insight that the body is never viewed from a 
neutral or objective position.  Other more positive interpretations of the impaired 
body are always possible and indeed are already being made especially in the context 
of Disability Arts (Swain & French, 2000).  The second insight that Shakespeare & 
Watson provide me with is that impairment is always embodied.  This opens up the 
possibility of exploring how disabled people experience their bodies in everyday life 
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and how these experiences are influenced by internal feelings and sensations as well 
as by external factors such as disabling barriers and social structures.
Post Modernist Challenges
A further challenge to the impairment/disability dichotomy comes from those writing 
from a post modern and post structuralist perspective who regard the social model as 
‘fundamentally flawed because of its association with a Marxist “meta-historical 
narrative”’ (Thomas, 2006:23).  One example of such a perspective is the work of 
Tremain (2002).  She argues that the division between impairment and disability is a 
‘chimera’ because it is only people with impairments that can experience disability 
(42).  In other words disability and impairment describe the same social 
phenomenon.  Therefore the ‘strict division’ proposed by the social model fails and 
the categories of disability and impairment cannot be regarded as mutually exclusive 
as the social model suggests.  Tremain then links this to Foucault’s argument that 
‘modern relations of power produce subjects… who “have” impairments because this 
identity meets certain requirements of contemporary political arrangements’ (42).  
What these requirements are isn’t specified.  From this view, impairments ‘must no 
longer be theorized as essential, biological characteristics of a “real” body’ (42) 
rather they are the effects of biopower and the outcome of discourse.  Impairment is 
‘naturalised’ to camouflage this.
But what is the outcome of discourse? Is it the phenomenological experience of 
impairment?  Or the way that experience is socially constructed through discourse 
and practice?   Or both? Let’s think about this through a mundane example, of me
being unable to lift a mug a coffee to my mouth without spillage.  First we need to 
know that Tremain argues that the ‘materiality of the body ought to be contested 
because the way bodies are discussed and interpreted are never “merely descriptive”
but are also prescriptive’ (34).  Shildrick & Price (1996) adopt a similar position 
when they dismiss the biological body in favour of the body which is constructed 
through discourse.  So my inability to lift a coffee mug becomes notable because 
discourse creates the knowledge that most people can lift a mug and drink without 
spillage, and indeed can drink without awareness of the physical manoeuvres 
necessary for drinking.  Hence straws are not always available in social spaces where 
26
drinking from cups occurs, so sometimes I may go thirsty or risk spillage.  And if I 
risk it, I may feel embarrassment because, again through discourse, I have been made 
a subject which regards coffee spilling as wrong, even infantile.
Yet Tremain’s argument is that things could be constructed otherwise.  It is just 
about possible to imagine a society in which straws are always available, or better 
still, are an integral part of the design of all cups.  In such a society I would never go 
thirsty or be embarrassed when drinking.  But where does all this leave the 
phenomenological experience of not being able to lift a cup and all the other things 
that are made difficult, impossible or simply messy due to unsteady hand movement?  
Shildrick & Price argue that saying the body is constructed does not imply ‘that the 
matter of the body has no reality’ just that ‘there is no direct access to the 
unmediated body prior to discourse’ (italics in original, 98).  So we can only know 
and speak about the body through language and that language is constrained by what 
Foucault terms biopower, that is the knowledge and power of biomedical practice 
that shapes what is known about the body and who knows it.  Again let’s go back to 
the coffee.  It is difficult to think about describing what my arm does without resort 
to the value laden medical language: “movement disorder” “dystonic”, “lack of 
control”.  But on a bad day, I do know what it feels like to go to grasp something but 
I can’t steady my hand enough to do so.   Even if I had a mug with an integral straw I 
may still knock it over.  I may not feel embarrassed because that is socially 
constructed and therefore can be deconstructed – but I’m still left with a mess to 
clear.  (But do I say that because I’m a woman and gendered discourses constrain my 
thoughts about domestic roles?)
As I see it, the arguments of Tremain and Shildrick & Price do create the possibility 
that what are currently understood as impaired bodies which are devalued, could be 
perceived and treated differently.  They also go beyond the radical intentions of the 
social model which sets its sights on removal of all social barriers but has nothing to 
say about impairment. However, there are three issues that appear to be missing in 
their arguments.  First, it is not clear how the potential of viewing bodies differently 
is to be realised.  Second, Tremain does not appear to allow theoretical space to 
explore the phenomenological body.  Third, it is not clear whether disabling barriers 
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would persist even if impaired bodies were not objectified and were undifferentiated 
from ‘non-impaired’ bodies.  On this point Tremain (2005) argues that the creation 
of the impaired subject provides the justification for the regulatory effects of 
practices designed to govern impaired bodies.  This can be recast in terms of the 
relationship between impairment and disability; ‘the category of 
impairment…persists in order to legitimise the governmental practices that generated 
it in the first place’ (11). In other words, there has to be a social category of 
impairment to justify the regulation of the impaired body.  If impaired bodies were 
left undifferentiated from non impaired bodies then the former could not be socially 
controlled.   
Impairment as Ambiguity
The discussion so far indicates that much progress has been made in generating 
conceptual and theoretical tools to understand impairment.  However, the nature of 
impairment as a social phenomena and an embodied entity is still not quite clear.  It 
will become more so if we draw out one of the implicit themes in the above: the role 
of culture in shaping dominant images of impairment and the values attached to it.  
This will also provide a means of exploring the boundaries between impairment, 
illness and health, one of the objectives of this thesis.  I will argue that the 
boundaries between these bodily states are fluid and indistinct and this is another 
reason why Disability Studies’ scholars have been reluctant to engage with health 
issues.
Cultural Values
Those adopting a materialist understanding of disability and impairment have been 
criticised for paying scant attention to the role of cultural processes in the creation of 
disability (Shakespeare, 1994).  Yet for Finkelstein (1980, 2001), who is considered 
a materialist, it is culture which provides the causal link between disability and 
impairment.  Schematically asserting that the specifics of any culture and its 
normative assumptions emerge from the mode of production, Finkelstein argues that 
the attribution of a negative value to impairment is a wholly cultural process.  So, 
using the example of missing an eye or an arm, he argues that there is nothing 
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intrinsically negative or limiting about this.  That such missing body parts might be 
experienced as a source of personal grief is a product of a capitalist society.  What’s 
more, Finkelstein argues, it is due to the negative valuing of impairments that 
disabling barriers are erected1.  Such barriers are a way of reinforcing norms of 
bodily capability and policing those who do not conform.  The implication here is 
that all forms of bodily states - from being the fastest long distance runner to being a 
wheelchair user or deaf – are interchangeable if, through culture, they are imputed 
with equal value and society is organised in such a way that the needs of all bodily 
states are met.  Yet it is difficult to imagine such a culture but this may be the 
problem Finkelstein is getting at: we are all so steeped in culture that we cannot 
imagine different ways of being.  
Abberley (1997) develops the argument that impairment can be problematic.  As a 
materialist he advocates an ‘attitude of ambivalence’ towards impairment, defining 
ambivalence as the ‘co-existence in one person of love and hate towards the same 
object’ (165).  What he is suggesting is that impairment itself is a problem and 
should be prevented if possible.  At the same time those with impairments should be 
respected.  However, despite the definition of ambivalence that Abberley gives, what 
is not clear is how one separates impairment from the rest of the self so the former is 
hated and the latter is loved.  This leads to an interesting question about the relation 
between self, impairment and embodiment.  In other words is impairment a bounded 
entity within the embodied self?  This is, of course, how most within Disability 
Studies (including myself) talk about impairment, as something we have or possess
as implied by saying ‘I have an impairment’.  Crow (1992) argues that we need to 
‘find a way to integrate them [i.e. impairments] into our whole experience and 
identity’ (4).   The pertinent issue here has less to do with how this is achieved and 
more to do with why we conceive of impairment as separate from self.  As we shall 
see in chapter two, medical sociologists make a similar argument to Abberley.  They 
suggest that people with chronic illness objectify their bodies so as to cast the self as 
                                     
1 Is there a circular argument here?  Culture emerges from the mode of production from which 
disabling barriers emerge but the pretext for the imposition of those barriers is cultural. 
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the victim of the body and avoid the self being overwhelmed by it (Bury, 1982, 
S.J.Williams, 1996).
More promisingly for my purpose is Abberley’s (1997) analysis of the social 
production of impairments through the interaction between the body and the socio-
economic context, for example through industrial accidents or the prescribing of 
unsafe drugs such as Thalidomide.  While not all impairments are created in this way 
(Shakespeare & Watson, 2001), this is the beginning of an argument that impairment 
is never exclusively biological and identifies the body in a social and economic 
context as the focus of analytic attention, although not at the level of everyday life.  
Abberley develops this by going on to argue that the effects of all impairments are 
always experienced through, and therefore influenced by, the particular social 
relations existing at any moment of time.  A similar point, but with a greater degree 
of specificity, is implied by Crow (1992).  Her argument is that some of the time 
impairment is ‘irrelevant, neutral or positive’ and at other time it is experienced as 
‘pain, fatigue and depression’ (2). This suggests that whether impairment is a 
problem or not depends on the context, time and place and on how the individual 
evaluates his/her bodily state.  So, although Crow sees impairment in essentialist, 
biomedical terms (Thomas, 1999) she nonetheless describes the experience of it as 
socially contingent.
Abberley takes his argument about the social production of impairment one step 
further by suggesting that ‘for disabled people the body is the site of oppression, both 
in form and what is done to it’ (73).  Drawing upon the work of Sutherland (1981),
Abberley identifies normalising medical treatment as one strand of oppression which 
is done to the impaired body: the example given is that of a person with polio who is 
made to walk using unwieldy equipment, despite the fact that is painful to do so.  
This is one area where Disability Studies scholars have engaged with medical issues 
and will be explored further in chapter four.
Impairment Is Not Neutral
Recently Shakespeare (2006) seems to have shifted from his view explored above 
that the disability/impairment dichotomy is unsustainable.  Rather he has argued that 
30
impairment is a ‘problematic reality of biological limitation’ (40) which is ‘limiting 
or difficult, not neutral’ (46).  From this stance Shakespeare argues that disabled 
people are restricted both by their bodies and by disabling barriers.  Although 
Shakespeare evokes biology, in an earlier part of his book he makes clear that 
impairment is always social because impairment can only ever be experienced in 
society.  Presumably, by the same token, the biological is always socially mediated.  
Shakespeare’s argument here seems to differ from that of Finkelstein, Abberley or 
Thomas’ concept of impairment effects on only two points.  First, he is more 
forthright in the language he uses to capture the negativity of impairment and doesn’t 
see ambiguity where the others do.  Hence he underlines impairment as an 
‘explanatory relevance’ (42) in the understanding of disabled people’s lives.  Also, 
Shakespeare debunks the idea that impairment is a ‘different but equal’ body state 
compared with non impaired people.  This refutes Oliver’s (1993a) argument that a 
wheelchair is an equivalent mobility aid to a disabled person as an aeroplane is to a 
non-disabled person.  What’s useful for my work is that Shakespeare suggests that 
regarding impairment as a limiting factor facilitates the exploration of what 
constitutes appropriate medical responses to impairment.  Presumably this is because 
one criterion for evaluating the benefit of such treatment would be the degree to 
which it reduces the disadvantage that impairment causes for a particular individual, 
rather than considering the degree to which it is normalising (see chapter four).
The second difference between Abberley, Finkelstein and Thomas and Shakespeare 
is that Shakespeare is more pessimistic – some may say realistic – about what can be 
achieved by social change.  In being so, he challenges the implication of the social 
model that all barriers could be removed to create a non disabling world.  For 
example, he points out that many aspects of the natural world cannot be made 
accessible and that there are a range of impairment needs which cannot be 
accommodated through barrier removal.   Further what Shakespeare hints at but 
doesn’t develop is how, when encountering an access barrier, a person may negotiate
with others to mitigate its effects (see chapter seven).  
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Impairment in Others
There is one further set of arguments that can be used to consider the nature of 
impairment: that concerning the attitudes of disabled people towards other disabled 
people. Morris (1991) points out that sometimes disabled people are 
‘guilty of undermining the lives of [other] disabled people. Those of us who 
walk with crutches often think that to have to use a wheelchair would mean life 
would not be worth living, and those who do use a wheelchair but have the use 
of their arms and hands think that to be completely paralysed would be 
sufficient to commit suicide.’(58)
Morris doesn’t consider what lay behind these sentiments beyond noting that nobody 
can know for sure how they would live with an impairment which they haven’t yet 
experienced.  Through his empirical work on impairment, disablement and identity, 
N. Watson (2000) develops this point.  A number of his research participants felt 
their ‘own impairments were more tolerable, less debilitating than others’.  So while 
two participants felt that their impairment, Multiple Sclerosis (MS), was preferable to 
being a wheelchair user, a third participant, a wheelchair user, thought having MS 
would be ‘dreadful’ compared with her situation (113/4).  The explanation that 
Watson offers for this is that people become accustomed to managing their own
impairment while ‘unable to comprehend how others manage their own’ condition 
(114).  He goes on to highlight that a disabled person is subject to the same social 
and cultural norms as a non-disabled person and this informs how they view other 
disabled people.  Yet when it comes to their own life, these norms are challenged by 
the detail of their own day to day experience.
Watson’s argument implies that to understand what impairment is, it is necessary to 
understand the embodied self in everyday life.  It is here that impairment (and indeed 
disability, if in fact the two can be distinguished) will become an explanatory factor –
or not – and presumably will take many forms.  This notion of impairment stands 
opposed to those above where the impairment is a bounded entity within the 
embodied self or the impaired body is divorced from the materiality and social 
relations in which it is enmeshed.  Watson’s argument can also be extended to give a 
partial explanation of the attitudes of non-disabled people towards disabled people.  
Recalling the argument above about the body being taken-for-granted in everyday 
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life, perhaps non-disabled people imagine that disabled people will be constantly 
reminded of their body, its pain and limitations, as they themselves would be if they 
were ill  (Toombs, 1992).  However, Watson’s research refutes this:
‘when the body was present, this presence seems to be no different for many of 
the informants from that of other [non-disabled] accounts of health and illness, 
or of the body in everyday life’ (121).
In this section I have begun to look at the role culture may play in shaping the 
experience of bodily states which constitute impairment and the values the self and 
others impute to the impaired body.  This has exposed a tension between celebrating 
the impaired body for its difference and diversity while also acknowledging that the 
experiences of the impaired body can be negative and limiting.  The challenge that 
has emerged is how to hold and explore this tension in such a way that doesn’t 
further devalue the lives of disabled people or scupper barrier removal through social 
change.  Yet despite this focus on impairment, the bodily experiencing of it is still 
underdeveloped, although Watson begins to offer a way forward with this.
In the final section of this chapter, I want to explore the boundaries between 
impairment and illness.  This provides another form of insight into the complexity 
and nature of impairment.  I will argue that the fact that boundaries between these 
bodily states are fluid and indistinct adds another layer to Disability Studies’
reluctance to engage with health issues.  Doing this may seem perverse given the 
arguments above that disability and (for the most part) impairment are social issues -
not medical - and establishing this has been vital.  However these arguments also risk 
excluding some from the remit of Disability Studies or the broader movement, for 
example those ‘disabled people whose bodies are highly medicalised because of their 
suffering, their deteriorating health, or the threat of death’ (Wendell, 2001:18).  It 
may also alienate this group from the disability movement (Shakespeare & Watson,
2001).  Should understandings of disability shift so as to include this group of 
disabled people, and if so, in what way?  There is also a further, unrelated question 
here: how is illness implicated in impairment and vice versa. 
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Mapping the Boundaries between Illness & Impairment
To begin mapping the boundaries between impairment and illness, I will review two 
relatively recent attempts to do this within Disability Studies (Wendell, 2001, De 
Wolfe, 2002).  I will then consider how these boundaries can also be discerned in 
other concepts of illness found in the Medical Sociology literature.
Wendell (2001) tries to distinguish between impairment and chronic illness by using 
the categories ‘healthy’ and ‘unhealthy’ disabled people.  The former are those with 
stable conditions whereas the latter are those with chronic illness.  But pinning 
unhealthy on to the chronic illness category appears to simply shift the definitional 
problem to the undefined ‘unhealthy’.  Further using the criterion of ‘stable 
impairments’ to define healthy disabled people also runs into problems.   This is 
because conditions such as spinal injury, polio or cerebral palsy which are sometimes 
considered stable are often not so due to vulnerability to both impairment and non 
impairment related infection or complications and the acceleration of the normal 
ageing process due to unusual wear and tear on muscles and joints.  
Wendell then tries to shore up the unhealthy and healthy boundary by suggesting that 
unhealthy disabled people do not fit within the dominant social categories used to 
designate legitimate social roles for those experiencing particular bodily states.  So in 
the context of illness, those with chronic illnesses are not given the ‘time out’ of 
social responsibilities afforded to the acutely ill, but neither are they well enough to 
return to normal life as can be the case for some disabled people.  Similarly those 
with chronic illness are young enough to be expected to be economically active and
yet unable to rest legitimately in the way that older people with chronic illness are 
able to do.  In the context of disability, those with chronic illness often ‘don’t appear’ 
disabled, or disabled enough, so have to continually voice and justify their needs in 
an effort to be included. 
This leads Wendell to collapse the unhealthy disabled category into that of non 
visible chronic illness.  For this group, Wendell argues, a major problem is lack of 
recognition as “genuinely disabled,” instead being held responsible or blameworthy 
for their condition (29).  Thus the issue seems to become the policing of the 
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boundaries between different types of illness and wellness.  Individuals whose bodies 
don’t, or don’t appear, to fit existing categories are problematised by social relations.  
Individuals then have to work to make their bodies fit or deal with the consequences. 
What we see here then is not so much a difference between healthy and unhealthy 
disabled people, more that boundaries are social, contested and can have a profound 
effect on life opportunities.
The notion that those with chronic illness don’t fit existing categories resonates with 
Murphy et al’s (1988) understanding of liminality.  The authors argue that disabled 
people exist in a liminal state, ‘neither sick nor well, neither fully alive nor quite 
dead’ (238) and hence in a ‘socially ambivalent’ position (235). As a result, disabled 
people somehow hover between the world of the healthy and that of the sick, 
‘nonpersons’ having lost one identity but not yet formed a new one.  This 
indeterminate social status, Murphy et al argue, extends to all areas of disabled 
people’s lives, including being seen as asexual.  They mainly attribute the liminal 
state to the social restrictions they see as inherent within impairment, along with the 
prejudiced and stigmatising attitudes towards disabled people.  It is perhaps the case 
that Murphy et al’s analysis is somewhat dated insofar as there is now greater 
recognition of the disability category and disabled peoples’ political claims for a role 
in mainstream society.  There is also a more general point to be made about 
instability of categories of body states.  Research has repeatedly shown that people 
identified their bodily state as indeterminate, as existing between health and illness.  
Similarly it has been demonstrated that most people, most of the time have some 
minor illness symptoms such as infection or injury (Blaxter, 2004, Cornwell, 1984, 
Herzlich, 1973).
Wendell’s next argument, and one De Wolfe also makes, is that the disability 
movement’s antagonistic approach to medical cure and prevention of impairment is
the proposition that disabled people’s problems can be dealt with by social change.   
However, they argue that with some conditions the major problems emerge from the 
nature of impairment itself rather than from disabling barriers.  This resonates with 
Shakespeare’s argument considered above that impairment can cause biological 
disadvantages.  Hence Wendell argues that extreme fatigue, which is a symptom of 
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her condition, is ‘one of the most challenging impairments to accommodate’ in 
society (25).   But it is not clear that this is a fruitful line of argument on two 
grounds.
First, it is possible to think of many impairments that are equally as challenging to 
accommodate as chronic fatigue, for example someone with a physically stable 
condition who cannot communicate verbally, in writing or formal sign language.  But 
the real point here is the sheer complexity of the relationship between bodily states of 
impairment and chronic illness on the one hand and how they are experienced when 
enmeshed in social relations on the other.  Using the instance of any one impairment 
and the possibility of accommodating it as a basis for distinguishing between 
different categories of bodily states, is doomed.  There can be no useful, objective 
ranking of conditions by their perceived severity because what is unbearable for one 
person may not be for another.   Moreover, if any particular impairment can be 
accommodated is contingent on social relations and the way these interact with an
individual’s biography.  
The second difficulty with Wendell and De Wolfe’s argument that in some instances 
the problems people face are wholly impairment related, is that it is not clear what it 
achieves: if a problem is not disability related why amend the disability category to 
incorporate it?  De Wolfe (2002) argues that disability theorists need to acknowledge 
the suffering of those whose conditions cannot be dealt with medically or socially.  If 
this doesn’t happen, she argues, those with chronic illness will be banished to the 
private sphere because social integration is contingent upon a lack of suffering.  But 
this gets confusing when De Wolfe calls for illness rights, analogous to disability 
rights.  Although such rights would still leave those with chronic illness in the private 
sphere at least now this would be socially sanctioned.  So illness rights would 
legitimate social disengagement while disability rights facilitated active social 
participation.  Despite this opposition it is likely that many disabled people would 
claim both sets of rights at different moments of their lives.  Yet De Wolfe’s 
arguments for illness rights seem to point not towards shared boundaries between 
impairment and illness but to the alliance of acute and chronic illness categories so as 
to extend the remit of the sick role.
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As something of an aside to De Wolfe’s arguments here, the dangers of connecting 
impairment or chronic illness with suffering is apparent in Cassell’s (2004) often 
quoted text The Nature of Suffering and The Goals of Medicine.  In the chapter on 
chronic illness, as well as freely using the dated term cripple, he argues that any 
attempt to facilitate the social engagement of people with chronic illness will itself 
cause suffering.  He then, in effect, inverts the social model, arguing that while the 
social standards (barriers) which prevent disabled people participating in the social 
world appear to be external, in fact disabled people impose on themselves standards 
they cannot meet. It is very difficult to know what to make of this beyond its 
offensive patronage and lack of any attempt to substantiate its arguments by drawing 
on the experiences of those with chronic illness or the Disability Studies literature.
The work of Wendell and De Wolfe demonstrate the slippery boundaries between 
impairment, chronic illness and acute illness.  Now I want to explore this boundary 
further by looking at different concepts of illness and the way impairment is 
implicated within them.
Illness as Undesirable
Earlier we considered the normative negative values attached to impairment and 
attempts to challenge them.  I now want to draw a parallel between these and the 
negative connotations associated with illness.  There are no ‘facts’ or fixed 
definitions of illness (Turner, 1995).  Rather illness is an evaluative concept used to 
identify and name body states deemed undesirable (Turner, 2004).  This naming is 
underpinned by cultural judgements about what constitutes acceptable ‘dysfunctions, 
pains or disfigurements’ (Cassell, 2004:145) but these judgements and the categories 
they create are always contested and provisional (Herzlich, 1973).  As we have seen,
the same is true for impairment.
These difficulties in categorising bodily sensations have practical implications.  For 
example, in the context of health and impairment, individuals (and their healthcare 
professionals) may find it difficult to distinguish between changes in bodily 
sensations that indicate an impairment related problem and those indicating the onset 
of illness unrelated to impairment.  In this instance, impairment can overshadow 
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illness. Similarly, the difficulty of categorising bodily sensations and functions 
contrasts with the use of secure and water-tight categories used to establish 
entitlement or otherwise to support services and roles.  Yet for all these difficulties 
created by social categories, it is hard to imagine how the social world would operate 
without them.  One example of this is the difficulties people face when bodily 
sensations or functions suggest that something is wrong, but for whatever reason, this
goes undiagnosed.  Without a diagnosis, an individual’s bodily experiences and the 
restrictions they cause are not legitimated, which can have a negative impact on 
relationships within the family and with employers.  It can also exacerbate the 
existential anxiety which often accompanies the onset of illness symptoms (Bury,
1982).
Thus illness is a socially defined state which stands opposed to disease ‘a neutral 
term referring to a disturbance in an organism’ (Turner, 2004:198).  While illness is 
clearly related to disease, the two are obviously not co-terminus: one can have a 
disturbance in the body without being ill and be ill without having a disturbance.  In 
this equation, impairment has to be aligned with illness, as it too is constituted 
through social judgements of bodily states (Shakespeare, 2006).  So on what grounds 
is illness and impairment deemed undesirable, what gives these concepts a normative 
basis?  There are a number of answers to this.  
First Crawford (1984) argues that bodily experience is ‘structured through the 
symbolic category of health’ (62).  Therefore for most people in comparison with 
healthy embodiment, illness is at best unwelcome. Logic suggests that this should 
also apply to impairment:  for those who have only experienced being healthy, the 
onset of impairment is unwelcome.  So here it seems that impairment is implicated in 
illness.  However, this cannot apply to those with congenital impairments who have 
no bodily experience without impairment, suggesting that the boundary between 
illness and impairment varies depending upon its onset.    Further Sander, Donovan 
& Dieppe (2005) found that amongst older people the onset of impairment did not 
mark a significant discontinuity with previous body states because of their previous 
embodied experiences of poverty and hard work.  But there is another confounding 
factor here, which is of greater significance.   While the onset of impairment may be 
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compared unfavourably with a former healthy state, this comparison may not endure 
over time.  This, of course, is the major difference between illness and impairment: 
the former has an endpoint of death or cure (Cassell, 2004) while impairment is by 
definition ongoing.  By virtue of impairment being ongoing, to a greater or lesser 
degree people become accustomed to the bodily ways and sensations, so comparison 
with previous states may not apply.  From this perspective the onset of impairment 
can be seen as an opportunity for self development (see for example, Albrecht & 
Devlieger, 1999, Frank, 1997, Lindsey, 1996).  Against this interpretation, Swain & 
French (2000) point out that, in the minds of some, it is precisely the permanence of 
impairment that is the problem.  From this stance, impairment is not the opposite of 
health but of death:
‘the ultimate version of the tragedy model is that physical death is better than
the social death of disability’ (571).
The second line of argument used to demonstrate that illness is undesirable is that it 
impedes one or more bodily functions.  In this regard Boorse (1975) makes the 
argument that categories of illness can be both descriptive and evaluative (he calls 
this weak normativism).  To illustrate this with an example relevant to our 
discussion: claiming that walking is preferable to wheelchair use is not just 
normative.  It is also a description of human functioning.  In comparison with 
wheelchair use, walking improves circulation, keeps leg muscles toned and is a more 
effective and efficient way of movement over a variety of terrains.  From this view, 
health is a matter of function, of the body working in the optimum way for everyday 
living.  Against this impairment is dysfunctional.
Finally, there is an argument that illness is undesirable on the grounds that human 
beings prefer health to illness.  This point is made by Canguilhem (1989) who states 
‘living beings prefer health to disease’ (222).  He goes on to suggest that this 
preference for health is not arbitrary but what is most ‘conducive to life’ for humans 
and an ‘essential part of being an organism’.  There is a risk here of ‘biologization of 
norms’ (Trnka, 2003:429) thereby neglecting the influence of culture in these 
matters.  However, this biological determinism is avoided, Trnka argues, because 
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Canguilhem regards the preference for health as both subjective and ontological. It is 
subjective because
‘experience of impediment and the subjective thought of an ideal are real as 
forms of sensibility and polarization in life. To be alive presupposes some 
ability to distinguish between good and bad in the sense of what helps or 
hinders me. This minimal sense of the evaluative is subjective for Canguilhem, 
meaning that it must take root in the individual organism’ (431).
In other words, the preference for health is usually taken-for-granted but becomes 
apparent through the ‘experience of impediment’, that is when health is disrupted by 
illness, injury and so forth.  This preference is also ontological because human beings 
have ‘evaluative dispositions’ (430), to choose health is part of what it is to be 
human.  What is missing here is any discussion that a preference for health, or for 
what is conducive to life, is influenced by social and economic forces (although 
Canguilhem does discuss this in other contexts).  There are two senses in which this 
is true.  First, ‘what is conducive to life’ is dependent upon social and economic 
factors.  For example, in a hunter-gathering society, being unable to walk would pose 
a far greater risk to survival than in a 21st century where wheelchairs are relatively 
sophisticated and the means of getting food relatively easy – at least in the Western 
world.  Second, in the current age there are many different options that can be chosen 
which are ‘conducive to life’ including those which are accessible to disabled people.  
For example one can chose to keep fit by swimming, going to the gym etc and these 
do not necessarily exclude disabled people.
Disruption of the Lived Body 
Another way of conceptualising illness is in terms of changes in bodily sensations or 
behaviour and our awareness and response to these. From this phenomenological 
perspective illness is conceived as a disruption to the lived body.  Hence Toombs 
(1992) argues that usually the body is taken-for-granted and attention is focused 
upon the external world.  In this state we live and perceive through the body without 
being conscious of it.  This is the lived body.  The onset of illness is marked by ‘alien 
sensations’ (14) and these cause our awareness to shift from the world and back to 
the body.  From this point of view, it is relatively easy to distinguish illness from 
impairment.   As Toombs (1992) argues, people become ‘acclimatised’ to the 
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impaired body so the sensations associated with it cease to be alien and do not cause 
attention to shift to the body. However, occasionally this may be problematic: a 
disabled person may have sensations which are only slightly different from normal,
so ascribe them to impairment instead of to the early stages of an illness or change in 
impairment.  Here then illness is implicated in impairment.
Toombs (1992) goes on to consider how changes in embodiment due to illness can 
change a person’s perception and relationship to the external world.  Drawing upon 
Merleau-Ponty, Toombs’ starting point is that ‘perception cannot be divorced from 
the concrete situation of the perceiver’ (53).  In other words, how perception operates 
through the body’s five senses influences the interpretation of what is perceived.  To 
illustrate this, Toombs uses the example of someone who has developed a tremor.  If 
they see a mug of tea on the table, it is no longer simply on the table, ‘there to be 
grasped’.  Rather the mug presents itself as a problem to be solved (1992:11).  Leder 
(1990) makes a similar point, arguing were he to ‘become weakened or paralysed, 
the quality of the world is equivalently transformed: objects now recede, mock me, 
proclaim my inability’ (23).  Toombs goes on to argue that the bodily changes caused 
by illness or impairment result not just in a physiological loss but also a loss of 
personal integrity.   The example given is that of someone becoming a wheelchair 
user losing integrity symbolically, because being upright refers not only to the 
physical act of standing but also metaphorically to having moral worth.
In some respects, the work of Toombs and Leder are useful insofar as they highlight 
how the relationship between embodiment and the external world.  Hence Leder 
argues that our physiological structure is ‘the groundwork of our mode of being-in-
the-world’ (quoted in S.J.Williams, 2006:10).  This suggests that disabled people
have a different ontology, a different way of being in the world.  However, one 
problem is that, despite Toombs’ acknowledgement of the differences between acute 
and chronic illness, she does not appear to take that into account in her analysis of 
the relationship between disabled people and the external world.  To go back to 
Toombs’ example of the mug, the person may use a straw - meaning that the mug is 
neither an object to be grasped nor a problem to be solved but a drinking receptacle 
in which to place a straw.  In other words, unlike the social model, a 
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phenomenological analysis does not consider how an individual or social agent may 
intercede to change the relationship between the individual and the world of objects.  
This confirms a common criticism of phenomenology: that it is essentially 
individualistic and descriptive (Turner, 2004).  It is for this reason that Hughes & 
Paterson’s (1999) analysis, considered earlier, ‘grafts’ a phenomenological approach 
to ‘notions of oppression and inclusion’ (598).
Illness as Social Action
A third way of looking at illness is as a form of social action.  Herzlich (1973) argues 
that we come to understand certain bodily states as illness through the meanings we 
assign to them.  This happens through action or behaviour.  For example if someone 
has a headache he may think it means he’s tired so goes to bed.  If the pain gets 
worse he may decide that the headache is more serious, so leave work and seek 
medical advice.  Hence through social action (Herzlich, 1973), biology and culture 
interact to construct illness or impairment and the disease categories used to describe 
and manage these. 
There are a number of issues that flow from this.  The first of these is that illness can 
be understood as a change and restriction of activity: the serious and persistent 
headache means one is temporarily unable to work.  As we saw above, both 
disability and impairment have also been defined as restriction of activity.  
Nonetheless, the point is that many disabled people manage to forge satisfying 
lifestyles, restrictions of activity notwithstanding and could do more so if disabling 
barriers were removed. Yet perhaps one of the reasons why non-disabled people are 
often incredulous that disabled people lead satisfying lives is that they base their 
judgements on their own experience or fear of restricted activity, suggesting that this 
is one of the ways illness implicates impairment. 
The idea that disabled people incorporate restrictions of activity into their lifestyle 
feeds into the next issue that emerges from Herzlich’s analysis, namely that there is 
an element of choice in how people act when they consider themselves as ill.  So 
Herzlich (1973) goes on to argue that if one is ill but behaves as if one is well, then 
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one is healthy2.  This argument seems to describe the approach of many disabled 
people to living with an impairment.  As we saw above, the action one takes is 
influenced by the meaning assigned to one’s illness, and these meanings are 
culturally shaped.   This is also true of impairment but most of the meanings of 
impairment which are culturally available are ‘uncompromisingly negative’ 
(Pillsbury, 2001:55) and reinforce the personal tragedy theory of disability (Barnes & 
Mercer, 2003).  
Conclusion
In this chapter I have tried to highlight the aspects of thinking on disability and 
impairment which have impeded consideration of disabled people’s health care 
encounters and of the relationship between the bodily experiences of impairment and 
disability on the one hand and health and illness on the other.  Yet these impediments 
notwithstanding, in some senses Disability Studies’ lack of engagement with health
matters may be more apparent than real.  Or rather it has explored these issues in a 
defensive rather than an engaged way.  This I think is an indication of the seemingly 
high stakes involved especially in bioethical debates about beginning/end of life 
decisions and what has become to be regarded as normalising treatment.   I intend to 
demonstrate all this in the three following chapters.
                                     
2 One could also argue that the reverse is also true: if one is healthy but acts as if ill then one is ill
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CHAPTER 2
Impairment, Chronic Illness and Health
Introduction
This chapter will discuss the relationships between impairment, chronic illness and 
health.  It will pick up one of the themes from the last chapter, the ambiguity which 
seems to be inherent in the concept of impairment.   It will do this by contrasting
arguments that the onset of impairment or chronic illness is negative with that which 
sees it as an opportunity and consider the reasons for this.  It will then consider how 
impairment has been implicated in concepts of health.  Particular attention will be 
paid to a line of argument that chronic illness or impairment is something that 
suggests attending to impairment and disability in everyday life is a form of work, of 
doing to the body. I will argue that this offers a way through and beyond the notion 
that impairment is either negative or positive and has the potential to contribute to 
new insights into the lived experience of impairment and disability. My underlying 
purpose here is to tease out the relations between health and impairment and consider 
why this relation is significant.
Chronic Illness as Negative: Disruption Repair and Reconstruction
One focus of the chronic illness literature has been personal responses to such illness 
(Paterson, 2001).  Hence one of its key concepts is biographical disruption. 
Developed by Bury (1982), this posits that the onset of chronic illness disrupts ‘the 
structures of everyday life’ (169) at a number of different levels.  One implication of 
this disruption is that those with chronic illness must rethink their biography because 
the ‘normal trajectory’ of one’s life becomes ‘fundamentally abnormal and inwardly 
damaging’ (1982:171). What is significant here is Bury doesn’t make the argument 
that life becomes ‘fundamentally abnormal’, but seems to simply assert it.  To 
mitigate the effects of such a life, a person’s biography becomes a resource which 
can be used to assign meaning to their illness experience, to try and answer the ‘why 
me, why now’ existential questions illness can provoke.  Bury makes clear that the 
informants were not seeking medical explanations for the cause of their illness but 
lay explanations,such as poor working conditions or stressful family situations.  This 
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links with Cornwell’s (1984) study of concepts of health and illness amongst East 
Londoners.  In ‘private accounts’ of their illness which are given to those who the 
speaker knows, individuals look for multiple causal agents rooted in their experience.
Here then, biographical disruption is the source of chronic illness (S.J.Williams,
2003) or biographically triggered (S.J.Williams, 2000), a concept that could be used 
to trace the relationships between social position, illness and biography.  There is 
also a sense of biographical continuity.  In searching one’s personal history for 
explanations for current illness one’s biography can to some extent counter the 
uncertainty of the present. This is what Carricaburu & Pierret (1995) call 
‘biographical reinforcement’ (80).  Similarly, although everyday life is disrupted, one 
remains ‘the same person’ before and after the onset of illness, as core identity 
doesn’t change’ (Kelly & Field, 1996).   
Bury’s ideas about repairing disruption by finding an explanation for illness is 
similar to G.Williams’(1982) concept of narrative reconstruction.  This concept 
describes a process whereby the rupture of body, self and society that chronic illness 
may cause are accounted for and repaired through ‘discursive consciousness’ (178).  
This consciousness entails producing a commentary in everyday talk of the sequence 
of events surrounding the onset of chronic illness, particularly identifying reference 
points in their biography that they implicate in the genesis of their illness.  The 
genesis of illness means not the disease aetiology but the social, biographical and 
teleological causes of the illness: that is the ‘why me’ question.  This takes place 
within the context of their belief systems and it highlights an ordinary and everyday 
way of dealing with bodily disruption.  It also indicates one of the ways in which the 
experience of chronic illness comes to be accommodated within the self and so offers 
the possibility of returning to a ‘normal’, if changed, lived experience.  
There are a number of difficulties with Bury’s concept of biographical disruption.  
The first of these is that his analysis focuses upon chronic illnesses which have a 
relatively slow onset.  It is not clear if this is because biographical disruption is 
limited to this type of illness or whether it also occurs amongst those who experience 
a sudden onset of impairment, for example, as a result of a traumatic spinal or brain 
injury.  Similarly, Bury doesn’t consider the case of those with congenital 
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impairment.  Obviously, amongst this latter group there is a continuity of biography 
and identity (assuming that the impairment isn’t progressive, degenerative or 
episodic).  Nonetheless, in comparison with non-disabled people, their lives may be 
disrupted in terms of the consequences of impairment upon daily living.  This raises 
the question of whether to place the emphasis on the concept of biographical 
disruption on the disruption itself or on the content or form of that disruption takes.  
This leads on to the second difficulty with biographical disruption, namely whether 
such disruption always occurs with the onset of chronic illness.  Recent work 
suggests otherwise.  For example, Sander, Donovan & Dieppe (2005) found that 
amongst older people, the onset of arthritis was an ‘integral part of their biographies’ 
as the condition was seen as ‘an inevitable result of their [i.e. the respondent’s] 
history and older age’ (234/236).  Notwithstanding this biographical continuity, the 
impact of the condition on daily lives was severe.   This suggests that disruption to 
the lived body doesn’t necessarily disrupt people’s sense of who they are, doesn’t 
necessarily divide life into ‘before and after’ illness.  One explanation for this is that 
older people have a lifetime’s experience of coping with adversity [and this] equips 
them to deal with illness cognitively and emotionally (S.J.Williams, 2000).  If this is 
the case it suggests that disruption is linked to the ability to deal with consequences 
of illness in the routines of daily life: the greater the ability to cope, the less the 
disruption.   It follows from this that the social contextual factors such as age, social 
history, expectations and personal resources are influential in determining the degree 
of biographical disruption brought about by chronic illness, rather than factors 
intrinsically linked to illness. 
The third difficulty with Bury’s concept of biographical disruption is that it assumes 
that such disruption only occurs in the context of chronic illness.  This overlooks the 
disruptive effects of a number of other life events such as pregnancy, having children 
or death of a loved one.  In doing so an opportunity is missed to highlight the 
similarities between illness and other life events.   Arguably, this increases the sense 
of isolation, the sense of disconnection between those who are ill and those who are
not.  Similarly it fails to consider that a wide range of life experiences may equip 
people resources and skills to accommodate impairment or illness.  
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The final difficulty to be noted here is that when biographical disruption occurs,   
there is a presumption that it will always be a negative experience.  In the context of 
the Medical Sociology literature generally, Thorne (1993) observes that chronic 
illness is assumed to be ‘traumatic’ for the whole family and the ‘inevitable
outcomes of disease’ (33).  Yet, she goes on to argue, the outcome is influenced 
hugely by the medical care available and the way in which it can be accessed.  From 
a Disability Studies perspective, Sapey (2004) argues that a focus on meaning 
reconstruction rather than disruption may facilitate more positive practices on the 
part of healthcare professionals, enabling them ‘to work in collaboration and as allies 
to disabled people’ (25).  He cites research by Oliver that suggests that there are a
wide variety of responses to adverse life events, including the onset of impairment.  
Following Abberley, Sapey goes on to argue that any loss experienced by a newly 
disabled person may have as much to do with experiencing social barriers and 
disablism as with bodily disruption.  .  Again, this underlines the importance of 
tracing the social causes of disruption as well as the bodily ones.
A final point to note about this work on chronic illness is that it implies that the 
“disruptive body” is the trigger for biographical disruption. This stands opposed to 
the social model of disability, which, as we have seen, locates the problems of 
disability firmly in social structures and relations.  From this perspective, impairment 
is not implicated in chronic illness, even though in common usage the meanings of 
impairment and chronic illness overlap and refer to similar body states.  However, 
this can not be said with any certainty as there is no sense of the fleshy body here, 
making it harder to discern the nature of chronic illness.
Illness as Opportunity
The idea that biographical disruption is always a negative experience has been 
challenged by ‘a more optimistic view of illness experience as a form of self-
development and liberation’ (Sander, Donovan & Dieppe, 2005:228). This is 
exemplified in the work of American sociologist, Arthur Frank (1995, 1997, 2002).
Frank (2002, 2007) argues that illness provides a ‘dangerous opportunity’ to reflect 
upon and re-evaluate what’s really important in life. Serious illness forces people to 
confront the possibility of death.  As a result, such illness becomes a moral occasion, 
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one which begs the question: what sort of person do I have to be in order to live with 
a less than satisfactory situation?  When people engage with this question, they often 
recognise the possibilities of adopting valued and valuable lifestyles, notwithstanding 
illness.  This is something that is not usually expected of those who are ill.  Here the 
question of whether illness or impairment is a negative or positive experience gets 
pushed aside.  Instead, Frank implies that through reflexivity, illness is an embodied 
state that offers a unique perspective on the world.  Moreover, this perspective is 
socially valuable because it leads to consideration of how to live well.  This also 
serves to decentre medicine from its usual position at the core of illness experience.  
As Frank points out, most of the life of someone with a chronic illness is lived 
outside the clinic.  Here, impairment and illness again overlap, doing so when the 
possibility of death is faced.
Impairment and Health 
In a similar vein as Frank, Lindsey (1996) uses the concept of health within illness to 
argue that the onset of chronic illness can be positive. This concept, developed by 
Moch (1998), posits that health and illness are not dichotomous, but each is a part of 
our existence to different degrees at different times of life. Lindsey’s findings from a 
small scale, qualitative study demonstrated that people used the experience of illness 
as an opportunity to develop, enhance or refine their sense of Self.  For example, 
interviewees spoke about deepening relationships with others, clarifying what was 
important in their lives, making positive life changes and finding new freedoms in 
their life.  However, there are difficulties here.  As Lindsey uses the concept, it infers 
that health within illness occurs only where there illness prompts self development.  
This doesn’t seem to allow for other, equally positive, responses to illness such as 
disability related political activism.  Yet that would risk seeing any positive activity 
undertaken by a disabled person as healthy rather than just pursued for its own sake.
A second difficulty with Lindsey’s application of the health within illness concept is 
that it risks denying the very sense of embodiment which she sets out to consider.  
Lindsey argues that health within illness occurs ‘regardless of the person’s physical 
condition’.  It is quite difficult to know what to make of this.  Is she suggesting the 
idea of health within illness has no physical or phenomenological basis?  How then 
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does health within illness differ from health?  Perhaps this reading is too literal and 
what is meant is that illness, whatever its particular characteristics, can be an 
occasion for personal growth.  But this interpretation again doesn’t really provide a 
means of specifying whether disabled people’s experiences or meanings of health are
any different from those of people who become ill and then recover.  
The third and final problem with the health within illness concept is it focuses upon 
an abstract individual, without reference to how the social context and biography 
impinges and shapes responses to illness and impairment.  In other words, it is not 
clear what factors encourage or impede people to strive for health within illness.
To sum up, Lindsey’s use of the concept of health within illness in the context of 
disability creates the much needed theoretical space to dismantle the usual opposition 
between health and illness or impairment.  Such opposition is epitomised in Murphy 
et al’s (1998) assertion that ‘a person who cannot walk and move about in a 
wheelchair can hardly be called “well”’ (238).  More generally, such opposition has 
also have been found in lay understandings of health and illness (Herzlich, 1973).  
However, as yet the health within illness concept doesn’t seem sharp enough either 
to differentiate between the concepts of health, illness and impairment or to delineate 
the various situations where they can coexist.
In some senses, there are similarities between Lindsey’s health within illness and 
what Albrecht & Devlieger (1999) call ‘balance theory’ ‘where the experience of 
well-being and life satisfaction is contingent on the person’s achieving balance 
between body, mind, and spirit’ in the context of the larger environment (978).  This 
theory was developed from analysis of research designed to investigate the apparent 
paradox that many disabled people ‘report that they experience a good or excellent 
quality of life when to most external observers these people seem to live an 
undesirable daily existence’ (977).   Whereas Lindsey identified self development as 
the key to a positive sense of health, Albrecht & Devlieger identified a number of 
outlooks on life which facilitated such a sense.  These included ‘just getting on with 
life’, finding new ways to connect with others, finding new meaning to life through 
spirituality, weighing up different aspects of life and realising that the onset of 
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impairment was relatively unimportant’.  These responses to impairment are not, 
Albrecht & Devlieger argue, about denying impairment but about acknowledging it 
and thus being in control of mind and body.
Herzlich (1973) discusses the relationship between concepts of health and illness 
used by lay people.  She suggests that there are different bodily modes of 
experiencing health: as a state of well being, as a possession or as a means of 
conduct.  Each mode is associated with a different concept of health and relationship 
between body and self.  So, for example, the concept ‘health as absence of illness’ is 
experienced bodily either as ‘being healthy’ or ‘being ill’.  In other words it is a 
dichotomous state, one is either ill or healthy and one or other of these states 
pervades the whole experience of the body.  Within this mode of being, it is 
relatively easy to imagine how the bodily experience of illness is very different than 
impairment.  For example, having the flu is likely to be a very different bodily 
sensation than having cerebral palsy especially if a status quo has been established 
with the latter.
So those who have an ongoing, stable impairment would be likely to consider 
themselves healthy as this is their usual way of bodily being in the world.  Thus 
health can combine with illness.  A further mode that Herzlich identifies is 
equilibrium which is experienced through doing health, and knowing that the body is 
all right which facilitates participation in the world.  It has similarities both with 
Lindsey’s health within illness concept and Albrecht & Devlieger’s balance theory.
Being Healthy and Impaired 
Moving on, I now want to look at work which suggests that some disabled people 
view themselves as healthy, using similar or identical concepts of health to those 
used by non-disabled people.  This is illustrated by Lowton & Cabe’s (2003) 
qualitative study which investigated how people with Cystic Fibrosis (CF) viewed 
their health.  For the purpose of the discussion here, it makes a number of significant 
points.
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Despite CF being a highly medicalised condition requiring ongoing medical 
supervision, most of Lowton & Cabe’s respondents regarded themselves as healthy.  
Just what they meant by being healthy was fluid and shifting, depending not (just) 
upon the disease process but on the social context and comparison with others.  For 
example, one meaning given to healthy was being able to to have a lifestyle 
comparable with those without CF. This meant being able to participate in everyday 
life by holding down a job or having a social life. This functional concept of health, 
the idea that being healthy means being able to cope with everyday activities, has 
been found in other [non-impairment] studies of lay views on health (Blaxter,1990).  
Similarly, the technique of comparison with non-disabled people was also important 
to respondents in Albrecht & Devlieger’s (1999) study of disabled people’s 
evaluation of their quality of life – see above.  In that context, for example, 
respondents used comparison to highlight that they gained life satisfaction in 
different but equally valid ways than non-disabled people or recognised that they had 
found a way of coping that meant they were able to have a better life than many non-
disabled people.
Going back to Lowton & Cabe’s findings, when respondents needed significant 
medical treatment, for example intravenous antibiotics to deal with a chest infection,
most still regarded themselves as healthy.  In this context however, health was a 
‘controllable state’.  This meant that respondents still had control over everyday life
by means of having a positive attitude towards having and managing CF.  In this 
situation, health wasn’t comparable to those without CF.  Yet again the idea that 
health is a controllable state ties in with other lay concepts, particularly that good 
health is about ‘overcoming disease, even if that disease is actually present’ (Blaxter,
1990:16).
Lowton & Cabe interpret respondents’ perceptions of being healthy as a strategy to 
manage their condition.  This interpretation provides a useful insight into how seeing 
oneself as healthy is also a way of being healthy.  It underlines the fact that having a 
positive attitude towards CF is an important part of dealing with it.  As Lowton & 
Cabe point out, this does not mean that respondents were denying their health 
problems, rather by placing them in the larger picture of their own life and that of 
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others.  However, this analysis can also be seen as problematic.  It could be argued 
that by seeking an explanation of why people with CF viewed themselves as healthy, 
Lowton & Cabe failed to take respondents’ health claims at face value.  By making 
the fact that people with CF see themselves as healthy a significant finding, Lowton 
& Cabe collude with the expectation that those with highly medicalised conditions 
like CF are almost inevitably considered to be ill. This expectation was also held by 
four respondents who considered themselves to be ‘frauds’ precisely because they 
felt healthy and yet had a CF diagnosis.   An indication of the strength of this 
expectation is that respondents seem to discount their experience, labelling 
themselves as fraudulent, rather than challenge the idea that someone with a 
medicalised condition cannot also be healthy.
Disability as Work in the Context of Health
In the previous section, I considered the similarities between disabled and non-
disable people’s concepts of health. I now want to consider a body of literature which 
may seem to undercut these similarities. 
It does so because it highlights the effort and additional tasks disabled people do to 
maintain health and manage activities of day to day living.  The obvious place to 
start exploring this is with the Medical Sociology literature that looks at how people 
manage or cope with chronic illness or impairment.  However, this is often 
descriptive rather than analytic, and does not always consider the broader social 
context.   Therefore I want to start with Tighe’s (2001) study of how impairment and 
disability impacted on the health of disabled women.  This introduces the concept of 
disability as work, which I will argue could be developed to provide a useful vantage 
point from which to understand what it takes to be impaired, disabled and healthy
For most of the eight women Tighe interviewed, the need to keep up with or survive 
in a non-disabled world ‘confounded the meaning of health’ (519).  In other words, 
women reported that their efforts to be healthy were compromised by having to deal 
with disabling barriers and attitudes on a daily basis.  It is this need to deal with 
barriers that constitutes the first type of disability work.  The second type of 
disability as work that Tighe highlights is what disabled people have to do with and 
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for their body in order to keep healthy.  What this involves is contingent upon 
impairment and people’s access to the personal, economic, social and medical 
resources which enable them (or not) to manage their conditions.  This tallies with 
studies which consider how those with chronic illness cope with their symptoms on a 
day to day basis, and the impact this has on one’s identity and sense of self (see, for 
example, Charmaz, 1983, Corbin, 1985 & Locker, (1993).  However, one advantage 
of Tighe’s concept over these is that it begins to include the social barriers that 
disabled people have to negotiate, as well as dealing with the body.  
The third type of disability as work Tighe identifies is the pressure on disabled 
women to define and maintain the same level of health as non-disabled people.  
Rather than live life at their own pace to accommodate disability work, the disabled 
women in the study felt they had to do this work in addition to everything non-
disabled people do in daily life.  This disability work was physically and emotionally 
draining, which impacted negatively on their health.  So not only did the women 
have to do additional work to be healthy but that work itself can be detrimental to 
health.  Underpinning this double whammy are the social structures that fails to take 
account of disability work, which contributes to disabled people’s discrimination and 
exclusion.  
A final point Tighe makes is that how non-disabled people view the relationship 
between disability and health impacts on disabled people’s perception of health.  For 
example, one of Tighe’s interviewees commented that while she viewed herself as 
healthy, she was aware that others saw her as ‘fragile’.  To confound this perception, 
the interviewee travelled ‘all over the place’.  When others expressed surprise about 
this, the interviewee felt she was ‘changing those attitudes about disability anf 
illness’. Tighe comments that the interviewee ‘needed to exonerate her good health 
in light of her impairment’ and thus ‘The negative societal perception of disability 
impacts how [the interviewee] has to think about her own health’.  Since acquiring a 
spinal injury, health has become something she has to strive for rather than health 
being something she could take-for-granted (520).
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Zola’s (1991) work provides insight into another dimension of the additional body 
work some disabled people have to do, one which focuses upon the relationship 
between embodiment and social space.  He describes his changed perceptions of his 
body between two episodes of air travel.  In the first, having parked the car in a 
convenient spot, with luggage strapped to his back he limped to ‘what often seemed 
the most distant terminal in the airport’.  When questioned about this experience of 
air travel, Zola replied that any problems were ‘relatively minor or non-existent’ (4).  
Twenty years later, in the second episode, Zola used a wheelchair to get from car to 
the air terminal.  In doing so he noticed his body was
‘untired, not needing a nap, not sore from sweating legs and tight braces, not 
cramped from the general strain of extra walking’ (4).
From Zola’s account here several related points can be made about impairment / 
disability work here.   The first of these is the sheer effort involved in getting from A 
to B and the impact this had on his bodily being, an effort that a non-disabled person 
wouldn’t have to make.  Yet he only became aware of this effort and its bodily 
impact – his body only dys-appeared, to use Leder’s terminology - when he avoided 
the effort by using the wheelchair.    
This is an indication of how impairment becomes an integral and undifferentiated 
part of embodiment (Watson, 2000) to the extent that Zola didn’t notice the effort he 
expended or how tired and sore his body used to get until he chose to stop walking 
and use a chair.  The obvious point here is that the disability work, like the body 
itself, becomes taken-for-granted.  This may in part account for what Zola described 
as his ‘own inability to communicate the quality of experience’ of walking being so 
effortful for him (4).  Assuming this inability is not unique to Zola, it suggests the 
need to explore the extent to which this represents a barrier in understanding 
disability and its relationship with impairment.
The taken-for-grantedness of some disability work can have contradictory 
implications for the individual.  If one is not aware of the work, it may make it easier 
to ‘just get on and do things’ which is what Zola did.  Although he couldn’t hide his 
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impaired body because of the manner and mode of his walking, he could make it 
appear as if it didn’t impact on what he could do.  In terms of functioning he could 
appear to be ‘just like anyone else’ (4).  This may not have been Zola’s intention or 
goal but the embodiment of prevailing culture and norms.  The invisibility and 
silence of disability work colludes with the inadequacies of attempts to make 
appropriate adjustments to enable full participation in society.  At the individual 
level, this can carry a personal toll in the form of bodily damage in the future.  
Indeed, it is now becoming apparent that people like Zola who had polio are now 
experiencing ‘post polio syndrome’.  One of the symptoms of this is painful or 
strained muscles which have been overworked or awkwardly used in a bid to 
compensate for paralysed muscles and an inaccessible environment.  Similar 
problems are being experienced by people with other conditions, for example 
cerebral palsy.  A suggestion can be made here that healthcare professionals are also 
implicated in taking for granted the effortful work of impairment by not considering 
its long term effects.
A final point to make about Zola’s experience is that what changed between the two 
episodes was neither his impairment nor the physical environment of the airport.  
Rather what changed Zola’s analysis of the situation was the growth of the feminist 
and disability rights movements.  As a result of the new discourses these movements 
engendered, Zola’s self perceptions changed.   He no longer felt he had to prove he 
was ‘just like anyone else…a “supercrip” (4).  This suggests that political ideas can 
become embodied.  The disability rights movement legitimated and valued diverse 
modes of bodily being and functioning and emphasised that society had to 
accommodate impaired bodies rather than vice versa.  It was this that enabled Zola to 
make the choice to use his wheelchair rather that struggle to walk without 
diminishing his sense of self, without having to emulate non-disabled people’s 
standards, without feeling the need to prove himself.  This resulted in his body 
feeling much more comfortable – ‘untired’, ‘not sore’ etc.  In this context, 
impairment becomes something quite different from illness.  As Lupton (2006) 
observes society sanctions the temporary withdrawal of the sick person from her 
normal social roles and responsibilities while those with chronic illness are expected 
to adapt and be part of the world.
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Adapting to Chronic Illness
Moving on, some interesting comparisons can be made between Tighe’s concept of 
disability as work and Bury’s (1991, 1997) writing on adapting to chronic illness.  
Bury’s focus is less on the doing of material tasks and more on the self processes 
necessary to facilitate such tasks (1991:460).  Bury identifies three types of self 
processes: coping which involves integrating the consequences of illness into the 
lived body: strategising which involves mobilising the necessary resources for daily 
living; and style, ‘the way people respond to, and present, important features of their 
illness or treatment regimes’ (462).   While ostensibly covering similar ground, the 
key difference between the approaches of the two authors is that while Bury is 
essentially normative, Tighe implicitly challenges the social status quo.  The 
language that Bury uses, “adaptation”, “coping” “putting up with” all speak of the 
individual doing all she can to ‘achieve a level of normal life’ (1997:129). Here, of 
course, ‘normal life’ is the life of non-disabled people.  Without elaborating what 
normal life may be, or what sort of lifestyles people with chronic illness may aspire 
to and achieve, Bury’s analysis risks making coping, strategising and style ends in 
themselves.  This makes the burden of work all the heavier and it is small wonder
that De Wolfe (2002) finds the Medical Sociology approach to chronic illness 
profoundly depressing and isolating.
It is interesting that Bury makes scant reference to health as if chronic illness rules it 
out of court. Yet for Tighe, by placing the concept disability as work in the context 
of health implies that this is the goal of such work.  Tighe recognises that while many 
concepts of health are based around non-disabled people’s standards and that these 
can be oppressive, these can also engender well-being and enable people to engage in 
the world.  This was something that the women in Tighe’s study worked towards.   
As we have seen, Tighe highlighted that dealing with disabling barriers was a 
significant part of disability as work, and this included dealing with the emotional 
consequences of dealing with prejudiced attitudes.  This work could jeopardise
health.  Thus, in comparison with Bury’s approach, Tighe’s took greater account of 
the social constraints which the disabled women faced and engaged with through 
doing disability work.
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There are several other examples of Medical Sociology studies on coping or adapting 
to chronic illness, and these too can be considered through the lens of disability as 
work.  Kelly & Field (1996) argue that dealing with ‘the physical problems which the 
chronic illness generates’ is the ‘epicentre of coping experience’ and is secondary to 
attending to social relations and the reconstruction of self (247). What this argument 
overlooks is that dealing with social relations can be an integral part of managing the 
problems of illness or impairment. For example, managing the fatigue which is a 
major part of several chronic illnesses such as MS (Multiple Sclerosis) or CFS 
(Chronic Fatigue Syndrome), involves negotiating social relationships, both with 
significant others and those in the wider world, so as to manage demands upon one’s 
time and expectations of social capacity.  Similarly, both the self and identity are 
implicated in body management.  How one attends to body management is, I would 
argue, both conditioned by and reflects the self.  For example, the self may neglect 
body management:  someone with a spinal injury may develop sores as a result of not 
checking pressure sites in the prescribed way.  Consequently, healthcare 
professionals may attribute laziness or being neglectful to the person’s identity.  
Radley & Green (1987) and Radley (1989) also explore the notion of adjusting to 
chronic illness.  Similar to Bury’s notion of adaptation, this work can also be read 
through the lens of disability as work, throwing some interesting light on it. 
Everyone, disabled and non-disabled, does body work, which is not prior to everyday 
life but an integral part of it.  From this point, Radley (1989) conceptualises 
adjustment as comprising the resolution of the ‘dual demands of bodily existence and 
social life’. For disabled people, what has to be done to or with the impaired body -
‘the demands of the bodily existence’ - may dictate ‘the terms in which the day shall 
be lived and personal relationships engaged in’ (232).  But the impaired body which 
has to be worked upon is the same body through which one experiences and engages 
with the social world.  Therefore the desire or need to engage in the world is in 
competition with bodily demands for the same time, energy and resources of the 
individual. 
Radley highlights that these conflicting demands should not be regarded as the 
simple opposition of social constraints associated with engaging in the world and the 
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physical constraints associated with body works.  This is because social constraints 
are realised through the conduct of the body and body demands are ‘defined and 
limited through social interpretations’ (233).  All these constraints are resolved 
through the process of adjustment, which is ‘located in the practices and the 
discourse of the people concerned’ (233).  It is through discourse that individuals talk
about what illness means and justify their way of coping with it.  It is, therefore, a 
practice itself and its form constitutes part of their adjustment style.  Adjustment is 
also done through bodily practices and the way these are used on a day to day basis.  
For example, one may choose to do an hour of physiotherapy or rest for the morning 
so one has the energy to go out in the afternoon.  Hence, as with Tighe’s concept of 
work, for Radley’s adjustment is something that has to be done.  It is a state of bodily 
doing rather than a state of being. 
Radley goes on to argue that adjustment is not made to a fixed and nebulous concept 
of society, but to the specific social situation of the individual.  So, for example, the 
adjustment to paid work after the onset of illness will involve very different issues 
for the lorry driver than for the accountant.  Radley & Green (1987) also argue that 
there are different modes of adjustment which are shaped by the individual’s 
relationship with his condition on the one hand and with society on the other.  For
my purposes, the important point is that adjustment is not a uniform process but 
varies both between individuals and with the same individual over time, depending 
upon how they negotiate social and bodily constraints.
Body Management 
Need discussion here about body management in general 
For some disabled people the nature of their impairment can be such that certain 
types of body management are always problematic.  For example, Kelly (1992) 
found that although managing a colostomy was usually a background feature of life, 
if the appliance failed or there was a problem with its management, then bodily 
difference came to the fore: a private trouble always threatens to become very public.  
This is problematic because the body out of control has become a key stigmatising 
image of diseased and sick bodies (Crawford, 1994).  Further, some degree of control 
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in the use and presentation of the body is necessary in order ‘to be acknowledged as 
a competent social performer’ (Kelly & Field, 1996:246).  This is because bodies 
convey meaning ‘designed to constrain and organise expectations about behaviour’ 
(Gagnon & Simon quoted in Kelly & Field, 1996:246).  There appears to be 
something of a circular argument here: to be competent is to have body control 
because lack of control is read as meaning socially incompetent.  Hence the question 
as to why lack of control is interpreted as meaning lack of social incompetence goes 
unasked. 
Moreover, Kelly & Field appear to treat body control as an all or nothing quality, 
failing to consider whether the consequences of lacking control differ according to 
the type or degree of bodily control at issue.  Further, they do not explore whether 
bodily behaviour and actions which are interpreted by others as lack of control, is 
actually a lack of control.  For example, someone with impaired hand movement 
who spills part of a drink may be observed by others to lack bodily control and to be 
child like.  However, for the disabled  person picking up the mug up may have taken 
extreme effort to restrain unwanted movement and so view any spilt liquid as 
‘collateral damage’.  Nonetheless, there may be embarrassment all round. So here 
the link between body control and social competence is about judgements made on 
the basis of surface appearance of the body and the outcome of body management 
rather than management itself. In all this,   the impairment work, in this instance 
restraining unwanted movement, goes unnoticed.  Similarly, this whole episode may 
have been avoided if environmental circumstances had been different: for example if 
a straw had been available or tables been a different height.  Thus appearances of 
some types of bodily control are socially contingent.
A more sophisticated argument about body control and social competence is found in 
the work of Hughes & Paterson (1999).  One of these authors, who has a speech 
impairment, analyses an incident in which he opened the door to a delivery person 
who asked ‘Oh, is your Mum not in?’, assuming that he was not a responsible adult.  
This assumption was based on surface appearances, on ‘aesthetic “evidence” as if 
(somehow) appearance is an omnipotent guide to competence’ (606/7).  Interpreting 
this from a carnal sociological approach, the authors argue that the 
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‘social competence of people with impairments is masked, not because of their 
carnal performance, but because the conventions and norms of “competence” 
are devoid of “their” carnal information’ (607).
This shifts the analytic focus from appearances of bodily control – ‘carnal 
performance’ - to the embedded norms of intersubjectivity which are based upon the 
intricacies of non-disabled bodily function and performances.  This shift raises two 
questions.  First, what explanation can be given for those who ignore these norms, 
who don’t view the impaired performance as problematic, and therefore relate to 
disabled person as competent?   The second question which followers from this is 
how can carnal norms be changed to  include the bodily realities of people with 
impairments and the degree to which carnal norms can accommodate the potentially 
infinite number of bodily realities and performances.  Such change would mean it 
was no longer necessary for disabled people to adjust to society in order to be 
assimilated into society on the terms of non-disabled people.  In the mean time, 
disabled people have to do the work necessary to handling encounters in which one 
party makes false assumptions about, and therefore excludes, the other.  
However, the potential of Hughes & Paterson’s work to liberate disable people
notwithstanding, there is a question here as to whether some experiences of lack of 
bodily control are inherently or always distressing.  In one survey Albrecht & 
Devlieger (1999) found that the ability to (re)establish control over mind and body 
correlated with good quality of life.  The 43% of respondents who reported a poor or 
fair quality of life felt that they had lost control of their body, social life and 
environment.  Type or effects of impairment seemed to be the pertinent explanatory 
issue as it was those who were in pain, continually fatigued or had communication 
impairments that reported a poor quality of life.   Interestingly, one of the common 
features of these impairment effects was that they made social contact difficult, albeit 
for different reasons.  
Resisting the Work of Impairment
One final point I want to flag up in this section is that none of the studies (including 
that of Tighe) consider whether some disabled people fail, refuse or resist doing body 
work, and if so, what forms this may take.  In many ways, the disability movement’s 
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long-standing and on going campaign for independent living can be construed as 
resistance.  This is clear from the definition of independent living as
‘being able to live in the way you choose…having choices about who helps you 
and the ways they help…it is not necessarily about doing things for yourself’  
(National Centre for Independent Living, quoted in Hasler, 2006:228)
Here then independence is re-interpreted as choice rather than doing and doing alone.  
It recognises that disability work can be complex and arduous.  Therefore in order to 
have greater time and energy for social participation it is more conducive to quality 
of life to have assistance with the doing of disability work.  Better an extra hour 
down the pub than the same time spent taking off one’s socks. Campaigning for 
independent living is a form of resistance that occurs collectively and individually.  
Collectively, current campaigning is focused upon securing legislation guaranteeing 
a right to independent living.  Locally, resistance takes place as people negotiate care 
assessments, rehabilitation programmes and so on.  This involves challenging health 
and social care professionals’ ethos and practice which is geared to maximising a 
disabled person’s function with the least assistance possible.  To do this risks the 
professional judgement of ‘failing to adjust to his or her condition’ (Hasler, 
2006:43).
Conclusion
In this chapter I have explored two lines of argument. The first of these is that the 
significance of the onset of impairment, including chronic illness, can be interpreted 
as a negative disruption to biography, positively as an opportunity for self 
development – or, presumably, both.  To what extent can these different 
interpretations be accounted for by the perspectives in which they are grounded?  In 
the chronic illness literature, which interprets impairment negatively, the body 
features as little more than something which, when disrupted by illness, also disrupts 
a way of life.  Moreover, this disruptive body, as little of it as there is, appears to be 
derived uncritically from biomedicine and therefore conceptualises illness and 
impairment as an abnormality of the body (see chapter three).  Yet little indication is 
given of how people actually experience the body, beyond the fact that it is 
objectified by the person with chronic illness, in an effort to ensure that it does not 
61
overwhelm the self (Bury, 1992).  An interesting line of future inquiry here could be 
how the relationship between the embodied self and the experience of the body as a 
source of pain or discomfort mediates the process of biographical disruption.
In contrast to the chronic illness literature, that derived from the personal experience 
of illness seeks to understand impairment in the context of health, is informed by the 
embodied self or the experience of the body.  Consequently, it suggests that there is a 
reflexive process of contemplation of the bodily experience of impairment, the 
outcome of which can be a positive perspective on life.  The irony here then is while 
the body in an given context may be the source of impairment or chronic illness, it is 
by appreciating the phenomenological, embodied experience of impairment, 
including the spectrum of feelings and emotions, that an optimistic outlook on life 
with impairment can be achieved.  If this argument is valid then it can add to those 
who argue for the inclusion of the body and embodiment in the Disability Studies’ 
cannon.  It may also be used to ally the fears of those, such as Morris, who fear 
talking about impairment play in to the hands of those who seek to denigrate or doubt 
the quality of life of disabled people.
A final point to make here is that the contrast between these two literatures highlights 
that the evaluation of bodily experience is extremely diverse and unstable.  While the 
concepts of health, illness, chronic illness and impairment refer to differing swathes 
of bodily experience, the relationship between these swathes, and that between each 
concept and a bodily state, are highly unstable.  This gives scope for disrupting 
taken-for-granted meanings of these concepts in order to challenge the values 
imputed to them.  Lindsey’s health within illness concept is an example of this.  This 
is also a way of challenging medical interpretations of the impaired body.  These 
interpretations are explored in the next chapter.
The second line of argument developed in this chapter is that the consequence of 
living with an impaired body in a disabling world is the necessity to do various forms 
of work to the body and with the body.  As we saw, for Tighe, this work comprised 
dealing with disabling barriers as part of everyday life and striving to conform to 
non-disabled people’s standards of health.  The burden of this work can in itself 
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undermine health.  Zola (1991) described a form disability work that was quite 
literally body work: dealing with tiredness and discomfort that emerged from the 
relationship between his embodiment and social space.  Zola chose to hide this work 
in order to appear ‘just like everyone else’ (4).  With both these examples of 
disability work, it is not impairment that leads to ill health but dealing with disabling 
barriers that does.  Here then the concept of disability work opens up for theoretical 
exploration the space between the experience of impaired embodiment and its fleshy 
encounters with disabling barriers.  Such an exploration will be undertaken in 
chapters six and seven.  A further advantage of highlighting disability works is that is 
problematises the normative underpinning on adapting to chronic illness, which 
places the onus for adapting without taking into account the social constraints which 
make adaptation necessary. 
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CHAPTER 3
Biomedicine and its Interpretations of the Impaired Body 
Introduction 
This chapter is about biomedicine and the impaired body.  It will look at how bodies 
are interpreted in medical contexts and the implications of these interpretations have 
for the regulation of the impaired body, both within the medical arena and beyond.  
One difficulty which needs to be noted straight away is the use of the term “impaired 
body”.  As a category, it seems to have little currency outside Disability Studies and 
certainly not within biomedicine.  Similarly, it is not clear whether individuals use it 
as a way of referring to their own bodies.  Yet despite these limitations it feels vital 
to use it here as a way of anchoring disabled people’s experience and understanding 
of their bodies outside the biomedical arena.   This is particularly the case in this 
chapter because its premise is that biomedicine’s interpretations of what can be 
called the impaired body are predominant but have been increasingly challenged.  As 
Cunningham Burley & Backett-Milburn (1998) point out, we have no ‘innocent’ 
knowledge of bodies, rather we ‘are always “reading” our bodies through lenses of 
various interpretive schemes’ (142).  In a sense then, in this chapter I am not looking 
at biomedicine’s interpretations from an ‘innocent’ or neutral position.  Rather the 
category ‘impaired body’ is enabling me to root my analysis in the social model 
notwithstanding its limitations.  
Having clarified this, the chapter will now discuss the principal ways in which 
biomedicine has interpreted impaired bodies, interpretations which have emerged 
through medical knowledge and practice.  These interpretations will be considered 
under the following headings:
 Impaired body as abnormal
 Impaired body as in need of fixing
 Impaired body as symbolic failure
 Impaired body as indicator of poor quality of life  
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Mindful of the fact that medical knowledge is a mode of discourse (Bury, 1986), 
taken together these interpretations have formed a narrative of the impaired body as 
abnormal and subject to continuous medical oversight.  However, it would be 
misleading to consider these interpretations as all-embracing, static or unified.  As 
we shall see, developments in medical knowledge and technology result in new 
forms of perception and discourse.  Moreover, these interpretations have been 
challenged by the social model of disability and by disabled people who become 
knowledgeable about their own conditions (Jessop, 1996) and develop 
‘sophisticated’ relationships with healthcare professionals (Watson, 2003).   So the 
questions that need to be explored here include the following: to what extent do 
biomedical interpretations of the impaired body influence disabled people’s 
embodiment and self worth?  How have these interpretations emerged?  What control 
do they exert over disabled people individually and collectively?
The structure of this chapter is as follows.  It will begin with a brief overview of 
biomedicine and sociological criticism of it, particularly that criticism which 
highlights the disembodied nature of biomedicine.  The second part of the chapter 
will explore the interpretations of impairment embedded within biomedicine and 
which are inexorably related to its normative and normalising tendencies.  In the 
final section of this chapter, I will consider the implications of biomedicine’s 
interpretations of impairment on disabled people’s sense of their bodies.
Overview of Biomedicine 
Biomedicine is the model of medicine which describes the key characteristics of the 
medical knowledge and practice which operates in the Western world.  Like most 
models, the biomedical one is an oversimplification of that which it seeks to explain.  
It is a ‘heuristic device’ that provides ‘a way of thinking about the truth’ rather than 
the truth itself which may or may not exist’ (Scully, 2002:51/2).   As such it has been 
thoroughly critiqued by Medical Sociologists.  They have highlighted the ways in 
which medical practice deviated from the biomedical model (Williams, 2003), 
challenged the taken-for-grantedness of medical knowledge (Bury, 1986) and, 
through the work of Foucault and those inspired by him, examined the close 
‘relationship between…medical discourse and the exercise of power’ (Turner,
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1995:10) enacted through the body.  What I want to do now is outline the main 
characteristics of biomedicine and discuss the criticisms made of it.  
Biomedicine is based upon ‘the principle of rationalism’ (Barker, 1998:1072) and 
more particularly, on knowledge derived through the use of scientific principles and 
methods (Lupton, 2006). This has provided biomedicine with a veneer of legitimacy 
and neutrality and has bestowed upon doctors a cultural authority.  Indeed, GP Dr. 
Tudor Hart (1988) has argued that the scientific roots of medicine are sometimes 
exaggerated in order to enhance doctors’ professional standing. From this 
perspective, the body became an object, and illness understood less through the 
subjective embodied experiences of the individual and more through the medical 
gaze of the doctor.  Thus the ‘disease had become more important than the person 
who harboured it’ (Doyal, quoted in Lupton, 2006:91).  
Recently this epistemological privileging of medical knowledge has been challenged 
(Prior, 2003).  Current health policy encourages ‘patient involvement and partnership 
in matters of care and treatment’ (43).  Lay people have become more sceptical about 
the efficacy and accuracy of medical knowledge (Williams & Calan, 1996) and are 
now more likely to question doctors’ ‘motives and judgements’ (Cassell, 2004:16).  
However, as Prior (2003) argues, lay people and doctors have different forms of 
knowledge and expertise and therefore the expertise of one can rarely be substituted 
for that of the other.  Medical knowledge then is still authoritative, albeit that best 
practice now recommends that it should be tempered with respect and understanding 
for the patient’s view.
These challenges to the privileging of medical knowledge have also been reflected in 
more theoretical work, particularly those who write from the ‘umbrella’ of social 
constructionism (Shilling, 2003).  From this perspective, medical knowledge is 
‘constructed and contingent’ and its scientific and objective basis ‘held to be myths 
which serve to disguise the actual struggles and consequences that surround the 
production of legitimate knowledge’ (J. Watson, 2000:20). Thus medical knowledge 
is problematised and enquiry focuses upon revealing the ‘conditions of possibility’, 
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the preconditions and social forces from which medical knowledge emerges (Bury,
1986:145/6).
Another feature of biomedicine is that it is rooted in the doctrine of specific aetiology 
(Williams, 2003).  This doctrine regards all diseases as biological abnormalities 
(Armstrong, 1994) which have a specific cause that can be identified and 
successfully treated through medical interventions (Turner, 2000).  The degree to 
which current medical practice conforms to the doctrine of specific aetiology has 
been challenged (see, for example, Cassell, 2004, Engel, 1977, Turner, 1995).  For 
example, Armstrong (1994) reported a study of people diagnosed with appendicitis 
who had an appendectomy.  Subsequent laboratory tests found that only in 50% of 
cases did the removed appendix show signs of disease.  This indicates that symptoms 
do not always correlate with underlying pathology and symptoms may be explained 
by a combination of factors including the social, psychological or biographical.  Thus 
doctors do not act upon the basis of biological information alone. 
However, there is a paradox here.  On the one hand, biomedicine in general and the 
doctrine of specific aetiology in particular is predicated upon the Cartesian 
mind/body split (Lupton, 2006) and the metaphor of the machine is used to describe 
and understand the body (Synott, 1993).  Hence within biomedicine the body is 
‘radically materialist’ and the ‘mindful’ causation of somatic states is largely ignored
(Scheper-Hughes & Lock, 1987:8).  Indeed we lack the vocabulary to even talk about 
the mind-body relationship.  On the other hand, medical knowledge does not have 
direct access to the biological fact.  Rather its understanding of the biological is 
always mediated through the social and cultural.  More explicitly, in the post second 
world war era, there has been a shift from seeing the body as a machine towards an 
ecological approach to the body, whereby the sick man is seen as an energy system 
‘in which the balance of forces have been disturbed’ (Walker, quoted in Arney & 
Bergen, 1983:12).  In another development, Engel (1977) advanced a 
biopsychosocial model which would take into account psychological and social 
factors.   However, as Armstrong argued (1987), this model assumed that 
sociological and psychological disciplines would remain separate disciplines rather 
than being integrated into biomedicine.  It was also assumed that these disciplines 
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would be subservient to the needs of biomedicine.  What this paradox highlights is 
that biomedicine is not monolithic, and that medical practice is underpinned by a 
knot of social, biological and cultural factors although it may not always serve the 
medical profession to acknowledge this. 
This cursory overview of biomedicine suggests that it privileges the mind over the 
body, the objective over the subjective, the biological over the social.  This has come 
to be regarded as the taken-for-granted, naturalistic understanding of the body, one 
rooted in science and abstracted from individuals’ everyday lived body (Toombs,
1992).  Bolstered by medical knowledge, it is from these interpretations of the body 
that impairment has come to be understood in particular ways.  It is this that I will 
now explore.  
Impaired Body as Abnormal 
The antecedents of impairment usually begin with the individual sensing that ‘there 
is something wrong’ with the body. In keeping with biomedicine’s doctrine of 
specific aetiology, the aim of the diagnosis process isto establish an underlying 
cause, an abnormality, to explain what’s wrong.  There is an interesting question 
about the boundaries between impaired and non-impaired bodies.   Does the impaired 
body emerge from the subjective sense that ‘something is wrong with the body’, 
from the biomedical process of objectifying the body to the point where a diagnostic 
label is attached to it, or from a mixture of the two?  There is also a question here 
about the role and significance of biomedicine in establishing these boundaries.  Is it 
the case, as Thomson (1997) argues, that ‘the concept of disability unites a highly 
marked, heterogeneous collection of embodiments whose only commonality is being 
considered abnormal’ (283)?  Given that it is, as we shall see, through biomedical 
knowledge that bodies are ‘considered abnormal’ the question becomes to what 
extent is it possible to interpret the impaired body outwith biomedicine?  What are 
the implications of this?
These are questions which need to be borne in mind here as we move on to consider 
how abnormality is understood in a medical context and what its relationship is with 
impairment.  Normal, abnormal and pathological can all be regarded as foundational 
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concepts of biomedicine (Trnka, 2003) and medical practice is concerned with 
diagnosing disease by assessing how a particular individual compares with a given 
norm.  There are, however, many different meanings of these concepts in 
biomedicine and they are applied in different ways to different disease processes.
In the context of impairment, Scully (2002) argues that ‘in medical practice, the 
problematic of “normality” has been reduced to agreeing on the magnitude of 
deviation from certain numerical “normal” ranges outside of which a person should 
be considered ill or disabled’. Thus ‘abnormality is defined in terms of deviation 
from the normal state (italics in the original, 49).   Here Scully is referring to normal 
in its statistical sense of a description of the distribution of a particular trait in a 
specified population.  The abnormal can only exist in opposition to the normal 
(Hughes, 2000).  
Scully goes on to make clear that the concepts of normality and abnormality used 
here ‘are not delivered in an unmediated form from biology’.  Rather, they are 
‘interpreted through existing understandings of the body in accordance with cultural 
standards’ (48).  In part, these understandings are always contingent upon the current 
state of biomedical knowledge and technology.  What is normal (and thus abnormal), 
Scully argues, reflects the availability of diagnostic tools to reveal bodily 
physiological and biochemical attributes and processes, together with the technical 
ability ‘to quantify’ them (49).  So what constitutes a biological abnormality, and 
hence a disease or impairment, is not somehow natural or given – although it may be 
experienced as such – but shifts over time.  The possible ways of interpreting bodily 
happenings changes and expands as medicine develops.  Scully illustrates this by 
highlighting the fact that hip fractures and spinal deformities, which used to be 
considered a normal part of the ageing process, are now classified as the disease 
osteoporosis (49).  So as medicine expands its jurisdiction to include more and more 
parts of the life course – birth, pregnancy, ageing – what was once considered normal 
is no longer so.
There is a further sense in which concepts of biological norms are interpreted 
through culture.  Scully hints at it when, in the passage quoted above, she refers to 
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normality being ‘reduced to agreeing on the magnitude of deviation… outside of 
which a person should be considered ill or disabled’.  Having obtained a statistical 
norm for a particular human trait or function, a judgement has to be made concerning 
the degree of deviation from the norm which marks the dividing line between the 
normal and abnormal. Such judgements, Armstrong (1987) argues, are made on the 
basis of whether an abnormality interferes with ‘proper functioning’. In other words, 
impairment is not coterminous with abnormality; there are many abnormalities that 
do not result in impairment.  Nor is impairment wholly biological because what 
constitutes ‘proper functioning’ is determined socially in terms of what is expected 
of individuals in a particular society at a particular moment in time.  Therefore, ‘the 
notion of abnormality embedded in disease is not the statistical but the social or 
ideal’ (1215).   To illustrate this with an example relevant to impairment, an 
abnormality which interferes with the ability to read will only be seen as such in 
societies that place a high value on literacy.
It is here then that we begin to see that biomedicine is normative: inherent in its 
foundational concepts of normal and abnormal are ideas about how bodies should be 
and the values attributed to those which are Other.  This point can be demonstrated 
by drawing upon Canguilhem’s (1989) historical study of the relationship between 
the normal and pathological within biomedicine.  His main thesis was that there is no 
objective, scientific way of determining ‘the normal’, so a ‘biological science of the 
normal’ is not possible. Rather, Canguilhem sought to show ‘that the pathological 
state is not a simple, quantitatively varied extension to the physiological state, but 
something else entirely’ (89).  In other words, there is no simple relationship between 
changes in the physiological or biochemical processes of the human body and the 
presence of disease.  
Tiles (1993), following Canguilhem, argues that values are inherent within medical 
knowledge itself.  This is so because such knowledge contains an assumption that 
physical health can be defined ‘in purely physicalist, physiological terms via the 
distinction between the normal and the pathology (normal is healthy) without a whiff 
of teleology,’ (731).  In other words, health has been equated with normal 
functioning of the physiological body, without mention that normality and/or health 
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are aspirations about what is good for human kind.   Ultimately, Tiles argues, 
perceiving health in terms of normality collapses the two concepts of the normal 
found in modern medicine: that is the average or statistical norm of physiological 
function and the normative activity of therapeutics which seeks to restore the 
statistical norm.  The statistical norm which describes what is, becomes the aim of 
therapeutic medicine via the normative which indicates what should be.  Crawford 
(1994) makes a very similar argument to Tiles and it is perhaps worth quoting here 
for the purpose of clarification:
‘When the body became an abstracted entity, identical to all other bodies, 
detached from living situations, health became a concept for describing its 
normal state. The description became the goal: the restoration or maintaining 
of normal functioning’ (1350). 
Thus impairment is not only a statistical abnormality but also a pathological 
phenomenon which needs to be normalised via therapeutic medicine – see below.  
Thus ‘through diagnosis, it is possible to determine how deviant one’s body is from 
the norm, and the degree of good and bad health can then be decided from this 
assessment’ (Mercer, cited in Tighe, 2001:512).
One point which emerges from the above analysis is the complexity which surrounds 
the use of the terms norm, normal and abnormal in biomedicine. Yet this complexity 
is not usually conveyed in medical discourse, still less in medical encounters.  Of 
course, this may be done from the best of motives: providing information in 
accessible form.  However, it can also be reductive, which is another characteristic of 
biomedicine which often has negative implications for the understanding of 
impairment.
This can be illustrated by examples drawn from debates about prenatal diagnosis.  In 
Shakespeare’s (1999) review of medical journals and textbooks, the language used to 
describe an unborn child at risk of genetic disease was negative and value laden.  For 
example, reference was made to ‘the burden of an affected child’, and that the 
discovery that a foetus has an abnormality is ‘always devastating for parents’ (673).  
What is particularly noteworthy about the last example is the very idea of the child 
having an abnormality is portrayed as devastating, regardless of what the 
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abnormality was and its possible implications for daily life.  Abnormality becomes a 
value judgement, inextricably linked to all that is negative and tragic – and totally 
disembodied.  Impairment is eclipsed by abnormality and abnormality itself becomes 
‘devastating’.  Yet ultimately, at a biological level, it is nonsensical to think that 
there can be a foetus without an abnormality.  Every human body is unique and, as 
we saw above, each contains many different processes and features which maybe 
abnormal at any given moment.  This diversity is an evolutionary necessity.
Here then we see another instance of biology being mediated by the social, as we 
saw Scully argue above.  In the process, the medical profession constructs a ‘story’ 
about impairment and abnormality.  The notion of a story here comes from 
Lippman’s (1992) paper on ‘geneticization’, which is also concerned with the effects 
of biomedicine’s reductionism.  She argues that advocates of the project to map the 
human genome tell stories.  The main theme of these stories is that the project ‘will 
relieve human suffering and improve human reproduction by greatly increasing 
physicians’ ability to diagnose, treat and predict disease’ (1469). They are told as if 
they represent objective reality.  However, like all stories, they are but one of many 
different ways of interpreting reality.  Lippman goes on to argue that in these stories,
where genetics is used to predict a susceptibility to a condition, emphasis is placed 
on preventing the condition occurring through individual behaviour change, rather 
than by dealing with the environmental or social factors which may trigger it.
Following Lippman, it can be argued that in the context of prenatal diagnosis a story 
is woven about the seemingly inevitability of the tragedy surrounding disability and 
impairment.  What gets omitted is any sense of the future personhood of the foetus 
and that social and economic factors will influence its quality of life as much as it 
biological make-up.  Further, prenatal testing and selective termination may be 
offered on the basis of a woman’s right to choose, abstracted from the social and 
economic factors which constrain that choice (Bailey, 1996).
So far, I have sought to establish that the terms normal and abnormal are 
foundational concepts of biomedicine.  However, their meaning silently shifts from 
the statistical to the normative, from describing what is to prescribing what should 
72
be.  Further, in the medical context, the concept of abnormality often replaces 
impairment and is negative and value laden.  Although medical knowledge is 
grounded in biology, it is mediated through the social and cultural.  Thus it leads to 
stories or discourses surrounding impairment – amongst other things – that are partial 
but authoritative and influential as a result of their scientific veneer. 
Impaired Body in Need of Fixing
Having perceived the impaired body as abnormal, it then becomes an object to be 
fixed, controlled or normalised.  Once a diagnosis is made the hope by all concerned
is that treatment and recovery will follow.  Impairment, however, fractures this hope: 
by definition it cannot be fixed.  Instead the impaired body becomes ‘the object of 
medical supervision’ (De Swaan, 1990:65) to be controlled, managed, researched, 
normalised and regulated.  There is, it seems, a diverse range of social and political 
forces which exert pressure to change the impaired body, to make it something other 
than it is.  These forces operate and are expressed through and within biomedicine 
and outwith it, as I will now explore.  However, for the sake of convenience, the 
debate about normalising treatment will be discussed in the next chapter as an 
example of medicalisation. 
While medical knowledge may be based on scientific principles, medical practice is 
essentially pragmatic: an art conducted in the clinical arena which involves the 
doctor’s use of skills and techniques to restore the norm in the patient in front of him 
(Canguilhem, 1989, Cassell, 2004).  It is through the ministrations of the doctor that
the bodies of patients are judged against the generalities and norms of medical 
knowledge and its strictures are then imposed upon the body.  This desire to fix and 
normalise both reinforces and is reinforced by the ‘modernist faith in the ability of 
reason and rationality to drive continued technological and social advancement’ 
(Scully, 2002:51, see also Thomas, 2007).   As this advancement continues, the 
‘possibility of fixing renders inescapable the question of whether or not to fix’ 
(Frank, 2006:68).  This question of whether to fix is also mirrored and reinforced by 
broader social forces which incline people to seek medical fixing.  These include the 
body being viewed as a project (Shilling, 2003), something which is no longer ‘God 
given’ but which is malleable and can be shaped (Frank, 2006).  . 
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A more specific study of the medical power to control and normalise the impaired 
body is provided by Disability Studies scholars Sullivan (2005) and Reeve (2002) 
who draw upon Foucault.  Foucault’s work is particularly apposite in understanding 
control of the body because one of his main concerns is the body and the institutions 
– of which medicine is a significant one - that shape it (Shilling, 2003).  This shaping 
occurs through the exercise of biopower, a subtle mechanism to make a ‘docile body 
that may be subjected, used, transformed and improved’ (Foucault, quoted in, 
Rabinow, 1984:17, Gastaldo, 1997).   Of particular interest here is the concept of 
normalising technology, an aspect of biopower, which classifies and ‘controls the 
“anomalies” of the social body’ (Tremain, 2002:37) through ‘the power to qualify, 
measure, appraise, and hierarchize… it effects distribution around the norm’ 
(Foucault quoted in Tremain, 2002:36).  
An example of a normalising technology relevant to disability is rehabilitation.  This 
involves first the identification of an anomaly, an impaired body adjudged by the 
medical or related profession to be in need of rehabilitation, second the spatial 
placing of the anomaly, that is arranging for the disabled person to be placed in a 
rehabilitation facility, and thirdly, the anomaly undergoing ‘therapeutic or corrective’ 
(Tremain, 2002:37) treatment such as physiotherapy or occupational therapy.  
Particularly when broken down into these three components, it becomes clear that 
many of the processes that disabled people have to go through in everyday life to get 
the support they need, from completing a welfare benefit form to getting a piece of 
disability related support or equipment, are forms of normalising technology.  This 
technology is a form of bureaucratic, constraining – Foucault calls it disciplinary –
power underpinned by medical interpretations of the impaired body.  The operation 
and effect of this power, which in enacted rather than possessed (Mills, 2006), is 
often obscured because it operates through self surveillance.  This means that the 
outcome of disciplinary power ‘seems for all intents and purposes to be expressive of 
a subject’s personal desires and individuality’ (Tremain, 2002:37).  The final point 
here is that normalising technology doesn’t make the anomaly normal but makes the 
individual able to live within ‘the band that binds the [statistical] normal centre with 
the boundary zones that must not break’ (Waldschmidt, 2005:196).  In other words, 
the abnormal, disabled people may be geographically placed within society but their 
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presence is rendered  invisible or ‘effaced’ (Stiker, 1999:131) because social and 
environmental structures do not incorporate their needs.
Having considered Foucauldian conceptual tools, I will now look at how they have 
been used to analyse the role of biomedicine in controlling the impaired body.  The 
first example I will look at is Sullivan’s (2005) empirical study of rehabilitation of 
people with spinal injuries in New Zealand.  This manages to capture the 
ambivalence of the rehabilitation process: it entails medical control of the impaired 
body but it without this control disabled people’s quality of life is likely to be 
significantly compromised.  This ambivalence towards medical intervention designed 
to optimise function was seldom acknowledged within the early days of Disability 
Studies (see, for example, Finkelstein, 1980, Oliver, 1990a but see also chapter four).
Sullivan goes on to argue that, when paralysed, the body becomes an object of 
medical power which is ‘subjected to intense diagnosis, classification, monitoring, 
and discipline in order to render [it] knowable and productive’ (30). In effect, 
individuals lose possession of their body ‘in terms of knowledge and control’ (31).  
For example, when repositioned on the bed, one research participant reported 
querying whether she was in the correct position because it was causing pain.  In 
response the nurse said ‘how would you know? You’ve just arrived here’ (32).   In 
other words, the participant’s experiential knowledge was totally dismissed and her 
pain ignored.  Alas controlling doesn’t necessarily mean caring.  When it came to 
setting the goals of their rehabilitation, participants felt they were just slotted in to a 
pre-existing programme based upon textbook explanations of what an idealized 
person with a certain type and level of injury should be able to achieve.  Thus one 
participant commented ‘It’s like they are trying to turn you into a cripple’ (35). 
Hence Sullivan argues that disciplinary power not only controls the body but also 
influences subjectivity. The body and what is done to it shapes identity although not 
in a deterministic way because the self is ‘fragmented into antagonistic sites of 
power’ (Haber, quoted in Sullivan, 2005:31).  These different sites make different 
subject positions possible, that is they allow for the subject to have a number of 
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identities. This in turn enables individuals to resist normalisation by moving between 
different identities.   
One final point Sullivan makes is that the healthcare professionals prescribed and 
taught the techniques participants were to use to manage their own bodies for the rest 
of their lives.  In doing so, on the one hand healthcare professionals retained control 
over participants’ bodies outwith hospital, while on the other making participants 
responsible and accountable for their well-being notwithstanding the medical 
complications of living through a spinally injured body.  Reeve (2002) takes up this 
point by exploring the psycho-emotional effects of self surveillance or what Foucault 
(1988), in his later work, called technologies of self.  Such surveillance occurs where 
‘people develop an awareness of how they are seen through the gaze of another and 
then modify their behaviour via self surveillance to attempt to make themselves 
acceptable’ (500).  Reeve recognises that self surveillance can facilitate personal 
autonomy yet also highlights its emotional cost by drawing upon her experience:
‘non-disabled people who criticise my failure to adhere to apparently simple 
self surveillance tasks fail to appreciate the emotional costs of having to carry 
out tasks they do not have to do themselves.  These tasks are yet another 
reminder of my ‘abnormality’, and I am held responsible for failing to contain 
and render invisible that difference from the norm’ (500).
There are several points that can be drawn from this.  First it is notable how doctors 
transfer the responsibility for routine management of the impaired body to the 
individual at the same time as remaining in control over this body.  Control is 
maintained both through teaching self care techniques sanctioned by medicine and 
making the individual accountable to healthcare professionals to ensure the ‘correct’ 
techniques are followed.  Through these processes judgements are made about her 
moral worth.  Second, in part self surveillance has to be done to protect the 
sensibilities of others so that the demands and particularities of the impaired body are 
‘rendered invisible’.  At the same time, Reeve is forced to become aware of her 
abnormality, to adopt a biomedical interpretation of her body so as to normalise 
herself to others.  Third, from Reeve’s emphasis it is clearly significant that it is non-
disabled others who impose upon her the necessity for self surveillance.  This 
imposition occurs with little empathy for the embodied experience of impairment 
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including that of having one’s routine body tasks subject to professional instruction 
and scrutiny.  
Shildrick & Price (1998) link biomedicine’s attempts to control and regulate the 
impaired body to political and social purposes.  They suggest that in modernity, the 
body ‘must appear invulnerable, predictable and consistent in form and function’ 
because peculiarity threatens paradigms of sameness and difference on ‘which 
western epistemology, ontology and ethics are founded’.  The impaired body is one 
such peculiarity. Hence they argue that treatment decisions ‘are all acts or omissions 
serving to continually reinforce and re-create medical notions of disabled and [sic] 
ablebodied’ (227).  In doing so, predictable, uniform bodies are positively valued.     
One of the implications of Shildrick and Price’s argument here is that the categories 
disabled / non disabled are not fixed but fluid.  Hence it is always difficult to pin 
down the nature of disability.  
What is not clear here is the extent to which this reinforcement of the disabled/non-
disabled binary is intentional on the part of the medical profession or individual 
healthcare professionals. There also appears to be an assumption here that medical 
practice divides people into the binary categories of disabled/non-disabled.   But it is 
not clear that this is the case within the clinical arena.  Medical practice identifies 
abnormalities and then classifies those into disease categories which are not readily 
divisible into the disabled/non-disabled dichotomy.  This is because such categories 
do not indicate the severity of the disease or whether it signifies impairment or 
disability.  Arguably it is through doctors’ roles as gatekeepers to welfare services 
that they are required to pronounce someone as disabled or not (see chapter four).
Impaired Body as Symbolic Failure
Disabled feminist Wendell (2003) argues that if the raison d’etre of biomedicine is to 
fix broken bodies, disabled people become its symbolic failure.  Ultimately, the 
desire to fix gives rise to a cultural myth that the body can be controlled.  This is 
reinforced by ‘a strong tendency in scientific medicine to pretend that the myth of 
control is the truth’ (94).  Disabled people shatter this myth because, as Wendell 
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points out, those with chronic illness or impairments that cannot be cured come to
‘symbolize the failure of medicine…to control nature’ 3(Wendell, 2003:96).  This 
symbolism seems to operate in a number of contexts.  One of these contexts is the 
organisation and funding priorities of the health service.  Acute care is usually better 
resourced than care of those with long term chronic illnesses or impairments.  
Further, the former is usually held in a high esteem because it involves ‘cutting edge’ 
medicine and the necessary heroics of life saving.  By contrast the latter are regarded 
as ‘low-prestige care’ and are often referred – or ‘dumped’ as Illich (1990:123) puts 
it - to health care professionals lower down the medical hierarchy.  Further services 
specifically targeted at disabled people, such as the wheelchair service or 
rehabilitation wards may be under funded and geographically marginalised within 
hospital or community premises.
Disabled people may also be a symbol of the failure of healthcare professionals, 
particularly where they are unable to alleviate bodily suffering (Frank, 2002).  In this 
context, biomedicine’s perception of impairment or incurable illness is that presents 
something of an embarrassment, appearing to be in need of medical attention and yet
professionals have little to offer by way of treatment.  Disabled people may 
experience this in terms of the medical profession being ‘disinterested, and are 
disappointed if it [i.e. the medical profession] does not provide advice and support’ 
(Harrison, 1993:212).  For some disabled people, this results in feelings of isolation, 
of being abandoned to manage their impairment alone.
Impaired Body as Indicator of Quality of Life  
A further way that the impaired body has been interpreted by biomedicine is as 
having less value than the non impaired body.  This interpretation can be linked to 
                                     
3 Wendell’s evocation of nature is interesting here.  Although probably unintentional, 
it suggests that the impaired body is somehow against nature, that biomedicine’s role 
is to control and correct nature’s ‘mistakes’.  The implication then is that the 
impaired body is unnatural as well as abnormal.  It seems as wherever the impaired 
body is, it is rejected.
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the normative drive of medicine where upon the abnormal or impaired body becomes 
devalued and inferior to ‘the normal body’.  As Canguilhem (1989) put it ‘normal is 
polemical because it devalues what does not fall under its auspices’ (239).   As I will 
explore below, one of the ways in which this devaluation manifests itself is through 
the use of quality of life judgements.   Such judgements are made both quantitatively 
through the use of instruments designed to measure quality of life and qualitatively 
when healthcare professionals invoke quality of life as a factor to be considered in 
clinical decision making.
Quality of life debates first surfaced in the 1970s as a basis for rationing access to 
medical intervention.  They were prompted by advances in medical technology 
which could sustain ‘mere biological life’ almost indefinitely but such life often did 
not have capacity for consciousness (Wasserman, Bickenbach & Wachbroit, 2005). 
Having made ‘mere biological life’ possible, the medical establishment then began 
questioning whether such life had sufficient quality to make it worth living.  In 
particular, there have been ethical discussions as to the circumstances in which 
illness, incapacity or impairment makes quality of life so poor that life saving or life 
prolonging medical interventions should be withheld or withdrawn in the full 
knowledge that the outcome will be death.. Similar debates have also taken place 
about the ethics of prenatal diagnosis, including genetic testing and the use of new 
reproductive technologies.  In the recent past, doctors were ‘relatively free’ to decide 
upon and then withhold or withdraw treatment.  Now, however, with the ‘growing 
emphasis on the right of patients to play a key role in such decision-making’ that 
freedom has been circumscribed (Riddell, Pearson & Watson, 2000:42).
Quality of life judgements have been problematised within Disability Studies.  The 
key issue has been that non-disabled people, especially doctors, have a tendency to 
assume impairment necessarily leads to an impoverished quality of life.  This 
tendency has been attributed to a number of factors including: prejudice against 
disabled people (Campbell, quoted in Disability Rights Commission, 2004, Morris,
1991); fears that disability is a ‘fate worse than death’ (Shakespeare, 2006:118) and a 
personal tragedy (Reindal, 2000).  Further it has been noted that some health 
professionals disbelief that disabled people are able to pursue ‘life plans they find 
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satisfying’ (Ashe, quoted in Miller, 2006:220). There is, therefore, a huge 
discrepancy between how disabled people assess their own quality of life and how 
healthcare professional assess it.  This has been dubbed the ‘disability paradox’ 
(Albrecht & Devlieger, 1999).
Disability Paradox
One of the ways in which biomedicine expresses its devaluation of disabled people is 
through quality of life judgements.  This has been implicitly challenged by the 
disability paradox, whereby disabled people report ‘that they experience a good or 
excellent quality of life when to most external observers these people seem to live an 
undesirable daily existence’ (Albrecht & Devlieger, 1999:977).   As we saw in 
chapter two, Albrecht & Devlieger accounted for this discrepancy through balance 
theory ‘where the experience of well-being and life satisfaction is contingent on the 
person’s achieving balance between body, mind, and spirit’ (978).  This suggests that 
disabled people’s quality of life is not determined by either (or both) impairment or 
disability alone but also by personal resources and general outlook on life.  This is 
something which appears to have been overlooked not just by the medical profession 
but also by many commentators involved in bioethical debates about beginning/end 
of life decisions. 
This is the case for Brock (2005), who offers an alternative view of the disability 
paradox when justifying prenatal diagnosis and selective termination. He suggests 
that while some people do adjust and accommodate disability, this is not the case for 
others.  However this appears to be an assumption as he does not provide any 
evidence to make this point.  This is somewhat surprising given, as we have seen, 
that it is precisely this assumption that disabled people have highlighted as 
problematic.  Nevertheless Brock goes on to argue that because it can be predicted 
(before birth) that some disabled people will experience a reduced quality of life, 
policies aimed at preventing disability can be justified on this basis.  What this seems 
to overlook is that prenatal diagnosis cannot usually distinguish between those 
impaired fetuses which would, if born, have a good quality of life and which would 
not.  Therefore Brock’s argument here suggests that an impaired foetus that has the 
potential to have a good quality of life is ‘collateral damage’ for those impaired
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fetuses that potentially would have a poor quality of life.  In part this is so because 
there appears to have been little attempt to isolate which factors tip the balance 
between a good or poor quality of life or whether such factors can be identified 
before birth.  Further, for any condition diagnosed before birth, it is rarely possible to 
predict the severity of the condition and how it would affect any individual. 
As an aside here, it is interesting to note that some disability activists, for example 
Morris (1991), argue that there are some conditions where selective termination is 
justified, for example, Tay Sachs which reduces life expectancy to 5 years or Lesch-
Nyhan which causes a compulsive tendency to bite off one’s own fingers.  
Shakespeare (1998) made a similar argument saying that because different 
impairments have different effects a nuanced approach was needed which recognised 
that it was acceptable to test for some impairments and not others.  More recently, 
however, Shakespeare (2006) has said such an approach makes the disability rights 
argument against prenatal diagnosis inconsistent.   While that may be true, it is
nonetheless an attempt to engage with the quality of life debate rather than the,
perhaps easier to defend, position of being against all forms of prenatal diagnosis.  
However, more thinking is needed to try and draw out the criteria which make 
prenatal diagnosis justified for some conditions and not for others.
Brock’s second justification of prenatal diagnosis is that the process of adapting to 
and living with disability is ‘burdensome’ even if it is ultimately successful.  Thus, 
he goes on, this burden should be avoided where possible.  Perhaps this argument is a 
response to the criticism that quality of life measurements fail to take into account 
the process of adapting to the onset of impairment (Menzel et al, 2002).   During the 
process people may experience grief, loss and the sheer day to day difficulty of 
impaired embodiment in a disabling society.  However, there comes a point, as 
Albrecht & Devlieger’s research indicated (see above), where impairment becomes 
incorporated within a new outlook on life.   While Brock acknowledges the 
adaptation process, he suggests it should be avoided at all costs.  But this seems to 
ignore the moral distinction between different types of impairment prevention 
programmes mentioned above, that is, those which prevent an impairment from 
occurring and those that involve eliminating a potential life because it has an 
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impairment.  It makes great sense to prevent impairment occurring in order to avoid 
the burden of adapting to impairment.  However, this becomes less clear cut when 
prevention is only possible through selective termination.  There are many events 
during life which can be burdensome, for example, child bearing or the death of a 
loved one.  Yet saying that a life event is burdensome is not the same thing as saying 
that one does not want to live because of that burden (Silvers, 2005).
A third reason Brock gives for discounting disabled people’s own assessment of 
their quality of life is that he argues quality of life isn’t entirely a subjective matter.  
Amundson (2005) questions this by asking what ignorance burdens disabled people 
to such an extent that their assessment of quality of life is flawed.  By the same 
token, what enables the ‘non-disabled majority’ to avoid this ignorance and make 
accurate quality of life judgements (112).  In other words, why is a non-disabled
person’s judgement of a disabled person’s quality of life more reliable than that of a 
disabled person? Brock would probably answer that the non-disabled person’s 
judgement is objective.   Any objective judgement would, Brock suggests, need to 
recognise that ‘there are activities, and accomplishments  and personal relations that 
actually make up what could be called the objective content of [the] life’ (69).  The 
implication here is as if disabled people have a sort of ‘false consciousness’, which 
means they do not realise that their quality of life is poor.   If, for the sake of 
argument, this is accepted, where quality of life judgements are used to assess the 
value of a medical intervention for a disabled person, surely this false consciousness 
doesn’t matter because the disabled person is satisfied with the quality of life 
achieved.
However, the work of Menzel et al (2002) highlights a further complexity here. 
They explore the implications the process of adjusting to disability has on quality of 
life judgements.  This process contributes to understanding the disability paradox, the 
discrepancy between non-disabled and disabled people’s assessment of a disabled 
person’s quality of life.  When a non-disabled person makes a judgement about a 
disabled person’s quality of life she has no way of taking into account that her own 
attitude towards having an impairment may change if they actually had an 
impairment.  In other words, the non-disabled person’s judgement includes fears 
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about having an impairment rather than – or in addition to – the reality of living with 
an impairment.  Thus ‘the adapted patient is in a privileged position ‘‘in regard to 
facts about the experience of having her disability’’’ (Menzel et al, 2002:2153).  
But ultimately Menzel et al reject using this privileged position to inform quality of 
life measures.  This may feel counter intuitive.  Yet to do so would result in 
discrimination against disabled people.  This is the case because an ‘adjusted’ 
disabled person may make fewer gains from health services than an ‘unadjusted’ 
disabled person.  As the allocation of health resources using quality of life 
judgements are based upon maximising health gain, an ‘adjusted’ person would have
a low health gain and thus would be allocated fewer health resources.  This would 
penalise all those who made a ‘laudable effort’ to adjust.  This, the authors argue, 
would be unjust and so they conclude that ‘laudable effort plays an important role in 
creating and sustaining genuine moral doubts about the use of adaptation-shaped 
values’ (2156) in quality of life measures.
The arguments above highlight the fraught nature of quality of life judgements, 
something borne out in attempts to formulate policy and practice based on such 
judgements.   A piece of Scottish-based research looked at the policy and use of 
placing ‘Do Not Attempt Resuscitation’ (DNAR) notices on the medical records of 
disabled people.  The research included analysis of relevant policy documents from 
Hospital Trusts and Health Boards.  While around half of these indicated that quality 
of life was key to deciding ‘whether CPR should be administered’ there was ‘a lack 
of clarity as to the areas covered by the term’.   This was recognised by the small 
number of consultants interviewed as part of the research.  They also acknowledged 
that quality of life judgments were highly subjective and ‘open to different 
interpretation by different doctors’ (Riddell, Pearson & Watson, 2000).
Conclusion
In this chapter I have sought to consider the various ways in which medical 
knowledge and practice has interpreted impaired bodies.  These suggest that the 
impaired body is wholly negative and a key determinant of a (poor) quality of life.  
One of the questions this raises is whether these interpretations influence disabled 
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people’s sense of embodiment, a question that I will explore through my data 
analysis in chapter eight.  Similarly, the chapter which follows the present one will 
look at medicalisation to illustrate the extent to which biomedical understandings of 
impairment have influenced both the spatial placing of disabled people in the 
physical and social environment and access to social and economic resources.
Here, however, it is perhaps useful to note that the expanding literature of sociology 
of the body has begun to explore the relations between embodiment and biomedical 
knowledge.  For example, Shilling (2003) has argued that the ‘social meanings which 
are attached to particular bodily forms and performances tend to become internalised 
and exert a powerful influence on an individual’s sense of self and feelings of inner 
worth’ (73).  Given that many of the social meanings attached to the impaired body 
have biomedical roots, it is tempting to speculate that disabled people’s sense of self 
and embodiment are to some extent shaped both by biomedical discourses or 
narratives about the impaired body and individual medical encounters.
However, one has to be careful here and allow for the possibility that some may 
resist biomedical interpretations of the impaired body.  For example, Williams & 
Bendelow’s (1998) study of people with various types of arthritis explored how 
impairment influenced feelings about body.  One of their findings was that doctors’ 
and patients’ had different bodily concerns: the former tended to focus on 
‘management of bodily manifestations of disease’ such as pain whereas the latter 
were primarily concerned with ‘body perception and feelings’ (137).   Similarly, 
Cunningham-Burley & Backett-Milburn (1998) point out that knowing about the 
body ‘may not affect how one feels’ about it (157).  
There are also signs suggesting that disabled people actively resist biomedical 
interpretations of their bodies both at the level of medical encounters and discourse.  
For example, the husband of an activist placed a photograph of his wife receiving her 
doctorate in a prominent position on her hospital bed.  This was to remind healthcare 
professionals that ‘she had everything to live for’ after a consultant had said ‘[i]f you 
go into respiratory failure - and it's looking likely - then I’m sure you won’t want to 
be anywhere near a ventilator’ (Campbell, 2004).
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At the level of discourse, disabled people both within Disability Studies and beyond 
have, as was seen above, been sharply critical of doctors’ quality of life judgements 
in the context of beginning/end of life decisions.   This has added significance when 
the reluctance of disabled people to engage with health related issues is recalled (see 
chapter one).  The bioethical sphere seems to be the one exception to this.  This 
could be seen as ironic insofar as it is the one sphere where the number of disabled 
people having direct personal experience of the procedures involved is likely to be 
smallest.  Yet the point of connection is the experience of invalidation and prejudice.  
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CHAPTER 4
Medicalisation, Disability and Impairment 
Introduction 
This chapter is about the medicalisation of disability and impairment.  It will 
consider how biomedicine’s interpretations of the impaired body, explored in the last 
chapter, have permeated social and cultural relationships and shaped social responses 
to disability.  These responses have often been constraining, restricting the social 
spaces where the impaired body can be, the powers to which it routinely has to 
submit and how its very fleshiness has been gazed at, touched and surgically shaped.   
This will be demonstrated by tracing the roots of the process of medicalising 
disability and exploring the implications of one form of medicalisation - healthcare 
professionals acting as gate keepers to a range of welfare and social resources on 
which disabled people have to rely.  Finally, debates about what has been dubbed
normalising treatment will be considered.  To put all this in context, an overview of
Medical Sociology’s debates about medicalisation will be given.
Overview of Medicalisation Debate
The medicalisation thesis emerged in the early 1970s as a sociological critique of the 
role of biomedicine in capitalist society. One of its core concerns was that ‘more and 
more of everyday life [was] coming under medical dominion, influence and 
supervision’ (Zola, 1983:295).  This was regarded as ‘a troubling phenomenon’
(Zola, 1991) because it expanded the range of bodily states and behaviours defined
and diagnosed as illness.  Then cultural forces dictated that these illnesses needed to 
be explained, treated and managed through the application of biomedical knowledge.  
There can be undoubted benefits to this process, particularly at the level of doctor –
patient interaction: for example, more women were able to access pain relief during 
childbirth as pregnancy became increasingly medicalised (Kohler Riessman, 1993).  
But it has also meant that common life events such as childbirth, death and disability 
become seen as a problem needing a technical and often a technological solution.  
Thus Zola (1991) argues that medicalisation can be dehumanising, that what 
previously was done to the body by a lay person, is now done by an expert or a 
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machine.  This raises the fear that increasing medicalisation may undermine people’s 
ability to care for themselves and result in life becoming a ‘pilgrimage through 
check-ups and clinics’ (Illich, 1990:87).
As biomedicine expands insidiously, its jurisdiction becomes a ‘major institution of 
social control’ (Zola, 1972:487).  For Zola, this means that medicine becomes ‘the 
repository of truth’ (487): as people once turned to religion, they now turn to 
medicine for moral guidance about what we do with our bodies and this guidance 
becomes technical and determined in the name of health.  A pertinent example of this 
is how legislators look to the medical profession for guidance when drawing up 
regulations on the time limits for selective termination following prenatal diagnosis.  
This guidance often focuses upon technical issues such as the stage in pregnancy 
when tests can be carried out rather than the morality of the process and its 
implications (Bailey, 1996).    
On a slightly different tack, Conrad & Schneider (1992) argue that medical 
institutions exercise social control as agents of the state.  They have the authority to 
identify and define ‘certain behaviours, persons and things’ (8) as problematic and to 
solve them by medical means.  This involves individualising and depoliticising social 
problems foreclosing the option of solving them through social intervention or 
political change.  Here the purpose of social control is to secure adherence to social 
norms specifically by using medical means to ‘minimize, eliminate or normalise 
deviant behaviour’ (242).   This understanding of medicine as social control 
resonates with one of the key criticisms made of the medicalisation of disability: that
it focuses upon individual solutions to disability rather than political ones which 
require the removal of disabling social barriers (Barnes, 2003).
Recently, one of the main criticisms of the medicalisation thesis is that it has failed to 
take into account the role of the patient (see, for example, Ballard & Elston, 2005, 
Broom & Woodward, 1996, Williams & Calan, 1996).  Within the early writings on 
medicalisation, patients tended to be ‘portrayed as victims of medicalisation’, 
helpless in the face of ever growing medical power (Broom & Woodward, 
1996:360).  This view is now regarded as inaccurate.  One reason for this is, as 
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Lupton (1997a) argues, since the 1970s lay people have adopted a more consumerist 
approach to health care.  They have also become more ‘sceptical of modern 
medicine’ (Williams & Calan, 1996:1611), more willing to challenge expert opinion
and more likely to be active participants in the doctor-patient relationship. This may 
be especially so for those disabled people who have to make frequent use of the 
NHS, and who become very skilled and sophisticated in establishing relationships 
with healthcare professionals (Watson, 2003) (see also chapter eight).  
None of this undermines the medicalisation thesis, but it does suggest that the 
behaviour of patients, the needs they articulate, the types of treatment they request, 
should be considered as one dynamic of medicalisation.  These needs and requests 
are influenced by the notion that health is a moral pursuit (Crawford, 2006). This is 
illustrated by recent increases in women’s requests for surgical reductions of labia 
(Liao & Creighton, 2007) and for fertility treatment (Becker, 1992).   However, one 
has to be careful about overstating the power of consumer demand because it is 
necessarily contingent upon the medical expertise and technology having been 
developed to deal with the problem in the first place. All this raises two questions.  In 
the early years of the debate, the term medicalisation was pejorative (Lupton, 1997b).  
Is it still a ‘bad thing’ or are there some situations where medicalisation is desirable
(Broom & Woodward 1996)?  The second question is whether this concept of 
medicalisation is still useful? In this regard, Lupton (1997b) has noted the growth of 
Foucauldian analysis which, while not framed within medicalisation, analyses similar 
territory to it, namely the way ‘individual lives are profoundly experienced and 
understood through the discourses and practices of medicine and its allied 
professions’ (94).  As we saw with Sullivan’s and Reeve’s work in the previous 
chapter, this type of analysis has been applied to aspects of disabled people’s 
healthcare experiences and offers a more finely grained analysis of the way micro 
power constructs disability in day to day life.  In particular, it recognises that the 
medicalisation of everyday experience, what Foucauldian’s would dub medical 
surveillance, does not only refer to face-to-face medical interactions ‘but also to the 
self-regulation individuals engage in because they internalize medicine’s gaze, they 
incorporate it into their understanding of their embodied selves and the world.’ 
(Lorentzen, 2008:53).  
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What emerges from this overview is that the phenomenon described as 
medicalisation is problematic.  Medicalisation is  “troubling” (Zola, 1991) because it 
increases medical jurisdiction over more and more areas of social life and operates as 
a form of social control through the labelling of more and more bodily states as 
medical problems.  This can sometimes have the effect of depoliticising social 
problems and reinforces the cultural authority of healthcare professionals as experts.  
Similarly, medicalisation as a conceptual or an analytic tool is problematic.  It 
provides no basis for evaluating whether medicalisation is desirable nor allows 
consideration of the role played by consumer or patient power in pushing for and/or 
resisting medicalisation.  Perhaps more fundamentally, it is often not clear how 
medicalisation relates to other social forces.  In the early work, the social forces 
implicated as the cause of medicalisation were the expansionist tendencies of the 
medical profession.  However, this is a view that is no longer sustained (Ballard & 
Elston, 2005), nor are healthcare professionals necessarily involved in all instances 
of medicalisation.  In short, the concept of medicalisation as both a social process 
and conceptual tool is somewhat amorphous, having different meanings at different 
moments of time and for different scholars.
Nonetheless, it is useful to review the Disability Studies’ literature on medicalisation 
because it is one of the ways in which it has critically engaged with the medical 
model of disability and its social and political ramifications.  In presenting this 
review I will use Conrad’s (1992) schema.  This posits that medicalisation occurs at 
three different levels of society, the conceptual, the institutional and interactional.  
This facilitates the analytic differentiation and identification of different instances of 
medicalisation and the relationships between them.  
Medicalisation at the Conceptual Level
Medicalisation as Ideological
Disability Studies’ scholars have used the concept of medicalisation to identify and 
challenge the deeply entrenched medicalised view of disability which underpins 
many of the social institutions that structure and regulate disabled people’s lives.  
This usage emanates from Oliver’s (1990a) heuristic model developed to link the 
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creation of disability through the capitalist mode of production (see chapter one) with 
the view that disability is a medical problem and a personal tragedy.  Oliver draws 
upon this model to analyse how the medicalisation of disability operates as an 
ideology or, in terms of Conrad’s schema, operates at the conceptual level.
Oliver’s (1990a) model posits that during the early stages of the industrial revolution, 
disabled people were excluded from the newly industrialised workplace and that this 
process was managed by the emerging medical profession.  This was facilitated by 
two historical forces from which the ideology of the medicalisation of disability 
emerged.  The first of these was developments in medical knowledge occurring in 
the second half of the 19th Century.  In particular, the development of “germ theory” 
meant that the immediate cause of diseases could be located within the human body.  
This underpinned the doctrine of specific aetiology and shifted the medical gaze 
away from the relationship between the patient and the environment, and towards the 
inner workings of the human body (Armstrong, 1983).  This was facilitated by the 
development of medical technology, such as the stethoscope, which gave doctors 
privileged access to the body (Oliver, 1990a, Stone, 1984), by-passing the subjective 
experience of the patient.   As we saw in the previous chapter, in this context 
impairment became interpreted as an abnormality requiring medical intervention and 
this reinforced impairment as a bodily problem.  
The second historical force from which the ideology of medicalisation emerged was
what Oliver (1990a) identifies as the core capitalist ideology of individualism.  He 
argues that “the individual” was an ideological construction necessary to legitimise 
the shift from the family as the unit of production in feudal times to the individual as 
the unit necessary for industrial production. At the same time
‘the rise of mechanised forms of production introduced productivity standards 
that assumed a ‘normal’ (that is to say, usually male and unimpaired) worker’s 
body and disabled all others’ (Gleeson, 1999:106).
So the individual or average worker was constructed as a body which quite literally 
fitted into the physical and temporal regimes of industry.  The category of “a 
disabled person” was created to account for and control one of the groups whose 
members who could not bodily conform to the needs of mechanised production.  
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Hence the impaired body was identified through the needs of capitalism.   In making 
this argument, Oliver also draws upon Foucault’s notion that the very idea of 
madness as an individual pathology was not possible without the notion of “sanity”.   
Thus disability, as with madness, was a ‘complex and non-intentional social product’ 
(Hirst & Woolley, 1982 quoted in Oliver, 1990a:46/7) that emerged as a result of 
capitalism’s need to define the individual worker.  
Combining these two historical forces, Oliver argues that the medical profession was 
in a social position which enabled it to legitimise disabled people’s exclusion from 
the workplace.  It did so on the basis of ‘classifying and interpreting disability in 
medical terms’ (Finkelstein, 1993:4) rather than what would now be described as the 
inaccessibility of the workplace.  This marks the beginning of the medical profession 
acting as gate keepers - that is being situated in a position of control over disabled 
people by first interpreting the body as impaired, and then using that interpretation to 
determine eligibility for welfare resources.  Simultaneously the medical profession 
was charged with distinguishing between “deserving” and “undeserving” poor.  This 
served the purpose of social control by reinforcing work and the exchange of labour 
for wages as the primary source of income distribution.  Thus those considered 
undeserving by virtue of being capable of work were given no assistance, forcing 
them back to work or into starvation.  The deserving too were socially controlled by 
being sequestered in particular institutional spaces such as the workhouse or asylums 
(Borsay, 2005).
Oliver’s argument is that the medicalised view of disability became an ideology 
through the medical practices of gate keeping, and so has a materialist base.  It is is 
possible to conjecture that the general population came to accept the official view 
that disabled people could not work due to their impairment.    Using Gramsci’s 
concept of hegemony, Oliver (1990a) argues that this view, this medicalised 
ideology, became the taken-for-granted way of thinking about disability.  It is this 
that the disability movement has challenged.  While the thrust of Oliver’s account of 
medicalisation as ideology is most plausible, it is schematic as he acknowledges.  
This becomes apparent when looking at more historically grounded, if less all-
embracing, accounts of the origin of the medicalisation.
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Borsay explores the origins of one instance of medicalisation by analysing the 
collaborative relationship between local charitable institutions and orthopaedic 
surgeons in the early years of the 20th century.  Part of the charity’s role was medical 
surveillance which involved visiting families and referring disabled children to 
surgeons for treatment.  This resulted in ‘painful medical intervention in the bid to 
police any deviation from the physical norm’ (2005:53).  Moreover, it also meant 
families were subjected to ‘intrusive socio-psychological scrutiny’ (53) to secure 
compliance with medical orders and admonished to aspire to middle class Victorian 
values of thrift, self help and independence.  
This analysis raises a number of useful points.  First, Borsay’s approach uses 
Foucault’s notion of disciplinary power which is localised and diffuse.  Such power 
operates not through institutions but comprises ‘instruments, techniques, procedures, 
levels of application, targets’ (Foucault, 1991 quoted in Borsay, 2002:105).  This 
allows Borsay to look beyond the role of the state and economic interests to highlight 
the practice of medicalisation.  She can then highlight a social control mechanism in 
the relationship between the families of disabled children and the visiting officers of 
charitable organisations.  
The second point that Borsay’s analysis highlights is a form of medicalisation that is 
proactive, what Foucault terms surveillance.  It involved identifying and seeking out
disabled children, who were assumed to need medical intervention.  Moreover, ‘the 
idea that the recipients [who were offered treatment], perceived here in eugenic 
terms, might resist assistance was alien to most early twentieth-century service 
providers’ (2002:111).  The reference to eugenics indicates that the treatment offered 
was not (just) in the humanitarian interests of the children concerned but in the 
surgeon’s interest, supplying him with patients and charitable funds to cover the 
costs of treatment.  Both of these things were significant at the time because 
orthopaedic surgeons were the ‘poor relation’ within medicine and anxious to bolster 
their reputations (Borsay, 2002:110).  Further such treatment was ‘legitimated by 
recourse to economic rationality’: by treating disabled children the hope was that 
they would become economically productive in adulthood (111).  Thus such 
treatment was also in the interests of the state.  
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From this historical account of the emergence of medicalisation, several features 
emerge which resonate with the contemporary relationship between medicalisation, 
medical practices and disabled people.  The first of these is the association between 
eugenics and disabled people’s health care with the fear being that this is an 
association that still continues (see, for example, Priestley, 2002, Rock, 1996).  The 
other feature that has a contemporary resonance is that medicalisation can be pro-
active and serve interests other than or in addition to the particular patient being 
treated.  An example of this is prenatal testing which ‘seeks out’ impairment in the 
fetus and in doing so medicalises both mother and fetus (Bailey, 1996).
There is one further historical account I want to consider and that is Stone’s (1986) 
analysis of doctors’ gate keeping role.  At the heart of Stone’s analysis is what she 
calls the state’s distribution dilemma: that is how to distribute public resources on the 
basis of need to the deserving poor without undermining the necessity for all those 
capable of working to sell their labour in exchange for wages.  To resolve this 
dilemma, a validating device was needed to distinguish between the deserving and 
undeserving poor.  This was problematic, Stone argues, because there was no 
consensus about the type or level of disability that rendered someone incapable of 
work.  Further, disability ‘could be feigned’ (23), the motivation for which was to 
have a legitimate reason for not working.  Stated this way, the implication is that 
disability existed prior to attempts to validate it, an implication sustained by Stone’s 
evidence that lay magistrates originally validated which paupers were sick.  This was 
done on the basis of the testimony of acquaintances rather than that of the medical 
profession.  So in this instance gate keeping involved validating the individual’s own 
interpretation of the body.  This differs from Oliver’s position which posits that a 
medical interpretation is imposed upon the body thus producing disability.  
One of the points that Stone draws from the involvement of magistrates is that the 
connection between disability and its medical definition is ‘an artefact of history’ 
(28). This suggests that the medicalisation of disability is something of an accident of 
history and not integral to the social and cultural forces of capitalism or modernity as 
Oliver and Hughes (see below) describe.  But this may reflect the limitations of 
Stone’s method, which consists of constructing ideal types, abstractions formed from 
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an amalgam of historical detail gleaned from a number of countries and moments in
time.  This means that the historical data presented is ‘selective and ambiguous’ 
(Gleeson, 1999:64) so we can’t be sure of the particular circumstances in which lay 
magistrates played this validating role.     
Medicalisation as a Feature of Modernity
Complementing Oliver’s notion of medicalisation as ideology, Hughes (2002) argues 
that there has been a ‘historic partnership between modernity and medicalisation’ to 
create ‘a hegemonic conception of disability as the outcome of biophysical or mental 
impairment’ (58).  Modernity, Hughes argues, comprises two seemingly opposing 
tendencies.  The first is to obliterate difference and thereby maintain modernity’s
‘overbearing sense of order’ (1999:157).   The impaired body seen through 
biomedicine’s lens is disorderly, ‘faulty’ and so offends this sense of order.  It also 
offends another modernist belief, the ‘triumph of reason’ (Hughes, 2002:58) to solve 
any problem through the application of rational knowledge.   Within this tendency, 
the impaired body is seen as a corporeal problem that medicine then normalises
through, for example, rehabilitation.  The aim of such normalisation was to change 
the individual to fit in to society with minimal disruption to the latter.  As Stiker 
(1999) puts it, everyone can have a ‘place in the group of the able (the normal)’ 
whatever burden that entails for the individual (135).  The aim is to make identical, 
without making equal (150, italics in the original).
The opposing modernist tendency was its ‘constitution of alterity’ (Hughes, 
2000:557), its social processes that marginalised and “Othered” those considered a 
threat to order, including disabled people.  Crawford (1994) has explored this process 
at the psychological level, in the context of the relationship between the healthy and 
unhealthy other.  Yet, the Other is necessary, for without it there can be no normal.  
It was the emergence of medical statistics which facilitated and reinforced the 
division between the normal to the abnormal and made possible the eugenic gaze
(Davis, 1997).
What Hughes’ demonstrates is that the medicalised views of disability and medical 
practice surrounding the impaired body were integral to modernist culture, as well as 
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the materialist needs of capitalism, which Oliver identified.  Hughes (2000) then 
goes on to be more specific, to provide ‘a critique of medicine as culture’ (557) to 
show how medical notions of the impaired body permeated social relations, yet 
appeared as if they were natural, unconnected with biomedicine. To provide this 
critique, Hughes analyses the concept of invalidation which he takes to have a 
medically derived meaning.  He argues that the process of Othering is essentially a 
process of validating some bodies and invalidating those that do not conform to 
norms.  One example of where this Othering occurs is the gate keeping process, 
explored below, where healthcare professionals both validate invalidity, by 
confirming eligibility for services, and invalidate validity when eligibility is denied.  
The dictionary definition of invalidity, Hughes tells us, suggests a ‘dual meaning’ of 
‘confinement through incapacity’ and ‘deficit of credibility’ (558).  The former 
meaning encapsulates the biomedical view that the solution to incapacity, 
impairment itself, is confinement and thus implying that disabled people should 
disengage from society.  Such a view underpinned much post war social policy, for 
example the 1948 National Assistance Act, in which local authorities were given 
discretionary powers to provide services to maintain people at home or in residential 
care but had no mention of supporting people to go out or take a job.  It also surfaces 
in casual remarks. For example in Begum’s (1996) study of disabled women’s 
relationships with their GPs, one participant reported that her GP had told her not to 
bother getting a job.   
Hughes’ notion of medicine as culture provides an account of how medicalised views 
of disability became pervasive and continue to structure perception of the impaired 
body.  This account is perhaps more satisfactory than Oliver’s in being clearer about 
how the medicalised view of disability permeated the further reaches of society.  
Hughes also takes account of the range of medical meanings of impairment and 
emphasises that these meanings have material consequences which contribute to the 
oppression of disabled people in the same way as disabling barriers.  
Oliver and Hughes demonstrate how the medicalisation of disability operates upon 
Conrad’s conceptual level but with reference to other levels, suggesting the levels 
intertwine.  A related point is that both conceptual and institutional medicalisation of 
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disability are based upon biomedical interpretations of the impaired body.  In turn,
these interpretations influence the meanings attached to the body.  But these 
meanings are contested within biomedical institutions and beyond.  For example, 
some disabled people interpret their own bodily experiences as an indication of 
impairment and (more) problems arise when these are discounted by strangers, such 
as when someone with a hidden impairment gets out of a car parked in a disabled 
space and is challenged by passers-by, traffic wardens or other disabled people 
wanting to park.  Perhaps more enduringly, the individual’s interpretation may also 
be discounted by healthcare professionals. This is demonstrated by Broom & 
Woodward’s (1996) study of people with Chronic Fatigue Syndrome (CFS) and their 
doctors.  One of its findings was that individuals wanted their condition to be 
medicalised, which Broom & Woodward define as receiving a diagnosis.  Without 
this medicalisation, the individual’s symptoms were ‘exacerbated’ due to 
‘uncertainty and alienation’ (371).  Yet GPs were reluctant to give a diagnosis of a 
condition which is clinically ill defined because of what they perceived as the 
negative connotations of being medicalised.
Medicalisation at the Institutional Level
Gate Keeping
I now want to consider healthcare professionals’ role as gate keepers as an example 
of medicalisation at an institutional level.  As intimated above, gate keeping 
describes a process whereby disabled people are ‘compelled to go through a medical 
professional or bureaucratic agency, to get a service they require or a piece of
equipment they need’ (French, 1994a:109).    Disabled people’s experience of 
accessing services in this way seems to have been negative (see, for example, Davis, 
2004, Finkelstein, 1990b, 1993a, Finkelstein & Stuart, 1996, French & Swain, 2000, 
Oliver, 1990a, Reeve, 2004).  For example, it has led to ‘the colonisation of disabled 
people’s lives by a vast army of professionals’ (Oliver, 1996:5, see also Blaxter, 
1976, Brechan & Liddard, 1981). To some extent this has occurred and contributed 
to broader concerns with increasing professional involvement in people’s everyday 
life (Illich, 1997, McKnight, 1977).  Indeed, Zola (1972) has identified the growing 
complexity of the bureaucratic and technological systems as one of the key dynamics 
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of medicalisation, which ‘has led us down the path of reliance on the expert’ (487).   
However, Finkelstein & Stuart (1996) argue that this is a particular problem for 
disabled people because it reflects ‘the absence of disabled people’s real impact on 
the way society is structured’ (172).  The point here is that due to disabling barriers, 
disabled people have been forced to use what are often designated ‘special services’
run by professionals in order to be able to obtain access the same social facilities as 
non-disabled people.  This has led to disabled people’s ‘enforced dependency’ and 
institutionalisation (Oliver, quoted in French & Swain, 2001:737)
In this section I will consider how the different forms of professional power which 
surround the institution of gate keeping may shape disabled people’s experiences of 
accessing services via gate keepers.  I will then look in more detail of two particular 
and very different examples of gate keeping.  The first looks at a relatively new and 
slightly unusual form of gate keeping, the self certification claim process of 
Disability Living Allowance.  The second will shift focus from the individual 
experience of gate keeping to consider how medicalisation has been enacted in the 
replacement of Incapacity Benefit with the Employment and Support Allowance.
The institution of gate keeping is underpinned by a number of forms of professional
power. The first of these interests emerges as a result of gate keepers being agents of 
the state (French & Swain, 2000).  As such, one of their roles is to control public 
spending.  Hence at a political and policy level,  ‘needs are defined by what public 
support systems are able, or prepared to afford rather than the actual barriers that 
disabled people face’ (Zarb, 2004:193).  One implication of this is that gate keepers’ 
ability to respond positively to disabled people’s own assessment of their need is 
limited by budgetary concerns (French 1994a).  This can lead to a discrepancy 
between the level of need that a person has to “prove” to get support, and the support 
which is on offer.  For example, to be eligible for the highest rate of the care 
component of Disability Living Allowance, a claimant has to show that he needs care 
repeatedly during the night.  Yet the amount of the Allowance is hardly enough to 
pay for two nights of care a week. Hence the level of disability that the claimant has 
to prove can be as much a rationing device as an indicator of need.
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A further interest at work in the gate keeper role is professional power.  The 
relationship between the professional and disabled person ‘has never been an easy 
one’ because the balance of power is usually skewed in the favour of the professional 
(French, 1994a:103) who is able to make the disabled person ‘act in a ways in which 
they would not otherwise chosen’ (Hughes & Ferguson, quoted in Abberley, 
2002:239).  One example of this found in the literature is an Occupational Therapist 
(OT) installing a toilet which was too high, notwithstanding that the disabled person 
had told the OT this.  As a result, the disabled person had to pay for a new toilet to be 
installed. Such power and professional arrogance deprives disabled people of agency 
and undermines their expertise of living with an impairment in a disabling world 
(Watson, 2003). This power is also grounded in a medicalised view of disability 
upon which the relationship is based.  Hence, disabled people are seen as ‘less than 
equal with their non-disabled peers’ (Finkelstein, 1991:5/6) and services are ‘framed 
in terms of people’s perceived deficits’ (French, 1994a:108).  This notion of disabled 
people’s perceived deficits’ is very similar to that of ‘deficit of credibility’ which 
Hughes (2000) identified as one medical meaning of impairment (558).   It could be 
argued that this notion is embedded within the gate keeping role and in the related 
process of requiring disabled people to obtain medical validation in order to take part 
in a range of activities from driving, travelling to sport.  One of the ironies of this is 
the healthcare professionals may be ill equipped to provide this validation.  This is
because they have neither the expertise (Oliver, 1990a) nor insight into the disabled 
person’s everyday life necessary to make such decisions.  This further undermines 
disabled people’s agency and autonomy.
In a study of Occupational Therapists (OTs), Abberley (1995) identifies another 
source of professional power rooted in the way OTs create ‘clients as an ideological 
construct’ (222).  Following Thompson, ideology is defined as ‘creative imaginary
activities’, that is beliefs, which ‘serve to sustain social relations which are 
asymmetrical with regard to the organisation of power’ (222).  Abberley found such 
a belief in the way OTs treated the client as a whole person, which involved 
recognition of the individuality of the client and their capacity to develop and 
change.  Abberley argues that while seemingly humanitarian, focussing upon the 
capacity for self-improvement obscures the structural constraints the client faces. In 
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other words, the whole person is seen in isolation from the social relations, including 
disabling barriers, which shape the client’s everyday life.  From this perspective, if 
an OT fails to meet the goals set for the professional encounter, the client’s failure to 
“develop and change” is blamed.  
A further source of professionals’ power derives from their role in defining clients’ 
needs (Hugman, 1998).  While the parameters of what constitutes need are usually 
set by policy makers, at the micro level it is constituted by ‘the product of social 
interaction in given circumstances’ (33).  However, it is rare for this interaction to 
result in consensus because the social structure provides the power for dominant 
groups to set the terms under which needs are defined (34).  Several commentators 
regard this professionalisation of human need to be a broad trend, started in the 
middle years of the 20th Century. Illich (1977) argued that this period should be 
known as the age of the disabling professions.  One consequence of this trend is that 
professionals ‘not only recommend what is good but actually ordain what is right’ 
(17). Having defined need, professionals then devise methods of meeting them 
which require particular skills and training which cannot be gained by lay people (De 
Swaan, 1990).  In other words, professionally defined need can only be met by those 
professionally trained.  Thus, professionalisation is very similar to medicalisation, in 
that it involves defining social problems as individual ones so only individual 
solutions backed by professionals are possible.
In the context of disability, again Abberley’s (1995) study of OT analyses with 
precision the consequences of professionals defining, identifying and resolving need.  
When asked what constituted a successful encounter with a client, a significant 
number of OTs said “when the goals set by the OT were met”.  In other words, what 
mattered were the professionals’ goals, not those of the clients.  Further, part of the 
OTs’ task was to use their professional knowledge to educate the client to fit the 
OTs’ definition of reality.  Hence the disabled person’s understanding of her needs 
was either discounted or manipulated to fit the professional’s perception of need.   
Moreover, the task of educating the client helps to ensure the client complies with the 
professional’s expertise, which meets another professional goal.  This was seen as 
more important than providing equipment, despite that being the client’s priority 
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(Abberley, 2006:241). This analysis seems to add weight to Barnes & Oliver’s
(1998) contention that the welfare state has resulted in exclusion, despite inclusive 
policy rhetoric, because services are based on professional definition of need.  If 
‘real’ client defined need is not met, the opportunities for social participation are 
reduced.
In addition to gate keeping being a source and demonstration of professional power,
it can also be a mechanism of social control.  One significant element of such control 
is keeping a close rein on public expenditure (French, 1994a). Yet it also involves a 
more subtle and insidious control.  Waitzkin (1989) uses the concept of social control 
to highlight the relationship between the doctor/patient interaction and the social 
structure and to link all three levels of medicalisation in one moment.  For Waitzkin, 
social control refers to ‘mechanisms that achieve people’s adherence to norms of 
social behaviour’ (225).  Ideology is one such mechanism. but Waitzkin’s notion of 
ideology is much broader than that of Oliver’s discussed above. Hence Waitzkin 
argues 
‘What patients and doctors say when they meet reinforces their particular 
ideologic conceptions about social life’ (223).
Waitzkin (1989) illustrates this by considering how medical practices reinforce the 
‘ideologic concept’ that health ‘is the ability to work’.  If the doctor provides a sick 
certificate which indicates when the patient should return to work, this reinforces 
both the idea that recovering from illness is normal and that, following illness, the 
expected social behaviour is to return to work (222).  Thinking about this example in 
the context of disability, a doctor may not offer a sick note to a disabled patient but 
assume that they were unable to work anyway.  This too would have reinforced an 
‘ideologic conception’, in this case the contention that disabled people were 
incapable of working, an assumption that until recently was embedded within social 
relations and conceptions which constitute disability.   However, it should not be 
assumed that the patient will act to comply with the ideologic conception: this will 
depend upon her agency and the factors which constrain it.  In this instance the social 
control is subtle and contingent.
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It is important to note that Waitzkin argues doctors do not intend to reinforce 
prevailing social relations or to consciously exert social control.  That they do so 
unintentionally is the result of several factors, including the nature of medical 
training.  Nowadays such training may stress that doctors need to take to heed of 
psychological factors and knowledge about the social situation of the patient.  
However, within the medical encounter, doctors try to help patient’s cope within the 
situation which they find themselves.  Trying to do otherwise may be beyond 
medical power or simply inappropriate (227).  The example Waitzkin gives to 
illustrate this is that of a patient suffering from stress due to an ongoing problem at 
work.  It isn’t within the doctor’s power to change the workplace, and to advise 
giving up or changing work may overlook the social, personal or economic 
disruptions this would cause the patient.  What the doctor is able to do, is advise the 
patient how to deal with the stress.  Depending upon the issue, doctors may also act 
collectively to bring the matter to politicians’ attention in the hope of securing 
appropriate social change.
Waitzkin’s example highlights the social constraints which impinge upon medical 
encounters.  However, in the context of disability and the gate keeping role, doctors 
may have more room for manoeuvre than Waitzkin’s example suggests.  As we have 
seen, there are many services and facilities that disabled people must access through 
their GP.  How a GP responds to requests for required medical certification can have 
a significant influence on the social and physical environment in which disabled 
people live (Begum, 1996:2).  Further, there is scope for GPs to be proactive by 
offering patients information about the services and benefits appropriate and 
available to them.  This is something which the Royal College of Physicians (1996) 
and empirical studies have highlighted as good practice (see, for example, Blaxter,
1976, Bhakta, 2000, Locker, 1982).  A cynic might argue that where GPs fail to give 
information is also a form of social control as it may reduce the demand for a service,
thereby liming its costs.  To argue thus may seem to weaken the concept of social 
control because it implies that however the doctor does or doesn’t act amounts to 
social control.  However, the real value of Waitzkin’s work on social control is 
precisely that it places any and every medical encounter within a larger social context 
to reveal the social relations embedded within it.  While medicalisation may 
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individualise and depoliticise the solutions to social problems as discussed above, the 
negotiation and implementation of those solutions at the interactional levels remains 
political and shaped by broader social forces.
Having considered generally how social control can operate through gate keeping, I 
now want to look at a very particular form of gate keeping by drawing upon the work 
of Shildrick & Price (1996).  They set about deconstructing the process of claiming 
Disability Living Allowance (DLA), a welfare benefit which contributes towards the 
cost of care and/or mobility.  As post modernists, their analysis is not couched in 
terms of social control.  Rather it is concerned with how the claim process constructs 
disability and how that in turn influences subjectivities, that is, how the person’s
internal senses of disability are mediated by the completion of the claim form. 
Shildrick & Price argue that as the DLA claim process relies largely upon self 
certification, the form of power that operates through it is not one of ‘external 
coercion’ but of ‘continuous surveillance’ (104) of the impaired body by the 
embodied self.  This is achieved by requiring the claimant to provide an account of 
the ‘minutiae of functional capacity’ which has to be used to carry out all daily tasks,
including the frequency of using the toilet and the help needed to do so.   In doing so,
the claimant has to confront and document how his body fails to meet ‘standards of 
normalcy’ (100).  While this may be true for many, it could actually be a moment of 
relief that someone acknowledges the minutiae of functioning which absorbs huge 
chunks of the day.  In that situation could there be a sense of relief that this someone 
is asking about their daily experience?  Is it helping to construct their normalcy?  Or 
would any such relief be immediately dissipated by the tedious prospect of having to 
document the detail of function?
Shildrick & Price go on to argue that in responding to questions about the minutiae 
of functioning, disability becomes constructed and therefore understood by the 
claimant as a series of ‘individual failings’ which make them less than normal.  They 
also argue that it creates the impaired body as an object of discourse for healthcare 
professionals, who have to validate what has been written on the claim form.   There 
seems to be a discrepancy here between the information that healthcare professionals 
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are asked to validate and what they can know about the claimant.  For example, how 
would a healthcare professional know how often the claimant used the toilet other 
than by asking them, just as the claim form does?  This suggests that there is 
substantial scope for the professionals’ judgements about the trustworthiness or 
deservingness of the claimant (French, 1994a). Yet this may be belied by the veneer 
of objectivity which is attached to medical and professional knowledge.  For the 
claimant, this can be frustrating and be experienced as ‘epistemic invalidation’ 
(Wendell, 2003:122), a concept usually used when doctors dismiss or ignore 
patients’ accounts of their symptoms but which seems equally useful here.  Perhaps 
there is a further construction here, one which Shildrick & Price do not consider 
directly, that in seeking to establish or confirm one’s disability status, one is 
compelled to surrender the body to the medical gaze which extends beyond the 
consulting room and into the furthest and most intimate reaches of everyday life.
A final point that Shildrick & Price make is that, in addition to enforcing standards of 
normalcy, the claim form also constructs what is normal within the bounds of 
disability.  Claimants have to shoehorn their experience into ‘the rigidly constructed 
parameters of disability’ (104) provided by fixed questions and the limited space 
allowed for the answers.  These parameters assume that impairment and disability are 
fixed and stable irrespective of the changing external and internal environments 
within which they are experienced.  It also presumes the complexity and diversity of 
disability and impairment experiences can all be captured on one form.   As a result, 
those whose experiences cannot be ‘inserted’ into the form are denied benefit and 
again have their experience invalidated. 
Welfare to Work
In the above discussion, a recurring theme has been that healthcare professionals are 
often ill-placed to comment upon the everyday experience of disabled people 
notwithstanding that, as gate keepers, they are called upon to do so.  Interestingly, 
this theme is reflected in some of the research and the policy rhetoric surrounding the 
replacement of Incapacity Benefit with Employment and Support Allowance for new 
claimants from October 2008.  I want to explore these reforms to consider the 
significance of supplementing healthcare professional gate keepers with non medical 
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ones.  In doing so, it is important to keep in mind the relationship between rates of 
claims for Incapacity Benefit and the state of the economy.   There are two factors 
here.  First, the highest rates of claims for Incapacity Benefit are in areas where 
employment in heavy industry has declined.  This is due to high levels of ill health 
associated with working in this type of industry and the lack of alternative 
employment opportunities.  Second, when the economy is slack those who are sick or 
disabled but who can work are at the back of the job queue due to the perceived risk 
of hiring someone who may require time off for health problems or need adjustments 
to make the workplace accessible.  Conversely, when there is economic prosperity 
and / or a labour shortage, disabled people are more likely to find work (Beatty et al, 
2007).  These economic issues are often obscured in the discourses which surround 
benefits policy and the claims process where the focus is upon the individual 
impairment or sickness.  In other words the discourse is medicalised.
In his review of welfare to work policy in the 1990s, Hyde (2000) shows that 
eligibility for the new Incapacity Benefit focused exclusively on “functional 
capacity” ‘to perform work tasks, whereas its predecessor, Invalidity Benefit took 
account of non-medical factors such as a person’s occupation prior to becoming sick 
and what jobs were available locally’ (329).  Accompanying this shift to a more 
medicalised understanding of the reasons why disabled people were unable to work 
(that is, due to lack of functional capacity), was an expanded gate keeping role for 
non medical “Personal Advisors” (formerly Job Centre employees) to supplement the 
medical evidence given by the claimant’s GP or equivalent. Thus, somewhat 
paradoxically, this more medicalised view coincided with the dilution of doctors’ 
role and power in determining eligibility.
This dilution continued in the government’s 2006 green paper ‘A New Deal For 
Welfare: Empowering People To Work’ (Secretary of State for the Department of 
Work and Pensions, 2006) encapsulated in the Welfare Reform Act 2007 (Fox, 
2007).  Ravetz’s (2006) analysis of this highlights a ‘de-coupling of health problems 
and medical conditions from unfitness to work’ (13).   It also shows that the research 
underpinning the changes questioned the suitability and effectiveness of GPs as gate 
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keepers suggesting, for example, that they do not 'understand the importance of work 
for health' and that
‘For common health problems and future capacity for work, the doctors' 
opinion.... is unfounded, of limited value and can be counterproductive...they 
should simply state that there is no objective physical or mental health barrier 
to rehabilitation or (return to) work’ (Aylward & Waddell, 2006, quoted in 
Ravetz, 2006:10).
This constructs health barriers to work as being divorced from the types of work the 
individual has the skills to do and the availability of such work.  This is contrary to 
the relationship between the economy and claim rates discussed above. This 
construction is reflected in the official guidance to healthcare professionals (Health, 
Work and Well-being Directorate, 2008).  For example it states that in some 
circumstances a GP will be required to provide a ‘factual’ statement of incapability 
for work based purely on the individual’s medical records.   If the GP wants to 
express an opinion in this statement, it must be ‘supported by factual evidence’.  One 
example of what constitutes factual evidence in the guidance to GPs is the number of 
fits a patient has had in the past three years.  However, it is not clear how the 
numbers of fits one has determines fitness to work   Similarly it is unclear how the 
GP would know this, particularly where someone has frequent fits which do not 
necessitate medical assistance.  Indeed, this example could be seen as encouraging 
medicalisation by implying that the individual should report all fits to healthcare 
professionals who in turn would document them. 
One interpretation of these changes to the process of medical validation of claims is 
that the process of claiming out of work benefits has been demedicalised.  This view 
is supported by the ‘progressive discourse’ (Jolly, 2003) of policy rhetoric which is 
about supporting disabled people to gain employment and focusing on what people 
can do rather than what they cannot. However, the interpretation of demedicalisation 
can be challenged on three points.  First, while GPs’ gate keeping role seems to have 
been circumscribed, the Work Capability Assessment, which will be used to 
determine if the claimant satisfies the impairment related eligibility criteria, will 
nonetheless be conducted by healthcare professionals: those from a private firm 
contracted to the Department of Work and Pensions for this purpose.  In comparison 
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with GPs, these professionals will have to rely more heavily on clinical information 
because they will not know the claimant.  As has been argued, such information is 
unlikely to provide insight on daily life or the social and economic barriers which 
restrict job opportunities.
Second, any demedicalisation which has occurred has not been counterbalanced by 
an increased commitment to remove the environmental and social barriers disabled 
people encounter within the world of work (Barnes, 1999, cited in Jolly, 2003:519).  
On one level, Barnes’s (1999) argument seems to overlook the DDA, which includes 
provisions to outlaw discrimination in the recruitment process and places a duty on 
employers to make reasonable adjustments to premises and procedures to ensure 
accessibility.  However, his point is a deeper one - that the organisation of work 
around the profit motive in itself creates barriers.  Further, Barnes makes the 
argument that many jobs now require an ‘able mind’ rather than an ‘able body’ (10) 
required by industrialisation, and in this context those with learning difficulties and 
mental health problems are most likely to be disadvantaged.  A further danger here is 
there ‘will be a refusal to acknowledge the medical realities’ of impairment and the 
‘huge efforts [by individuals] to cope with these’ (Ravetz, 2006:25) both of which 
create impairment related barriers to work.  Yet these types of barriers have been 
inadequately identified.  There is a risk that those experiencing these barriers may be 
blamed and penalised for not trying “hard enough” to get work or may be pressurised 
to take jobs which would be detrimental to their health.  The latter may be a 
particular problem for those with mental health problems, where the barriers to work 
are perhaps more subtle: for example if someone has learnt she can only maintain 
good mental health by not working.
The third and final reason to be sceptical about viewing the recent benefits reforms 
as demedicalisation is that employment itself may become medicalised.  Evidence 
for this can be found in the ‘roll out’ document (Fox, 2007).  This highlights that 
claimants who undertake activities designed to improve health will satisfy the 
eligibility criteria that a work related activity must be undertaken.  Similarly, a claim 
for the new allowance can be disqualified to penalise a claimant for ‘failure to follow 
medical advice without good cause’ (21).  These requirements suggest that for 
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disabled people, obtaining a job could become a matter of following doctors’ orders.  
All this resonates with Illich’s (1990) argument that ‘wage labour acquires 
therapeutic characteristics’ (130), as everyday life becomes increasingly medicalised.  
As this happens, more people will consider themselves to be ill.  Unless an 
increasing number of these people gained work, there would be labour shortages and 
substantial increases in public expenditure on benefit payments.  Thus, to avoid this, 
work has to be seen as therapeutic as a matter of social control to avoid (further) 
economic crises. Similarly however, when disabled people are viewed as incapable 
of work via a gate keeping procedure, they become subject to ‘means of social 
control to minimise their “cost” to society’ (Barnes, Mercer & Shakespeare, 
1999:57).
So far in this section, I have considered gate keeping as a form of medicalisation.  
This has entailed “expanding” the concept of medicalisation to consider broader 
issues such as how professional power and interests can constrain disabled people’s 
lives. It could be argued therefore that medicalisation sustains and is sustained by 
other social forces, including welfarism and bureaucratization. Welfarism refers to 
social processes through which individuals receive ongoing, long-term assistance, 
particularly welfare payments, and the condition of being dependent upon such 
assistance (Prein & Buhr, 1998).   In one sense, welfarism could be seen as the 
outcome of medicalisation, that because impairment continues to be seen through a 
biomedical lens the social response to it concerned with ameliorating its effects, it 
symptoms, rather than addressing its causes, many of which take the form of 
disabling social barriers which constrain disabled people.  Compounding 
medicalisation, welfarism itself has unintended consequences, including enforced 
dependency on the state and its institutions (Flossy & Otto, 1998).  This ‘entrenches 
the political invisibility and powerlessness of disabled people’ (Smith, 2003:346) and 
leads to bureaucratic intrusion into disabled people’s everyday life (Oliver, 1990).
It is also possible to argue the opposite case, that medicalisation is the outcome of 
welfarism.  This is Stone’s (1984) argument, reviewed above, that it was when the 
state wanted to redistribute resources that it created the category of disability as a 
means of ensuring welfare payments only went to “the deserving poor”.  This 
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ensured the incentive to work amongst the “able bodied”, the undeserving poor was 
maintained.  Perhaps at the end of the day it is most helpful to view both 
medicalisation and welfarism as two entwined forces which emerge from particular 
sets of political and economic forces.
As we saw at the beginning of this section, Disability Studies has been sharply 
critical of both medicalisation at the institutional level and the welfarist approach. 
Moreover, the disability movement in its many guises has campaigned with 
considerable success for support services which facilitate disabled people’s equal 
participation in social life rather than ameliorate impairment effects.  It does so on 
the basis of claiming legally enforceable rights rather than what for politicians and 
the general is the ‘more comfortable’ issues of welfare needs (Sykes, 1987:176).
In this section, I have tried to unravel the complexities of medicalisation that are 
operating in one social institution, out of work benefits.  In keeping with Conrad’s 
(1992) argument that instances of medicalisation do not necessarily involve a
healthcare professional, I have suggested that limiting GPs role in this institution 
does not necessarily signal demedicalisation.  I have also indicated some of the risks 
of a policy that demedicalises the significance of impairment or illness in shaping 
employment prospects.  While for some disabled people the main barriers they face 
are disability rather than impairment related, for others the two will be interwoven or 
more impairment related.  To address this, a policy is required that can be sensitive 
and responsive to impairment related differences and takes account of the DDA.  
Finally, I have suggested that whatever the skills or background of gate keepers, 
there are substantial difficulties when it comes to their assessment of disabled 
people’s everyday lives.  Yet, unless these difficulties are confronted, the gate 
keeping role is likely to continue to cause problems for disabled people and their life 
chances. 
Medicalisation at the Interactional Level
Normalising Treatment 
I now want to explore the third of Conrad’s (1992) levels of medicalisation by 
drawing upon Disability Studies’ debates about normalising treatment.  This 
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treatment is what is done to the fleshy impaired body to make it literally “more 
normal” as defined by a ‘particular set of cultural values’ (Barnes, 2003:7).  As we 
saw in the last chapter, biomedicine is normative, with most medical interventions 
aimed at normalising bodily function, something which is usually welcomed.  
However, a range of treatments have been problematised because they involve 
disabled people’s embodied differences being medicalised, that is interpreted as a 
medical abnormality.  These differences are then treated to make the impaired body 
conform more closely to general bodily norms rather than what is normal for the 
particular disabled person concerned.    The treatments that have been problematised 
as being normalising include the provision of artificial limbs (Hughes, 2000, Marks, 
2001), physiotherapy (Begum, 1996, Johnson, 1993), rehabilitation (Barnes, 2003, 
Finkelstein, 1998, Oliver, 1990a, 1993) and the abortion of impaired fetuses (French 
& Swain, 2001).   
The debate about normalising treatment seems to be rooted in Oliver’s (1990b) 
argument that, whilst it is appropriate that doctors treat illness or injury whether or 
not related to impairment, it is not appropriate for them to treat disability. Attempts 
to do so, he argues, reframe the collective, social problem of disability as an 
individual, medical one.  Such reframing is a defining characteristic of 
medicalisation (Conrad & Schneider, 1992) and it is this to which -Oliver objects,
fearing it will lead to the prioritisation of medical solutions over social ones.  More 
pragmatically, Oliver points out as there is no cure or treatment for disability and in 
the face of this doctors may have a sense of powerlessness and feel pressured in to 
“doing something”.  As a result, they may suggest normalising treatment which,
while they hope will be beneficial, may not be strictly necessarily.
At one level, it is fairly straight forward to criticise this position. Oliver does not 
consider the difficulty of distinguishing between impairment and disability (see 
chapter one) or whether it should be the doctor or patient who should decide what 
should be treated. He appears to discount the value of treatments which, while not 
curative, may have positive benefits by increasing bodily comfort, functioning or 
both.  Similarly, Oliver assumes that social remedies to disability have broadly 
similar benefits to those achieved through medical intervention. But this may not be 
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the case.  For example, somebody who becomes deaf at an older age may have a 
cochlear implant which may, amongst other things, enable her talk to her hearing 
friends and family on the phone.  While the social solution, getting a text phone, may 
potentially enable the person to keep in contact by phone, this potential may not 
materialise because her friends do not have such phones.  Thus, the person’s ability 
to socialise remains limited.  Of course, what’s significant about this example is that
it is historically specific.  In five years’ time, technological changes may well mean 
that everyone, including older people, may have text phones.  Hence, one benefit of 
Oliver’s position is that it highlights that in some circumstances, medical 
intervention with all that it can entail is no longer the only option for enhancing 
quality of life (French, 1994a).
As I discuss below, providing Oliver’s arguments are not interpreted too literally, 
they have other merits in the debate about normalising treatment as well.  Yet this 
may seem unlikely when Shakespeare (2006) makes the following argument, 
believing it to be controversial:
‘I argued that a multi-level approach was needed to tackle the disability 
problem, one which recognised that medical intervention to treat or minimise 
impairment are valuable, alongside (and not replacements for) interventions at 
the social and structural levels’ (103).
I want to argue that this position is unassailable and that there is very little in the 
Disability Studies literature which suggests otherwise.  Indeed it is notable recently 
that both Oliver (1996a) and particularly Barnes, (1996, 1999, 2003), a harsh critic of 
normalising treatment (French, 1994a), have repeatedly stressed that neither they nor 
any element of the social model of disability is against medical intervention per se.  
Rather, what they are against is the medicalisation of disability.  However, I also 
argue that it is only because Oliver, Barnes and others have problematised
normalising treatment, perhaps often in a rhetorical and didactic way, that 
Shakespeare’s common sense position has become possible.
Shakespeare (2006) makes a further criticism of Disability Studies’ approach to 
normalising treatment, namely that it reflects an ‘unwillingness to engage with the 
question of impairment’ (105).  There is, I think, evidence of this in the lack of 
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hypothetical discussion about types of impairment or life situations where 
normalising treatment may be more or less justified.  Shakespeare is also right that 
impairment comprises a diversity of experience, which needs to be reflected in 
discussions.  However, similar to my argument above, in problematising normalising 
treatment, the Disability Studies literature provides the beginnings of a framework in 
which to consider whether some experiences of impairment make normalising 
treatment a more attractive proposition than others.
To elaborate my arguments I will now explore three interlinked criticisms made of 
normalising treatment. The first of these concerns is whose interests are served by 
this treatment. Oliver (1990b) implies that normalising treatment is not (just) about 
the best interests of the disabled person but also about ‘securing adherence to social 
norms specifically by using medical means’ which is a more general feature of 
medicalisation (Conrad & Schneider, 1992:242). Oliver makes this point by drawing 
upon Finkelstein's experiences of rehabilitation following spinal injury which 
involved spending ‘soul-destroying hours … trying to approximate to able-bodied 
standards by ‘“walking” with callipers and crutches’ (Finkelstein, quoted in Oliver, 
1990a:54).  The charge here is that the treatment was worthless because no matter 
what effort was expended, for Finkelstein approximating walking would always 
remain an inefficient means of mobility in comparison with using a wheelchair.  
Moreover, using a wheelchair is normal for someone with a complete spinal injury, 
so encouraging Finkelstein to walk represented an imposition of a social norm which 
failed to take account of Finkelstein’s bodily differences.  The process of doing so 
was soul destroying and thus risked causing psycho-emotional effects (Thomas,
1999).  Elsewhere, Oliver (1996a) goes on to argue that from this interpretation, the 
practice of rehabilitation has to be seen as a form of social control and as such is 
‘oppressive’ and an ‘abuse of human rights’ (107).  This is so because it imposes on 
those who do not walk a value system which is at odds with their own.
For Oliver’s argument to make sense, it is necessary to establish an alternative to 
walking which is different but of equivalent value.  The social model provides this in 
general by positing that if social barriers are removed disabled people can have a 
good quality of life.  More particularly, Oliver (1993, 1996a) has argued that 
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wheelchairs and aeroplanes are both mobility aids, the use of which requires
particular environmental conditions. Finkelstein (1989) has made a similar point 
arguing that disabled people 
‘… are encouraged, for example, to use and highly value the PWA [person 
with abilities] mobility (walking) aid, shoes, while disabled people’s mobility 
aid, wheelchairs, are negatively valued’ (6).
If one considers this argument solely in terms of function it is relatively easy to 
refute.  In a thoughtfully designed building, using a wheelchair may provide a means 
of movement that can be equivalent to that of walking in shoes, but this is not the 
case in other environments, for example, in the open countryside.  However, another 
way of looking at this is in terms of the value for its user in the context of his usual 
everyday life.  For a seasoned user, a wheelchair provides a means of comfortably 
getting around and is taken-for-granted in the same way as a pair of shoes for a 
walker.    Another vehicle for countering a negative evaluation of impairment has 
been the Disability Art Movement.  This has provided both a celebration of bodily 
difference and the possibility of a positive identity for disabled people both 
individually and collectively (Swain & French, 2000).  Both of these ways of 
thinking about impairment provide one basis upon which to resist normalising 
treatment.  Further, neither Oliver nor Finkelstein reject rehabilitation per se but do 
criticise its current form.  They argue that what is needed is a ‘systematic approach’ 
to enabling disabled people acquire skills to manage social barriers and to the 
provision of aids and necessary housing adaptations (Finkelstein, 1984).  
A second set of arguments against normalising treatment concerns the pain and 
psycho-emotional effects that it may cause.  This was hinted at above by reference to 
the ‘soul destroying’ hours Finkelstein spent trying to walk.  It is also a point which 
emerges from adults accounts which reflect upon undergoing corrective medical 
treatment as disabled children (see, for example, Mason, 2005, Sutherland, 1981).  
These suggest that corrective treatments have been problematic as a result; of the 
‘dismissive, patronising, punitive and unhelpful attitudes’ of healthcare professionals 
(Lonsdale, quoted in, French, 1994a); of not being informed about what is being 
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done; and the very way in which one’s impaired body is touched, handled and gazed 
at in medical encounters.  Mason describes this very movingly:
‘I was never told I was nice to look at or nice to touch, there was never any 
feeling of being nice, just of being odd, peculiar. It’s horrible. It’s taken me 
years and years to get over it’ (quoted in Sutherland 1981:5).
This is a reminder of the importance of understanding the detail of the embodied 
experience, especially as a child and/or of being repeatedly being treated as an object 
of medical enquiry.  It could be argued that there are two issues here, one concerning 
the appropriateness of a particular treatment and the other concerns day to day 
experience of hospital routines, the attitudes of staff and the respect (or lack of it) 
accorded to the embodied self.  So the difficult question is in what circumstances
treatment is valuable despite the pain and effort it causes. As French (1994a) points 
out much perhaps mundane normalising treatment, such as physiotherapy to 
strengthen muscles or improve balance, is vital in terms of people’s day to day lives, 
enhancing both bodily comfort and function.  For many disabled people, the problem 
is often the lack of such treatment rather than too much.  Thus the question then 
becomes how healthcare practice can be improved so disabled adults and children 
can undergo the medical interventions they judge worthwhile with the least trauma 
possible.  This is a point I will return to in my conclusion.  Here, I think Finkelstein 
(1990) usefully captures the tension between the hoped for benefit of treatment and 
the emotional and physical endurance it requires:
‘it is highly desirable to campaign and set up systems for good medical 
practice in relation to disabled children and adults so that we can be 
physically comfortable, free from pain and illness. But it seems to me that this 
does not imply spending ten years of ones life trying to be “normal”’ (3). 
The third objection to normalising treatment, one which is strongly related to the 
first, concerns the consequences it has for the individual’s identity.  Marks (2001) 
argues that normalising treatment, and indeed the medical gaze itself, implies that a 
‘disabled person is not acceptable as they are’ (69).  She suggests that particularly in 
the case of young children, this can lead to feelings of insecurity and a need to 
psychologically withdraw from the world.  Again, the underlying argument is that 
medical intervention can have profound psycho-emotional effects.  A similar point is 
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made by Finkelstein (1990a) who argues that ‘obsessive concerns with normative 
goals’ prevent disabled people from developing ‘an independent self image’ (3).  
Shakespeare (2006) too argues that there is a relationship between normalising 
treatment and identity, but does so to draw attention to the diversity of impairment 
experiences.  This diversity, he speculates, gives rise to very different views on 
undergoing normalising treatment.  One example Shakespeare gives is that people 
with congenital, static impairments are ‘well adjusted to their situation’ and 
impairment may well be an integral, positive part of identity.  Therefore this group 
may have ‘little enthusiasm for cures’ and corrective surgery during childhood may 
have ‘been experienced very negatively.’ (106). By contrast, those with acute 
degenerative conditions may see impairment not as a characteristic of identity but as 
an external threat.  This group may have a ‘considerable interest, even desperation 
for cures’ (107).   
What is not clear about Shakespeare’s argument is whether the lack of enthusiasm 
for cures amongst those with congenital impairments emerges during childhood or in 
adulthood when reflecting upon childhood experiences.  If the former, a significant 
factor might be the views and roles of parents.  While a disabled child may have a 
positive sense of her body on the basis as she has known no other, adults may be 
anxious to encourage the child to be more ‘normal’, for example, to walk rather than 
use a wheelchair (Morris, 2002).  Perhaps more likely, the views of both the parents 
and the child will shift and be influenced by what treatment is on offer, the child’s 
embodied experience and other factors going on in their lives.  A critical issue then 
becomes the matter of consent and how the child’s voice is heard and respected.
A further problem with the identity argument is, as Shakespeare (2006) highlights, 
there is no straight forward relationship between impairment, disability and the 
adoption of identity.  For example, one government backed survey in 2003 showed 
that 52% of those who come under the DDA definition of disability do not define 
themselves as disabled people (72).  This raises the question of whether the identity 
that someone adopts is related to one’s sense of self and/or decisions about treatment.  
In other words, is it possible that one could refuse normalising treatment, not identify 
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as a disabled person, yet regard impairment is an integral to the embodied self? 
There would seem to be scope for empirical work to tease out the complex relations 
between identity and undergoing different forms of normalising treatment.
In this section I have tried to explore the way Disability Studies’ scholars have 
problematised the medical practice of normalising treatment.  While some of the 
arguments are didactic, a much needed discourse has been established to challenge 
the biomedical view that the impaired body is always in the state of being fixed.  The 
success of this is indicated by Frank’s (2006) remark that ‘normalisation has a bad 
name in the age of disability rights’ (78).  This success is both timely and necessary 
to provide ballast against broader cultural pressure to continuously improve the 
appearance and function of the now malleable body (Shilling, 2003) and where the 
‘judgement of social worth has become thoroughly aestheticised’ (Hughes, 
2000:560).  
There is a further problem to note about the Disability Studies’ debate on 
normalising treatment: there has been little recognition for disabled people’s agency
and the way they engage with the complexities of normalising treatment (but see, for
example, Aspinall, 2006, Sullivan Sanford, 2006).  As with much of the early 
writings on medicalisation, Oliver (1993) assumes that individuals are passive 
“victims” of medical care (Broom & Woodward 1996).  Perhaps this is why there has
been so little discussion about how to ensure disabled people, including disabled 
children, can be enabled to make fully informed choices about medical interventions 
and non medical alternatives.  This is all the more necessary given that some 
healthcare professionals may be sceptical that disabled people can enjoy a good 
quality of life and thus over emphasise the potential benefits of the intended 
treatment (Miller, 2006).  Zola’s (1991) work is useful in this context, as he suggests 
that strategies should be devised to empower patients, for example by encouraging 
patients to prepare for consultations and through the provision of advocacy services.
Conclusion
While most people, including disabled people, value timely and appropriate medical 
interventions, this chapter has explored how medicalised views of disability have 
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also placed a number of constraints upon disabled people both as patients and 
citizens.  Disability Studies scholars have used the concept of medicalisation to 
highlight and challenge these constraints.  Some scholars have argued that ongoing 
medicalisation diverts resources and distracts attention from the political project of 
barrier removal.  For example, Oliver (1999) argues that public resources invested in 
individual interventions such as rehabilitation give poor returns compared with that 
channelled into making the environment accessible.  This is because individual 
interventions only benefit those privileged enough to access them, whereas removing 
barriers helps large groups of disabled people as well as older people and those with 
young children.  However, at a policy and political level, it is not clear if there is a 
direct substitution of resources being allocated to individually based interventions 
rather than collective ones.  In this context then, Shakespeare’s (2006) argument that 
there needs to be multi-level solutions to disability and impairment is perhaps more 
radical, demanding more money for most types of solutions.
Further, in some ways Oliver’s argument overlooks the very real gains that the 
disability movement has made in the development of resourced backed policy that 
transfers power from gate keeping professionals to disabled people.  The 
movement’s lobbying, consulting and promotion on independent living is a key 
example of this. Through the vehicle of Direct Payments, many disabled people have 
gained substantial control over their day to day lives and there is hope the 
government’s Personalisation agenda will expand this.
Finally, with the exception of Begum (1996), little consideration seems to have been 
given to if and how healthcare professionals’ role as gate keepers infringes upon the 
doctor-patient relationship more generally.  Similarly, there has been no exploration 
of how medicalised interpretations of the impaired body influence disabled people’s
relationship between the embodied self and the impaired body.  These are issues that 
will be discussed in the analysis of my data in chapters six and eight.   Nonetheless 





This chapter aims to provide an account of the design and practice of the research 
upon which this thesis is based.  It will guide the reader through the choices made at 
each stage, the reasoning behind them and their epistemological and practical   
implications.  It will also compare and contrast what I set out to do with what I 
actually did.  All this will be placed in the context of wider debates about social 
research methodology.
It is generally recognised that, while the elements of research design suggest a linear 
process from the setting of the research question through to data analysis and 
presentation, in practice the process is cyclical (Blaike, 2003) and iterative (Bechofer 
& Patterson, 2000).  This was my experience as I kept revisiting and revising earlier 
decisions in the light of experience and the development of my thinking.  In addition, 
my research had two beginnings.  The completion of five pilot interviews coincided 
with the start of an eighteen month suspension of my PhD on the grounds of ill 
health.  The outcome of both these events resulted in significant changes to my 
research design.  All this created dilemmas for structuring this chapter.  In the end, a 
chronological approach has been used.  There are two exceptions to this: first, in the 
Theoretical Approach section, I discuss how my thinking developed after the first 
and second beginning, and second, in the Conducting the Interviews section, I reflect 
upon both the pilot and main interviews.
An enduring component of my research design and practice has been reflexivity, 
which ‘refers to the researcher’s conscious self-understanding of the research 
process’ (Hammersley & Atkinson quoted in Wainwright, 1997:11).  I have used my 
diverse experiences as a disabled person, a former activist and worker in disabled 
people’s organisations as a resource (Stanley & Wise, 1993) at each stage of the 
research process.  In addition I have paid attention to how the enactment of my 
impairment and the disabling barriers I faced influenced my research practice. 
Reflexivity will also be the means through which the validity of the research will be 
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established: by highlighting the ways in which my embodied self and my biography 
have moulded the research process, the reader may judge the influence these had on 
data generation and analysis (Seale, 1999).
First Beginnings
Research Design
If a research design is a plan ‘for getting from here to there’ (Yin, quoted in Blaikie, 
2003:35) then its first stage is to specify the location of ‘there’ by devising a research 
question.  In this regard, the terms of my scholarship gave much room for 
manoeuvre.  It  set the topic as disability and health and it made sense that the 
geographical boundary of any field work should be Edinburgh and the Lothians, the 
area covered by ECAS, the disability charity which funded the scholarship.  ECAS 
hopes that any relevant research findings will enable it to lobby for better health care 
for disabled people.
Finding a focus for the research was difficult because my interests were broad and 
both theoretical and empirical. I was fascinated by the apparent paradox that,
although disabled people are often frequent users of the NHS, neither the social 
model of disability nor the disability movement had much to say about health or the 
problems disabled people experience when using the NHS (DeJong & Basnett, 2001, 
Begum, 1996).   This suggested that some sort of exploratory research would be 
appropriate, with a research question that would enable disabled participants to 
identify and discuss the health care issues which they deemed important rather than 
what I thought was important.  My task would then be to consider the implications of 
disabled people’s health care experiences for the theoretical understanding of 
disability as well as to generate useful information about health care experiences for 
ECAS.
At this point, I followed Blaikie’s (2003) advice and brainstormed all possible 
questions.  The question which emerged from this process was
“What social factors influence disabled people’s experiences of using Primary Health 
Care in Edinburgh and the Lothians?”
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“Social factors” is a somewhat imprecise concept but signals that the study is 
sociological rather than medical and focused upon the disability and impairment 
related issues that influence disabled people’s experiences of using Primary Health 
Care (PHC).  The decision to concentrate on PHC reflected the shift of resources 
from hospital based care to primary health care which has occurred since the 1980s 
(Klein, 2001) and the fact that 90% of all NHS contact is at this level (Scottish 
Consumer Council, 2001).  PHC incorporates a range of services from district 
nursing to community based rehabilitation.  Considering if and how disabled people 
use a range of services would facilitate exploration of how disabled people build up 
the support networks they need and the ease or otherwise of accessing different 
services.  This would build an element of comparison into the study which is an 
essential part of good research design (Bechofer & Paterson, 2000).
Having devised a broad research question, this was broken down into three main 
areas of interest and in each of these secondary research questions were generated.  
The three areas were:
 Experiencing Impairment - One of my interests was to understand the 
everyday experience of impairment and if and how this influences health care 
encounters. As part of this I was also interested in how people differentiated 
impairment, illness, disability and health. I was hoping that by getting people 
talking about their health care experiences I would be able to explore these 
relationships and gain a greater understanding of how people experienced 
impairment and how it is embodied.
 Managing NHS Use - My second area of interest was how disabled people use 
the NHS.  Do disabled people feel that the support and care they receive from 
primary health care meets their needs?  How do disabled people get or 
negotiate the support they need? Many disabled people say that their GPs know 
little or nothing about their condition (Jessop, 1996).  What implications does 
this have for the doctor-patient relationship and the quality of care that the 
disabled person receives?  The Expert Patient Initiative (Department of Health,
2001) aims to increase disabled people’s skills and confidence in managing 
their own condition and encourages professionals to respect patients’ choices 
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when deciding upon treatment regimes.  To what extent were disabled people 
already expert patients?  What was the basis of this expertise?  How was it 
acquired?
 Access and Barriers - One of the social factors likely to affect disabled 
people’s use of health care is disability access issues, for example the difficulty 
of finding a dentist willing to treat a wheelchair user in his own chair if he was 
unable to transfer to the regular dentist chair. Here, my interest was not in 
documenting the range of barriers faced but how people dealt with these 
barriers in the context of the health care.  Does dealing with such issues have 
an emotional or psychological cost for some?  Does it impact on the health care 
relationship?  What disability and non disability factors influence how people 
deal with barriers?  Further, the relatively recent Disability Discrimination Acts 
(DDA) require health care providers (amongst others) to take reasonable 
adjustments to ensure its services are accessible.  These adjustments must be 
made to any policy, physical barrier, practice or procedure which might 
otherwise lead to a disabled person being treated less fairly than a non-disabled
person.  Is this proving an effective framework to tackle access issues?  What 
has helped or hindered the implementation process?
At this stage then, my research was aiming to be exploratory and to generate data 
which would enable me to describe a range of factors influencing the way disabled 
people used the NHS in Edinburgh. 
Theoretical Approach
At this stage then, my research was aiming to be exploratory, to generate data which 
would enable me to describe a range of factors influencing the way disabled people 
used the NHS in Edinburgh. Implicit in this aim is an interpretation of health care 
encounters which is limited to using the NHS, to those encounters that occur in 
clinical settings.  Consequently, the factors influencing more informal encounters are 
excluded.  These informal encounters include health promotion campaigns, searching 
for health related information on the internet or medical advice given 
opportunistically, for example, advice given by district nurse when helping with a 
routine daily living task.  It also excludes health care encounters what are a result of 
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medicalisation at the institutional level (see chapter four), for example, when a 
disabled person has to have their impairment verified for bureaucratic purposes by 
someone other than a healthcare professional.
Focussing upon formal health care encounters runs the risk of overlooking the more 
subtle and insidious health related influences on disabled people’s experience of 
disability and impairment in general and their experience of healthcare in particular.  
It rules out a Foucauldian analysis of medical knowledge/power and its role in 
shaping subjectivities.  However, I believe that these risks can be justified on three 
grounds.  The first of these is pragmatism.  As mentioned above, ECAS was keen to 
use my research findings to lobby for improvements in healthcare practice.  I felt this 
keenness would be best served by looking at easily definable health care encounters 
where the potential for effecting relatively small but significant changes might be 
greatest.  The focus on clinical encounters was also pragmatic insofar as it narrowed 
and clarified my research interest, making the research process more manageable.  It 
also facilitated a more in depth analysis, the importance of which is discussed below.
The second ground for focusing on clinical encounters was that, as we saw in the 
previous chapters, the Disability Studies’ literature is skewed towards understanding 
disability and impairment outwith the formal healthcare context. Within this 
literature there are a number of useful, small scale studies of disabled people’s 
experience of healthcare, for example, Begum (1996), Lonsdale (1994) and Thomas 
(1997 & 2001). However, these all focus upon disabled women’s experiences and are 
limited to a particular type of healthcare setting: for example, Begum’s study looks at 
relationships between women and GPs and Thomas (2001) at the use of maternity 
services.  Moreover, these studies do little to draw out the implications of disabled 
people’s clinical encounters for the theoretical understanding of disability and 
impairment. My research aims to build upon these studies by looking at disabled 
men’s experiences as well as disabled women’s across a range of healthcare settings 
and consider what can be learnt about impairment as a social phenomenon by 
looking at the experience of healthcare.
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My third justification for focusing upon formal healthcare settings, one that became 
apparent in retrospect, is that it does not preclude exploration of the influence of 
health care encounters in the moments prior to, or after, clinical encounters.  This 
will become apparent in chapters six to eight where the data analysis is presented. 
Here we shall see, for example, how rehabilitation encounters influence the daily 
enactment and “doing” of impairment,  how the absence of clinical encounters 
influences the self management of impairment and increases disabled people’s 
appreciation of impairment solidarity, that is sharing healthcare and bodily 
experiences when attending meetings of impairment specific support groups.  Indeed, 
I would argue that one of the significant findings of my research is that getting 
disabled people to talk about health care encounters is a useful way of exploring 
disabled people’s experience of impairment.    This suggests that one of the contexts 
in which disabled people become aware of their impaired body is healthcare settings.
Having decided upon my research questions, my next task was to clarify my 
ontological and epistemological stance.  This was a necessary prelude to deciding 
which research methods to use because each type of method is predicated upon a set 
of philosophical beliefs about the nature of the social world and what constitutes 
evidence or knowledge of it (Hughes & Sharrock, 1990). 
At this stage of my research, I was clearer about the theoretical approaches I didn’t 
want to adopt than the one I did.  Within Disability Studies there has been significant 
criticism of much disability research, on the grounds that it has failed to explore 
disabled peoples’ viewpoint, failed to see disability as a political issue and failed to 
make any impact on disabled people’s way of life (Oliver, 2003).  As a corrective, 
Oliver (1996d) argued that disability research should be emancipatory and rooted 
theoretically in the social model of disability with its materialist underpinning.  
While sympathetic to some of these arguments, I felt the limitations of the social 
model (see chapter one) would hamper exploration of my secondary research 
questions.  For example, the social model has little to say about the embodied 
experience of impairment, one of my interests.  I also wanted to be able to draw upon 
a range of approaches in order to explain ‘what was going on’ in participants’ 
accounts of their experiences. Having said all this, I nonetheless wanted to draw 
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upon some of the social model’s key insights, namely that there is a very strong and 
significant socially created element to disability and that this often takes the form of 
barriers.
This suggested that I should take an eclectic approach to theory, drawing ideas from 
a range of traditions at different points in the research process.  Such an approach 
requires ‘active engagement’ to think through the implications of different theories 
and their underlying epistemology and ontology to ensure they are philosophically 
compatible (Mason, 2002:15). So, for example, a positivist  approach which suggests 
that there is an objective truth which can be revealed through a disinterested observer 
using quantitative methods would be incompatible with a post modernist one which 
suggests people’s social experiences are constructed through language and 
discourse.  This active engagement will continue throughout this chapter and the 
three which follow. However, at this stage, it was useful to have a theoretical starting 
point to guide my research design.  For this purpose, I adopted a broad interactionist 
framework.  A key interactionist concern is how human beings assign meaning to all 
aspects of the social world (Plummer, 2000).  This process of assigning meaning is 
negotiated through interaction and is always in a state of flux.  It is through 
interaction that the social world is continually constructed within everyday life.  One 
of the advantages of interactionism is that it assumes human beings are active agents, 
an assumption which I will make of disabled people.  This challenges cultural 
stereotypes of disabled people as pathetic and helpless (Shakespeare, 1994).  Also, in 
keeping with my research interest in access and barriers, it will enable me to explore 
access as something which has to be handled through social interaction.  Further, as 
we have seen (chapter two) the meanings of disability, impairment and health are 
contested.   Understanding the meanings that research participants give to these 
concepts and if and how these influences health care encounters will be a key task of 
the research.  
However, one criticism levied at interactionism as it has been applied in Medical 
Sociology studies of chronic illness, is that insufficient attention is paid to the role of 
social structures (Thomas, 2007, Watson, 1998).  Following my Second Beginnings
when considering whether to use an autoethnography (see below), I came across the 
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work of feminist Dorothy Smith (1988) who offered a way round this problem.  
Smith argues that women are ‘knowers’ of their own everyday experiences.  Rather 
than the researcher producing knowledge by interpreting or finding meaning in this 
social interaction, Smith argues that researchers should  analyse women’s reported 
experiences in order to make transparent how the relationships of production and 
‘relationships of ruling’ shape everyday experience (4).  Critical here is the idea that 
women’s everyday experience doesn’t just happen but is produced through political 
and social relationships.  As Smith puts it:
‘the everyday world … the matrix of our experience, is organised by relations 
tying it into larger processes in the world as well as by locally organised 
practices.’ (10)
From this point of view, social theory should emerge from understanding women’s 
everyday experience in its social context.  This avoids theory being imposed upon 
women’s experience, with any mismatch between the two being explained by 
“moulding” women’s experience to theory, for example, by using the Marxist 
concept of “false consciousness”. 
A further idea in Smith’s standpoint theory, and one which flows from the first, is the 
emphasis she places upon starting from women’s subjective experiences.  Doing so is 
to recognise and explore the role subjective experience plays in relationships 
between the individual and society and hence in the way in which society operates.   
Again this contrasts with the positivists’ orthodoxy, in which the subjects of research 
are cast as objects, to be observed and interpreted.   From Smith’s view point, to 
ground research in subjective experience is to start from ‘the body, in the place in 
which it is’ (82).  
Starting with the body is particularly appropriate for my work given the need to 
incorporate embodiment in the understanding of disability and impairment (see 
chapter one).  To quite literally ‘flesh out’ Smith’s approach I intend to use the 
concept of the lived body.  One of the great strengths of the concept of the lived body 
is that it incorporates understanding of the subjective “feeling” body as it is 
experienced by the individual in the context of everyday life.   This is particularly 
important in relation to understanding disabled people’s experiences, given that 
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biomedicine has dominated interpretations of the impaired body (see chapter three).  
A focus on the lived bodies of disabled people is a means of challenging this 
domination.
Theoretically speaking, the lived body has been closely associated with 
phenomenology, which is a descriptive science of “existential beginning” (Williams 
& Bendelow, 1998) and with the writings of Merleau-Ponty.  It refers to the 
‘facticity’ of the body, which is real and exists prior to any analysis or reflection 
upon it and which is always experienced in relation to a given environment 
(Merleau-Ponty, 2004).   Thus the body is the ground level of all knowledge, we 
come to know the world through our bodies (Hughes & Paterson, 1999). All higher 
levels of other knowledge are built upon the lived body which is ‘the acquired 
dialectical soil upon which a higher “formation” is accomplished’ (Merleau-Ponty, 
quoted in Baldwin, 2004:8).
Data Generation 
My next task was to consider what methods I would use to generate the data which 
would at be the core of my research.  Using qualitative methods seemed appropriate.  
This is because such methods are designed to elicit ‘in-depth understanding of the 
meanings and “definitions of the situation” presented by informants’ (Wainright, 
1997:2).  What I wanted to discover was how disabled people defined their situation 
when using the NHS, if and how they felt disability or impairment played a part in 
that definition.
A number of different techniques can be used to collect data which reveals 
participants’ meanings and definitions of situations.   For example, I considered 
running focus groups which might have allowed participants to ‘think out loud’ and 
draw out from each other how disability and impairment issues influence healthcare 
use.  However a concern here was confidentiality: people may have felt 
uncomfortable about revealing health and impairment matters in a group of strangers 
who may have had little in common with each other.  Further, I was sensitive to the 
fact that disabled people often experience invasions of their privacy in order to 
access services or to deal with comments from strangers.  I did not want to add to 
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that.  It was for similar reasons that I ruled out using ethnographic methods, despite 
the fact that this would have given first hand access to relationships between disabled 
people and healthcare professionals.  There was also a practical problem with this, in 
that there is no obvious healthcare setting in which one will necessarily or only 
observe disabled patients.  
Having ruled out focus groups and ethnographic observation, I decided to generate 
data through   one-to-one interviews. Qualitative interviews are informal and semi 
structured and this makes them suited to exploring lived experience and subjectivity,
which is my aim.  Using a topic guide as opposed to an interview schedule can help 
to ensure the interview covers relevant areas of interest yet remain sufficiently 
flexible to follow topics that participants feel important (Kvale, 1996, Mason, 2002).  
What then would be the relationship between the data generated through the 
interviews and the aspect of the social world in which the research was interested?  
This is essentially an ontological question, the answer to which has to be informed by 
my interactionist starting point.  From this point of view, there are multiple realities 
and the meaning attributed to each is always negotiated.  Therefore, semi structured 
interviews are best conceived as a collaborative process through which significant 
moments of the past are reconstructed.  These reconstructions are filtered through 
participants’ memories and reflections as prompted by the researcher’s questions, 
demeanour, as well as the circumstances in which the interview take place.  Thus the 
data derived from these interviews will be highly contingent and the knowledge 
produced is situational.  As a result, the research process needs to be made as 
transparent as possible so the reader can judge the degree to which the research 
process itself has mediated the relationship between the data and the events or 
meanings described therein (Mason, 2002).
Criteria for Inclusion in the Research 
A vital part of qualitative research process is sampling and selection, that is, the 
principles and procedures devised to determine the population from which to recruit 
participants, how to select participants from that group and how many participants to 
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select and interview (Mason, 2003).  In this section I will consider the first of these, 
the criteria I used to recruit participants for the study.
The population from which I would find evidence to explore my research question 
was disabled people.  Identifying this population was beset with difficulties.  Most 
official sources of statistics on disabled people reflect the purpose for which the data 
was collected and there is no single definition of a “disabled person” which suits the 
needs of all those who gather disability statistics.  Moreover, whatever definition 
used, those that identify themselves as a disabled people are not necessarily the same 
group that those collecting statistics had in mind.  This point is illustrated by a survey 
that suggested that only 52% of those deemed to meet the criteria of a disabled 
person in the DDA actually identified them self as a disabled person (Shakespeare, 
2006).
In some ways, I was able to sidestep these definitional problems by adopting a social 
model of disability perspective.  From that perspective, a disabled person is anyone 
who identifies them self as such on the basis of experiencing disabling barriers.  In 
the context of my research this self definition approach made sense on two grounds.  
First, given that the research aim was to learn about disabled people experience of 
healthcare, I needed to talk to who used the category disability to make sense of 
some of their experiences of healthcare.  Second, I felt that I had no authority or 
justification for overriding either a potential participant’s claim to be disabled or to 
impose a definition of disabled person on someone who was not comfortable as 
identifying her self as such.
Having adopting a social model perspective as the starting point in defining my 
sample population, I then limited that population by establishing three further criteria 
for selecting participants for the study.  These were: 
 Self identify as having a physical impairment 
 Be a resident or work in Edinburgh or the Lothians
 Be aged between 18 and 64
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Each of these criteria was influenced by the funding of the Project: ECAS works 
with younger people with physical impairments in Edinburgh and the Lothians.  To 
ensure the research findings were relevant to ECAS, it made sense to focus upon the 
experiences of its client group.  More pragmatically, as I do not drive, travelling to 
interviews outwith Lothians, or getting participants to come to me, would have been 
difficult and expensive. There was another reason for the age criterion. Rightly or 
wrongly, in terms of health policy, older people and disabled people are often seen as 
distinct groups.   A further question here is the definition of ‘disabled person’.  There 
is a plethora of ‘official’ definitions for the purpose of determining entitlement to 
benefits and services.  However, what matters for my purposes is that people define 
themselves as disabled and want to talk about how their impairment and disability 
impact upon their healthcare experience.
Recruitment of Participants 
The strategy for recruitment of participants was through disability networks 
including:
 Impairment specific groups such as the Multiple Sclerosis Society
 Specialist disability Housing Associations 
 Personal contacts
It was possible to foresee a number of drawbacks to this approach. The first was that 
many disabled people were not in touch with these networks.  Arguably, these people 
would be particularly isolated and perhaps have greater reliance on the NHS, 
particularly for information about services and benefits.  Therefore it was planned to 
place a small advert in a local paper through a contact with ECAS who funded the 
Project. Second, having to rely upon people to volunteer to be interviewed made it 
difficult to ensure a diverse group of participants in terms of gender, race, class and 
impairment type.  Yet this was vital, not least to enable me to compare disabled 
people’s experience so as to be able to understand how different facets of people’s 
identity influence their health care encounters.  Therefore I planned to contact as 
many networks as possible.
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This method of recruiting participants meant that I could make no claim that they 
were in any sense representative of the sample population (see above).  Rather, the 
aim was that taken as a group, participants’ hinted at the range and diversity of 
experiences to be found in the sample population.
Ethical Issues
As my research involved health issues, I applied for ethical approval through The 
Lothian Research Ethics Committee (LREC).   Approval was granted subject to two 
stipulations:
 That all research documents were made available in accessible formats
 That participants should advise their GP of their involvement in the Project
To comply with the first stipulation, all information about the Project was amended 
to indicate that it was available in other formats on request.  The second stipulation 
appeared to be based on a medical model interpretation of disabled people as 
vulnerable, particularly when talking about health issues.  I found this disconcerting 
and at odds with the tenor of the research4.  Thinking it through, however, I realised 
that participants could be given the choice of whether or not to contact their GP.   At 
the beginning of each interview, I told the participant that it was considered good 
research practice to inform their GP about taking part in the Project.  The participant 
was then given a pro forma letter from me to the GP along with a blank stamped 
envelope.  I explained that if the participant wanted to tell her GP, all she need do 
was write her name and address on the letter and then post it in the envelope 
provided. This procedure meant I didn’t have to know if the participant sent the 
letter.  Similarly I didn’t need to know any details about their GP.   In this way 
participant’s choice was maximised and the fear and risk of breaching confidentiality 
                                     
4 The Project’s Information leaflet stated I was a disabled researcher.  It is not clear 
whether the Committee overlooked this or had a reason for believing that, unlike my 
participants, I was not vulnerable.
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was minimised. One participant queried the letter but appeared satisfied with my 
explanation.  Another mentioned being undecided about sending it, fearing it might 
influence how the GP would respond to her request for proof of disability for another 
matter.
In addition, the Ethics Committee queried why no consideration had been given to 
the protection of participants from “vulnerable groups” that is, people with learning 
difficulties and mental health issues.  In response, I gave the reasons why the 
research focused on people with physical impairments.  These reasons included the 
fact that healthcare literature and policy rarely focuses upon the inclusive category 
‘disabled people’.  Rather, it breaks the category down into three groups: people with 
learning difficulties, mental health issues and physical impairment.  If I used an 
inclusive category there was a risk my project would only scratch the surface of the 
main issue for each group.  Further, substantive changes in the research protocol 
would have been necessary to ensure the access needs of participants with learning 
difficulties and mental health issues would be adequately met.  Having made these 
points, I acknowledged that people’s experiences do not fit neatly into these 
categories: for example some people with physical impairments may also experience 
mental health issues.  Therefore I discussed what I would do to ‘actively consider’ 
inclusion of those who had experience of physical impairments and other forms of 
impairment.   In the event, all research participants had physical impairments, while
two also had learning difficulties and five also had mental health issues.
Role of Researcher
The final aspect of my research design I had to decided upon was  my role as 
researcher.  To do this required consideration of debates about the nature and 
production of knowledge.  Until the early 1970s, the positivist paradigm underpinned 
most social research.   Simply stated, this paradigm posited that there were social 
facts “out there” which exist independently of any particular person or social 
situation.  These ‘facts’ can become knowable through research practices deliberately 
modelled upon those used for scientific inquiry into the workings of the natural 
world.  Crucial to these is the injunction that researchers adopt an objective stance 
and employ various methods to ensure the data are a ‘truthful’ representation of the 
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phenomenon being studied.  From this point of view, sociological knowledge is 
produced by those within the academy and, as such, is privileged (Stanley & Wise, 
1993). This view, along with the positivist paradigm itself, has been increasingly 
challenged. 
One aspect of this challenge has been to consider the implications which arise when 
significant aspects of a researcher’s life experience resemble those of the research 
participants.  Some feminists and proponents of Black studies have argued that it is 
only when a researcher does have similar life experience to participants that the 
situation of women or Black people can be understood.  Merton (1972) has dubbed 
this the "Insider Doctrine":
‘…as a matter of epistemological principle, particular groups in society in 
particular moments of history lay claim to having monopolistic access to 
certain kinds of knowledge.  Taken to its logical extreme, as it is by some, this 
means “you have to be one in order to understand one”’ (15).
This implies that knowledge is situated and partial, that who we are influences the 
knowledge we can produce.  Yet on the other hand - or perhaps at the same time - the 
feminist writer Du Bois warns of the dangers of being an insider:
‘The closer our subject matter to our own life experience, the more we can 
probably expect our own beliefs about the world to enter into and shape our 
work - to influence the very questions we pose, our conception of how to 
approach those questions, and the interpretations we generate from our 
findings’  (quoted in Reay 1996:62).
The concern here is that being an insider will unduly influence what we can know, 
not least because the researcher will assume s/he knows certain things about the 
insider rather than ask about these things.  The question that I needed to address was 
whether being a disabled researcher researching disability would be  a help, a 
hindrance or both?
Interestingly, despite considerable debate within Disability Studies about the 
appropriate purpose of disability research, very little has been said about the 
advantages or otherwise of being an insider (but see Branfield, 1998).  In one sense, 
this is consistent with the social model that regards barriers as features of a 
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materialist environment that can be identified by anyone who looks for them. Hence 
Oliver (2003) has argued ‘the crucial issue in developing more useful and less 
alienating research is that of control not experience’ (9).  For Oliver, research that it 
is useful is emancipatory, that is the research process is used as a political education 
tool, enabling research participants to name the difficulties they face as oppression 
and to learn that change is possible through political struggle (Oliver, 1996c).  This 
requires that disabled people must have control over the production of research, the 
topics to be researched, the methods used and so forth.  So being an insider is vital in 
directing the production of disability knowledge but not in the day to day process of 
its collection.  Finkelstein (1999a) argues this is necessarily so because the very 
barriers that need to be researched hamper or prevent disabled researchers from 
conducting research.   In other words, ensuring that disabled people are in control of 
research production is what would be considered, under the DDA, a reasonable 
adjustment to overcome the disabling barriers inherent in research practice.   This 
line of argument about control is also a challenge to the idea that knowledge 
production is limited to those within the academy (Stanley & Wise, 1993).  However, 
it overlooks the experience of the many disabled researchers who do negotiate and or 
engage with those barriers which emerge from the doing of research.  This is a point 
I will pick up below.
Oliver (1996c) goes on to makes a further demand on disability researchers, namely 
that they commit to taking the side of disabled people.  This feeds into Becker’s 
(1967) classic argument that it is not possible to do research “uncontaminated” by the 
researcher’s personal and political sympathies.  Therefore the question was not 
should researchers take sides, but whose side should they take?
But what if taking sides diminishes the credibility of the research which is derived 
from the presentation of evidence and reasoned argument rather than the promotion 
of a particular set of interests? For Becker, this problem could be solved by using 
‘our [research] techniques impartially enough that a belief to which we are especially 
sympathetic could be proved untrue’ (246).  This is interesting on a number of 
counts.  First, it implies that while researchers may nominally take sides, this should 
not be allowed to compromise a commitment to the presentation of a fair and faithful 
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representation of the research findings.  It is this that leads Hammersley (2000) to 
caution against a radical reading of Becker, which would impute that Becker thought 
an objective point of view impossible, or at least not worth striving for.  Second, 
Becker places faith in the methodology of social research as a means to counter bias 
although concedes that methodologies tell ‘us how to guard against error, but they do 
not tell us how to make sure that we will use all the safeguards available to us’ (246).  
A third point, which underlies the first two, is that Becker’s argument implies that
there is a ‘truth’ or at least a reality “out there” and a means through which one can 
strive to represent or understand it, albeit partially and at a given moment in time.
All this suggests that personal integrity on the part of the researcher is as important 
as methodology, and both can help the researcher to negotiate the tension which 
exists between gaining the fullest possible understanding of the phenomena being 
researched and commitment to its subjects.  Gouldner (1973) makes a similar point 
in his critique of Becker’s work:
‘A partisanship that is set within the framework of a larger humanistic 
understanding is quite different from one devoid of it.  This is one difference
between the merely political partisanship of daily involvement, and the more 
reflexive and tempered partisanship which may well be such objectivity of 
which we are capable’ (53).
What I think is being suggested here is that one has a commitment to giving voice to 
“the underdog” but that there should be a similar commitment to understanding the 
broader context in which the underdog is situated.   To do this, Gouldner argues, one 
has to be explicit about which side one is on, as Becker suggests, but also to go 
further than this by examining the values which lead one to take the side one does 
and to assess the consequences of doing so.  Doing so requires a researcher to be 
explicit about why she has taken a particular viewpoint.  This makes it easier for 
others to evaluate and comment upon the research, which is a vital part of the 
academic tradition.  If a researcher asserts rather than argues the case for his/her 
viewpoint, critics may be accused of being against the particular group to which the 
researcher is committed and real debate may be stifled (Hammersley, 2000).
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One final difficulty which relates both to being committed and to being an insider is 
that the oppressed group with whom the researcher sides may be assumed to be 
homogenous and have similar interests.  Hence the researcher may not capture the 
complexity and the diversity of those being studied, and so vital information about 
how oppression operates or how people in different situations resist oppression may 
be lost.  To be an effective academic researcher and to be committed, it seems one 
has to be open and ready for one’s own theoretical conceptions and personal 
assumptions to be challenged.  If such a challenge occurs, one has to be ready to 
engage with the political consequences (Finch, 1984).   
The arguments reviewed above suggest that a researcher’s commitment to a 
particular group has the potential to compromise her capacity to gain the fullest 
possible understanding of a social problem.  However, the same point could be made 
about a commitment to being a detached observer.  In that case, one’s values and life 
experience may limit or colour one’s understanding of the problem without being 
aware of this.  In both cases, the researcher’s integrity and commitment to enhancing 
social understanding can act to counter biases.  
So what does all this mean for my role in my research?  In several senses, I cannot 
but be an insider, given my biography and experience of disability.  Further, it would 
be likely that participants would perceive me as an insider.  Yet I am persuaded by 
the argument that the futile struggle to be objective is nonetheless worth making.  It 
will enable me to learn from the diversity of participants’ experiences and endeavour 
to understand them by placing them in a social context.
Having decided not to be actively committed in the sense Oliver suggests, there still 
remain two related questions: how should I handle my insider status and what form 
of relationship should I strive to have with participants? With regard to the 
relationship between the researcher and participant, Oakley (1997) advocates that 
there is ‘no intimacy without reciprocity’ (49).  This suggests that the researcher has 
to be open and willing to invest something of herself into the interview.  Oakley goes 
on to note that this is one means by which to establish rapport which is as much 
about manipulating the participant to provide “good data” as it is about establishing a 
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genuine sympathetic relationship.  There seems to be little consensus or indeed 
advice about how to achieve this and much depends upon the interviewer’s 
personality and the degree of involvement with which she feels comfortable.
Within Disability Studies, many have called for disabled people to be in control but
few have explored how this can be achieved in terms of the researcher/participant 
relationship (Barnes, Mercer & Shakespeare, 2000). There are two exceptions to this.  
Shakespeare (1996), while expressing scepticism at the emancipatory project, 
nonetheless describes his attempts to reduce the power imbalance between researcher 
and participant.  For example, he explains to participants the research aims, asks if 
they want to read and comment upon interview transcripts and indicates a 
willingness to answer personal questions.  This ensures that the research process 
reflects and acknowledges that the disabled person, rather than the researcher, is the 
expert.  This challenges traditional research practice as well as commonly held 
assumptions that professionals, rather than disabled people, are expert in disability.
Drawing on feminist literature and reflecting the Du Bois point quoted above, 
Vernon (1996) argues that the closer the researcher is to the researched in terms of 
social position, the more likely the researcher’s beliefs and values are to influence 
the research.  Hence
‘reflexivity, the examination of the ways in which the researcher’s own identity 
and values affect the data gathered and the pictures of the social world 
produced, is a critical exercise for those researching the experience of 
oppression, particularly to ensure the avoidance of colluding with the 
established hegemony’ (159).
I think such reflexivity is also needed to help a researcher who is an insider trying to 
know other insiders unravel the multiple and sometimes conflicting interests she has 
in the research.  In my own case, as a disabled woman researching disability issues, I 
am not only a researcher but also the subject and object of my research.  This 
requires a certain self-awareness so as to be clear from which of these interests or 
positions one is acting. 
There is one further reason to be reflexive which comes from Finkelstein’s (1999)
observation that every disabled researcher faces the paradoxical situation of having 
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to engage and negotiate with the very barriers that she is researching.  My argument, 
however, is that this is an excellent learning opportunity.  Through being reflexive at 
each and every stage of the research process, it becomes possible to observe, analyse 
and document how the minutiae of disability and impairment influence the process.  
This makes it possible to give an embodied account of the doing of research, 
something to which I will now turn.
Second Beginnings
My second beginning comprised two events: considering how to use my personal 
experience of health care encounters and reflecting upon and analysing five pilot 
interviews which I conducted immediately before suspending my PhD.  Together 
these events led me to make substantial changes to my research design.
Personal Experience 
Returning to the research after eighteen months of numerous health care encounters, 
I questioned whether and how I wanted to draw upon these in my work.  If there are 
multiple realities and, as Smith (1988) argued, all knowledge is partial (see above), 
then researchers’ subjective experience can also be analysed and contribute to the 
story that sociologists can tell about what it is to be human and live in a particular 
society.   
Autoethnography is one means of exploiting researchers’ experience.  Although 
autoethnography has been variously defined and takes many forms (Humphries, 
2005), most definitions and autoethnographical texts display two common features.  
The first of these is that these  texts situate the self at the intersection between 
personal struggles and the public issues of social structure (Church, 1995:2) or 
connect the ‘personal to the cultural’ (Ellis & Bochner, 2000:739).  The aim is then 
‘to learn from the one about the many’ (Church, quoted in Sparkes, 2002:216).
The second feature of autoethnography is that writing from the subjective requires 
researchers to convey not only rational thoughts about experience but also its 
emotional and bodily textures and the ever shifting senses of self.  To do this, Ronai 
suggests using a ‘layered account’ which she defines as
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‘ …a narrative form designed to loosely represent to, as well as produce for, 
the reader, a continuous dialectic of experience, emerging from the multitude 
of reflexive voices’ [of the writer] (Ronai, quoted in Neville-Jan, 2004:116).’
I was excited by the prospect of writing a ‘layered’ account of my experience.  
Through personal writing, I had become convinced of the importance of bodily 
detail, the otherwise mundane, in the understanding of disability and impairment in 
healthcare contexts.  I had also become interested in the emotional dimensions of 
impairment.  I worried these things may not be captured in a one hour interview with 
participants, and this made autoethnography all the more appealing.  But I had 
concerns too.  Would it lead to a privileging of my experience over that of 
participants?  Would it perpetuate the ‘tragic but brave’ stereotypes of disability 
which abound in literature and the media (Couser, 2000)?  Would I feel 
uncomfortable blurring the line between my public and private embodied self?  So 
should I write “for my eyes only”, so as to prevent my experiences leaking in to my 
interpretation of participants’ experiences?
In the end, I did two things.  First, drawing upon my personal writing I wrote and 
analysed two scenarios which illustrated access barriers in health care settings.  
These are presented in chapter seven.  Second, a fellow PhD student interviewed me 
twice, using my topic guides.  I did this because I wanted to compare the amount, 
quality and detail of healthcare experiences that can be revealed in interview 
situation against that revealed through personal writing.  Similarly I wanted to 
compare data generated from an interview with the actual experience it tried to 
reproduce.  Beforehand I feared being frustrated at only being able to tell a fraction 
of my experience, which is perhaps indicative of the strength of the urge to tell the 
tale (Frank, 1995, 2002).   But, perhaps due to the skills of the interviewer, this 
frustration didn’t materialise.  Of course, much went unsaid, but that which was 
revealed represented my experiences and I found the process cathartic.  Also, it did 
capture a similar level of detail as to my personal writings and that made me more 
optimistic about my research interviews.  With the benefit of hindsight, I realise that 
much depends upon paying attention to the detail during the analysis.  However, the 
interview did not provoke the same degree of self revelation as my writing: the 
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incident described in the second scenario presented in chapter seven was not 
mentioned in the interview, yet I believe it makes useful points.
The other reason for my being interviewed was to incorporate my experiences into 
my data analysis.  Hence, my intention had been to analyse my interview transcripts 
along with the others and present it in the third person.  However, upon reflection 
this felt disingenuous.   I feared I would not treat it in the same way as other 
transcripts but would add material surreptitiously.  I worried about the experience for 
readers upon finding out that a certain example or quote was actually from me.  If I 
felt justified to use my experience, why not write in the first person?
Pilot Interviews 
Between September 2003 and January 2004 I conducted five pilot interviews as a 
way of testing my topic guide and honing my interview skills.  The five comprised 
four men and one woman who were recruited through friendship networks and an 
advert in the local paper.  From these interviews four main points were learnt and led 
to amendments to my research design. 
Reaffirming My Neutral Stance
Despite intending to adopt a neutral stance as interviewer, in fact my style, comments 
and probes were those of an insider.  This wasn’t because I was trying to establish 
rapport as Oakley suggests (see above), rather I forgot my role and was responding 
as a friend.  At times I had to make a conscious effort to stop myself sharing my 
experience.   Further I took things for granted just as Du Bois predicted.  For 
example, one participant highlighted a need for healthcare professionals to have a 
greater “disability awareness”.  Many understandings of what constitutes this 
awareness exist; hence probes should have been used to clarify the participant’s 
intended meaning.  Unfortunately I assumed I knew what he meant. 
To learn from this, my interview preparation included reflecting and reaffirming my 
intended role.  I also needed to take a naïve role, to probe and question participants’ 
meaning of insider terms rather than taking them for granted.   Similarly I needed to 
probe more so as to get the depth and detail of participants’ experience, although 
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remembering that not everyone will want to divulge these (Kvale, 1996).  To keep 
this in mind, the topic guide was reformatted to include examples of probes and 
follow-up questions so as to jolt my memory.
Impairment Matters in Data Collection
One theme which emerged from the pilot interviews was that participants’ 
experience of impairment influenced the pattern and content of health care 
encounters.  For example, two participants made sense of their current health care 
encounters with reference to those experienced as a disabled child.   To explore this 
further posed a problem: participants were not asked directly about the name and 
characteristics of their impairment and I would have felt uneasy asking such 
questions.  This unease was derived from my personal involvement with the social 
model which renders medical detail of impairment irrelevant to the understanding of 
disability.  Further, refusing to give medical labels is a form of resistance to the 
phenomenon of strangers who ask disabled people “what’s wrong with you?” and 
expect to be told one’s medical diagnosis.
Yet in place of asking for impairment details, I was making assumptions about them.  
This felt unsatisfactory and unethical so I considered devising a short questionnaire 
to collect some basic demographic and impairment data.  However this seemed to be 
a ploy to get round my uneasiness.   Upon reflection, what was needed to make the 
link between impairment and health care were descriptions of the influence of 
impairment / disability, and I needed to trust that participants would decide what I 
needed to know.  The implications of this decision not to ask for impairment details 
will be considered more below.
Dropping Primary Health Care Focus
My intention had been to focus upon participants’ experiences of PHC.  Yet while 
my questions all referred to PHC, participants spoke about their experiences with 
primary and secondary care, without making a distinction between the two.  
Moreover, what participants were telling me about secondary care was useful and 
participants clearly felt this was an important issue for my understanding of their 
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health care issues.  So it made sense to drop the PHC focus.  This risked the Project 
becoming unwieldy but it enabled participants to “set the agenda”.
The combined influence of my personal experiences and the pilot interviews 
resulted in two further changes to my research design.
Interviewing Participants Twice
In terms of generating data, the pilot interviews provided breadth but lacked depth.  
Yet my personal experience suggested that the detail and depth were vital.  In part, 
this reflected my novice skills as an interviewer, something I hoped would improve 
with experience.  But the duration of the interview was also an impairment issue.  Of 
the pilot interviews, the shortest was less than an hour and the longest well over 
three.  The latter would have been impossible after my illness for reasons of fatigue 
and concentration.  This may also have been an issue for some participants.  Hence I 
decided to interview people twice, with each interview lasting no longer than an 
hour.  There were further advantages to this.  The second interview would enable me 
to follow up issues raised in the first and thus yield more detailed descriptions and 
explanations.  For this reason, the gap between the two interviews was short, a 
fortnight to three weeks.  Further, in two instances, the comparing a participant’s first 
and second transcripts was revealing analytically One further change made to the 
research design and that was the employment of a research assistant, to enhance the 
accessibility of the interviewing process.  A successful grant application to the 
University of Edinburgh Small Development Grants secured funding for this.  This 
was a great success, enabling me to focus my attention and energy entirely on 




Using the strategy outlined above, recruitment of participants was slow and difficult.  
One reason for this could have been the Project’s title, Disabled People’s Healthcare 
Encounters.  Perhaps this seemed irrelevant to disabled people who don’t have 
regular contact with the NHS.  This was suggested by one participant whose friend 
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declined to be interviewed on the grounds she had little contact with the health 
service.  Another problem could have been that people do not like talking about 
health and illness.  All this was similar to Cornwell’s (1984) experience:  when 
participants realised they would be asked about their health they dropped out because
they saw their health as good and didn’t want to be seen as moaning about their 
illnesses.  Thus they assumed that a health survey would actually be an illness 
survey.
In the end, personal contacts and snowballing proved to be the most effective 
recruitment strategies.  Appendix one provides a breakdown of who was recruited 
through which channel.
Who Was Interviewed?
In the event, 27 participants were recruited, including the five pilot participants.  It is 
perhaps worth noting here that two participants had learning difficulties as well as 
physical impairments.  Of these, one had a supporter at the interview and this was 
arranged by the participant.   The supporter occasionally assisted the participant to 
work out what he wanted to say and then the participant told me.  At the participant’s 
request the questions for the second interview were sent in advance so he could 
discuss them with his supporter.  An easy read, large print version of the interview 
summary was produced.  The other participant with learning difficulties had no 
verbal communication.  Her family carer was interviewed.  I also spent time with the 
participant to get a sense of her.  When analysing the carer’s transcript I was mindful 
that there were two experiences being reconstructed: first the disabled person’s as 
recounted by her family carer, and second the carer’s experience of accessing and 
attending health care appointments with the participant.
Five participants told me they had mental health issues as well as physical 
impairments.  They were interviewed in the same way as others.  The fact that the 
interviews were only semi structured meant that I could encourage people to talk 
about mental health issues if and when they mentioned them.
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The reasons why the sample size was 27 were two fold.  The first was due to data 
saturation. Each participant’s experiences were unique in terms of its content and the 
way in which it was reconstructed.  I think this would have been the case however 
many participants were interviewed.  Nonetheless, in the last four or five interviews, 
I was beginning to feel familiar with what I was hearing and understanding.  At this 
point, pragmatism became an issue, and this was the second reason for the sample 
size.  My recruitment networks yielded no further potential participants.  Therefore if 
I wanted to increase further my sample size I would have had to do a further round of 
recruitment network.  I felt I did not have time to do this.
Venue 
It was when arranging a mutually accessible and convenient interview venue that the 
barriers I faced as a disabled researcher had to be handled. My inclination was to 
make things as easy as possible for participants who were volunteering to help.  But 
this was not always possible, given my needs.  In part this was because many 
participants’ houses were inaccessible to me, including those of wheelchair users.  
However, participants were very obliging and creative in their choice of an 
accessible venue so interviews took place in a shopping centre, hotel lounge, 
workplace, theatre and community cafés as well as the university.  Only two 
problems occurred.  One of these was a house with incredibly long, steep ramp tracks 
which I would not have attempted in any other circumstances than conducting an 
interview!  Second, at one venue, a therapy centre, the physiotherapist asked me to 
interview the participant while he was cycling in the gym.  The participant was 
happy, so I agreed.  With hindsight, recognising my power, I should have explored 
other options so the participant had a real choice.
The Role of Research Assistant
In all the interviews (except the pilots), I was accompanied by a research assistant
whose role was to handle all the practicalities of the interview apart from conducting 
the interview.  This had a significant influence upon who “I could be” in the 
interviews.  Meeting with the participant and setting up the interview is a vital 
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opportunity for establishing rapport.  In the pilots, this was a physical struggle 
because it involved handling papers, using recording equipment and making the 
space accessible, all things at the edge of my capabilities.  Moreover, while doing 
this I felt very self conscious and this undermined my confidence.  This is an 
example of what happens when the doing of routine tasks cannot be taken-for-
granted.  Precisely because one has to be aware of the minutiae of doing the task, one 
is distracted from the relationship with the other person. 
By contrast, when the assistant handled these tasks, I concentrated on welcoming the
participant, offering refreshments and working at making him feel at ease.  I could 
treat the participant as I wanted to, unfettered by my physical limitations.  In turn, I 
was much fresher and more relaxed when I began the interview.  As argued above, 
the interview is a space where past events are reconstructed and that reconstruction is 
in part contingent upon the immediate circumstances.  This suggests that there may 
be a relationship between my having an assistant and the quality of the data 
collected.
In addition to setting up the interview space, the research assistant took notes during 
the interview and transcribed the recording.  This influenced my research design.  
Without the notes, I would not have been able to produce a summary before the 
second interview.  Yet this was an important way of checking with the participant 
that I understood and interpreted his/her experience correctly.  While it is recognised 
that transcribing is a way of becoming immersed in the data (Corden & Salisbury,
2005), I listened to the recording several times after each interview to ensure such 
immersion.
I amended the research information poster to reflect that I would be accompanied by 
the assistant.  At the beginning of the interview I introduced the assistant to the 
participant and explained her role.
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Interview Preliminaries
At the beginning of the first interview, a brief overview of the Project was given and 
the format of the interview was explained.  Participants were then given a copy of the 
consent form (see Appendix four) and we discussed each item.
Style of Interviews 
I aimed to make the interview informal.  The topic guide (see Appendix six) for the 
first interview had four main questions, which were broad and open ended.  They 
were designed to get people talking about different aspects of health care encounters: 
what services they used, their relationships with healthcare professionals, any access 
problems they experienced and whether they had ever had to get proof of disability 
from a healthcare professional. I then used probes and follow up questions to steer 
the participant to the issues which most interested me in and to get the detail about 
what happened, why and how they felt about it.  I also made extensive use – perhaps 
overuse – of the summary technique, reflecting back to the participant my 
understanding of what had been said.  This was a way of indicating I was listening 
and of checking my initial interpretation of what was said (Kvale, 1996). 
Two participants were interviewed together at their suggestion.  This proved very 
effective in terms of data generation as they bounced ideas off each other.  The 
interview demonstrated the importance they attached to supporting each other.  
Rather than ask each of them questions I suggested they described their best and 
worst health care encounter and then asked further questions to draw out what I was 
most interested in.  This worked well.
One participant phoned me the day before the second interview to cancel saying he 
did not want to go over it all again.  I made no attempt to persuade him otherwise.  
On another occasion a second interview was cancelled by mutual agreement because 
the person felt there was nothing more to say.  This person was the parent carer of a 
participant with learning difficulties who used non verbal communication. I felt it 
was inappropriate to probe the carer either about her own feelings or those of the 
participant.
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In the second interview, again I used a topic guide (see Appendix six), covering 
expertise, managing impairment and how the NHS could be made more disability 
friendly.  In addition, I drew up a list of questions for each participant, asking for 
clarification or for elaboration of a topic discussed in the first interview.  These 
bespoke questions took priority over the standard ones as the aim of the second 
interview was to obtain more detail and depth.  
Researcher – Participant Relationship
A number of participants acknowledged my “insider” status.  For example, two 
participants made comments about ‘not wanting to end up in a wheelchair’ but 
immediately looked up and said ‘no offence’.  This was quite touching, as it 
indicated that they did not feel constrained by whom they perceived me to be, yet 
were nonetheless sensitive to that perception.  Another participant drew an analogy 
between my reliance on a wheelchair and his dependence on a ‘note book system’ he 
had devised to compensate for his poor memory.  The common feature of these 
remarks is that the wheelchair is instinctively interpreted as the paradigm case of 
disability and impairment and the participants position themselves in relation to it.  
While the first two participants were distancing themselves from wheelchair users, 
the third was trying to align himself with the paradigm case in order to make his 
hidden impairment apparent and significant.
Another participant referred to my insider status in a much more detailed way.  For 
example, he talked about nurses being unfairly put upon, in part because of his high 
level of need.  Thinking aloud, he reflected upon why he felt this as the nurses had 
never indicated that they were put upon did not even hint at it.  Struggling to say this, 
he questioned me: ‘you must have felt like that?’.  What is interesting here is that he 
takes for granted that our experiences would have been similar in order to explain 
something that he could not put in to words.  So the participant may also make 
assumptions about shared knowledge when the interviewer is an insider.  Later in the 
interview, I asked a question about the Wheelchair Service which was deliberately 
naive and from an outsider position.  In response the participant’s stance changed 
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from being reasoned and keen to help to being mocking and forceful.  In part I felt 
that this reflected his strength of feeling about the issue but it also felt as if he was 
irritated by my taking on an outsider status.
In a number of interviews I restrained my urge to engage in conversation.  For 
example, one participant talked about the difficulty of getting impartial advice when 
purchasing a wheelchair privately.  This is something I have experienced but felt it 
would have changed the dynamics of the interview to say so. In another example, a 
participant described several difficult and upsetting hospital experiences which were 
very similar to some of my own.  Indeed as the participant spoke I felt quite 
emotional, although I remained in control. It would have disrupted the participant’s 
opportunity to tell his tale if I had shared my story.  Indeed, given that I was in a 
situation of power, it may have put him in an awkward situation about how to 
respond.  It may have also constrained what he felt able to say for fear of upsetting 
me.  However, in both cases I tried to express empathy for what participants were 
telling me but from a position of neutrality.
Impairment Matters in Interviews 
For reasons discussed above, I did not ask participants to name their impairment.  
However, all but three did so during the interview.  In one of these three, I was 
unsettled by my urge to ask for the name of the participant’s impairment.   During his 
I couldn’t get a feel for how his impairment was enacted, although it was clear that 
social responses to him were often disabling.  My assistant shared my curiosity about 
his experience.  Perhaps this curiosity was a sign of my intellectual laziness: rather 
than piecing together the experience he was describing, perhaps I wanted the quick 
fix of a medical label.  Yet labels rarely reveal much more than a category.  However 
these can be useful in placing people, understanding their situation in relation to 
others.  Perhaps my unsettling curiosity was something similar to what participants 
were doing when placing themselves in relation to me as a wheelchair user (see 
above).   The pertinent question here is whether there is broader social function at 
play here, something to do with needing to impose order or to have some sort of 
explanation for bodies which differ. 
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After the end of one interview, a participant asked about my impairment, assuming 
that it was the same as hers because I had recruited her through an impairment 
organisation.  I explained I didn’t have that condition but was reluctant to name 
mine.  Yet Oakley’s injunction is to reciprocate, and I felt this acutely as the 
participant had just revealed many aspects of herself.  Before I could respond 
however, we were told to vacate the room (in the university).   Hence the moment 
passed, something which I later regretted as it was an opportunity for me to 
experience reciprocating and moving beyond my comfort zone.
Post Interview Process
After each first and second interview, I wrote impressions of each interview and the
participant.  These included my sense of the participant, the main themes of the 
interview, ideas for the second interview and reflections upon my performance as an 
interviewer.  All these were coded and used both in the analysis and the writing of 
this methodology chapter. 
My intention was to send participants a copy of the first interview transcript before 
the second interview.  This is a recognised method for establishing credibility by 
enabling participants to agree or otherwise with the way in which the researcher has 
represented them (Seale, 1999).    However, three of the first four participants 
expressed concern about the way they came across.  For example, one commented 
that she went ‘on and on’, another was shocked to learn she ‘didn’t speak in 
sentences’.  Also the transcripts were long and one participant apologised for not 
having the time to read it.  I took all this to be a reminder that what makes theoretical 
or methodological sense in the academy does not always work out in the field.  After 
the fourth interview, I decided to send participants a two page summary of the 
interview rather than the transcript.    At the beginning of each second interview, the 
participant was invited to comment upon the summary.  This gave useful feedback 
on whether my sense of the salient points tallied with what the participant felt was 
important and whether they felt my interpretations were accurate and fair.
Two participants made substantial comments about the interview summary.  One 
challenged my terminology, saying he preferred “person with a disabilities” to 
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disabled person.  We agreed that I would use his preferred term with reference to him 
but I would use “disabled person” for other participants. The second participant had 
shown the summary to his GP, who was unhappy with the participant’s description 
of his expertise.  This was tricky.  If the summary alone was amended the 
information would remain in the transcript and therefore be analysed.  Yet, to amend 
the transcript raised awkward issues about the knowledge status of the transcript.  To 
make the amendment would have been to recognise the fallibility of the interview 
process: at best, the transcript represented a reconstruction of reality which existed at 
one moment of time and from one point of view but mediated through the 
participant’s memory and any gloss he gave it.  This underlines the fact that the 
knowledge produced in interviews is contingent and mediated.  There was a further 
complication here.  The participant was requesting that his view be substituted by 
that of the GP.   This could be construed as medical paternalism, of the doctor 
knowing “the truth”.  Yet the participant’s view was my interest, including that he 
valued the GP’s expertise even though the GP denied having such expertise.  In the 
end, I did change the transcript.  Otherwise inviting participants to comment upon the 
summary would have been rendered tokenistic as it did not lead to any change in the 
“real” data contained in the transcript.
In this section I have tried to contrast my intentions regarding the data generation 
process with what actually happened.  In doing so I hoped to highlight how I felt 
participants’ perceptions of me as an insider, along with the disabling barriers I 
faced, influenced the interview process.  The perhaps unanswerable question this 
raises, is whether all this has coloured the data collected.  However, it certainly 
confirms that the production of knowledge is situated and contextual (Kvale, 1996).
Data Analysis
My reading of the data has been an interpretive and reflexive one (Mason, 2002). 
That is I have tried to interpret “what is going on” in the reconstruction of the events, 
feelings and meanings described by the participants and then trace the connections 
between these and the ‘relations of ruling’ (Smith, 1998).  In the process, I have also 
tried to take account of my influence on the generation and analysis of the data.
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All transcripts, summaries and impressions were transferred into NVivo for coding.  
As with much analysis of qualitative data, the initial phase involved looking for 
general themes across all the data (Gibbs, 2002).  Pieces of data which were similar 
were marked and linked.  I regarded this as broad brush coding.  These codes were 
mainly derived from my topic guides that in turn linked to my research questions
(see Appendix two).  These codes were:
 Experiencing impairment 
 Managing impairment 
 Disability Access and health care 
 Managing use of the NHS 
 Relationships with healthcare professionals 
 Medicalisation 
There were two main difficulties with the broad brush coding. First, I was not clear 
about the boundaries and interrelationships between the themes.  For example, many 
instances of managing impairment were also instances of managing use of the NHS.  
Although the same bit of data could be coded both ways, the underlying issue was a 
conceptual one: my “working definition” of each theme was vague.  This is not 
necessarily a problem insofar as the codes need to be flexible at this stage in order to 
incorporate unanticipated data which is related to the theme in an unusual way or 
challenges its definitions or boundaries.
The second problem was a lack of clarity about the angle of interest in a 
phenomenon. For example, the code managing use of the NHS seemed to become a 
residual category which comprised descriptions of any health care encounters not 
coded elsewhere.  Was my interest here concerned with the appropriateness of the 
services being used, the outcome, the way it was handled etc? On further reflection it 
became apparent that “my angle” needed to be determined by three related questions:
 What does the encounter tell us about how disabled people use the NHS?
 Is there a clear boundary between encounters for impairment related and non 
impairment related issues?
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 Do impairment or disability issues influence the actual encounter?
Having completed the broad-brush coding, I started reading through the text at each 
code in order to discern themes emerging within it.  In other words, an inductive 
approach (Baikie, 2003) was adopted, whereby the direction of analysis was from the 
experiences reconstructed by participants to the generation of new concepts and 
frameworks in which they could be understood.  Some useful and fresh concepts 
arose from this process.  For example, a number of participants described the support 
they derived from meeting others with the same impairment.  What was especially 
interesting was that an aspect of this support was “being with” similar others.  I 
called this “impairment solidarity”.  However, again there were difficulties.  It felt as 
if I was abstracting from participants’ lived experience rather than understanding it 
and placing it in the relations of ruling (Smith, 1988).  I was neither getting the 
detailed picture nor the bigger one but was stuck in the middle of the two.  To make 
matters worse, I became sidetracked by trying to create an abstract logical framework 
of codes to represent the text.  Having done that, I then tried to summarise each 
occurrence coded to each part of the framework.   Although this structured the data, 
it did not give me space to really engage with what was being said. This was 
frustrating and stultifying.
At this point, a colleague advised “ask the data questions”.  Needing a fresh 
approach, I began to generate analytical questions by going back to my research 
questions, tracing their connection with the interview and broad brush questions and 
then refining them in light of what was already known about the data.  The questions 
(see Appendix two) that proved most fruitful were:
 How do disabled people talk about their bodies?
 Are emotions implicated in the embodiment of impairment?  How?
 Are disabled people “experts” when it comes to handling relationships with 
health care professionals?  What forms does this “expertise” take?  
 What factors influence the development of expertise? 
 Does patient expertise conflict with health care professionals’ expertise?  What 
happens?  How does it affect relationships?
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 What range and type of access problems do disabled people face in health care 
contexts? 
 What factors shape access issues in the health care context?  Are some access 
issues unique to the health care context?
 Who takes responsibility for dealing with access issues in health care contexts?  
How? What does it involve?
I started to deconstruct each portion of data that related to a question (Wainright, 
1997), breaking it down and asking “how does it this piece of data relate to social 
structures and relations?”.  Thus, I established a dialogue with the data, writing my 
answers by each bit of text.  Having done this for each question I realised I had three 
main themes and each could be explored in a chapter.  These were:
 Experiencing impairment 
 Expertise and the disabled person/healthcare professional relationship 
 Handling access issues 
It was at this point that I started writing and reading (again).  I will describe that final 
analysis phase at the beginning of the next three chapters.
Presentation of the Data
All participants have been given pseudonyms to preserve anonymity.  As the 
disability community is quite small, there is a risk that some participants may be 
recognised from their biographical details, so some of these details have been 
changed.  The same risk applies to accounts of some health care encounters, 
particularly where these relate to the nature of impairment. These are more difficult 
to disguise because in some places they form the substance of analysis.  However, I 
have tried to ensure anonymity by making changes wherever possible.  Where it is 
relevant to the discussion, I have described the characteristics of a participant’s 
impairment - for example a late onset neurological condition, but not the name of it.  
The exception to this is where the participant has named it in an unusual way, in 
which case a direct quote is used. There are different views concerning how to edit 
participants’ quotations, which are presented in the analysis of data (Corden & 
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Sainsbury, 2006).  On the one hand, if quotations are regarded as evidence or as a
means of representing the voices of participants, then editing should be minimal and 
should reflect its original spoken form, for example by retaining the “ums” and 
“ahs”.  On the other hand, limited but judicious editing may improve readability.  
Further, some argue that it is ‘patronising to reproduce the hesitancies and false starts 
in normal speech’ (Corden & Sainsbury, 2006:18).  This tallies with how some 
participants felt on reviewing their transcript (see above).  I am persuaded by the 
latter arguments.   Accordingly, I have removed “ums” or “ahs” and on occasion 
made cuts to the quotation for the sake of clarity and brevity.  These cuts are 
indicated by three dots.   I have used square brackets in quotations to clarify meaning 
or to replace words which could jeopardise participant anonymity, for example the 
name of a family member or of a health institution.
Discussion
This chapter has given an account of the design and execution of my research.  By 
way of conclusion I want to consider the validity of the research or, to put it another 
way, on what basis can I ask you to trust the accuracy and integrity of the analysis 
that you are about to read?  Trust is needed on two grounds.  The first of these is that 
the data on which the analysis is based is a faithful retelling of what participants told 
me and that, in turn, the data bears sufficient relationship with the participants’ 
notions of reality.  Second trust is needed that my interpretations are reasoned and 
plausible in the given context in which they were made.  What should count as a 
fruitful measure or test of validity when using qualitative research methods is a 
matter of considerable debate (see, for example, Mason, 2002, Maxwell, 2002, Seale,
1999).  However, there are several measures which can be applied to my work. 
While none give decisive or compelling proof of trustworthiness they do give some 
indications of it.  One of the elements which contributes to Lincoln & Guba’s notion 
of credibility (as discussed in Seale, 1999) are “member checks” or participants’ 
feedback on the researchers’ accuracy and interpretation in representing their 
accounts.  This was done through inviting participants to comment upon the written 
summaries of the interviews.  A further element of credibility is the provision of a 
reflexive and critical account of the research process.  This has been the purpose of 
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this chapter and is continued in the following three chapters, where I discuss the 
selection and interpretation of the data presented.  Further, my style of data 
presentation illustrates how interpretation was reached.  This also satisfies Mason’s 
(2002) stipulation that the researcher should make transparent the basis on which he 
makes claims or arguments based on the data so that readers can judge validity for 
themselves.  Finally, I cannot make any claims to external validity, no
generalisations can be made about the applicability of my analysis to other situations.  
This is because the data and its analysis are infused by my biography and embodied 




In this chapter I want to use my interview data to explore how impairment is 
embodied and embedded in the mundane details of everyday life.  The analysis 
which will be presented here is the result of an iterative process which on the one 
hand, involved analysing, questioning and writing about the data, and on the other 
involved developing my own thinking through reading contemporary sociological 
texts about embodiment and lived experience.  As a way of setting the scene for this 
chapter I will begin by discussing this process before going on to present the 
analysis.
Questioning the Data
One of my initial research interests was managing impairment, what disabled people 
have to do with or for their bodies in order to live well from day to day and how this 
is influenced by health care encounters.  Hence one of my “broad brush” codes (see 
chapter five) was managing impairment.  Initial analysis suggested that this 
comprised three elements:
 Lived Experience of disabled people: how particular embodiments require 
people to act and be with their bodies in certain ways.  For instance, someone 
with balance problems has to be constantly mindful of her body when 
transferring: that is the technique by which a wheelchair user moves from one 
surface to another, for example from wheelchair to the toilet.
 Regular Management Tasks which people have to do in order to maintain 
functional levels and/or keep well, and the role the NHS does and should play 
in supporting this.
 Different Styles of Management that disabled people adopt and why.
The first two of these are clearly related, but whereas the former primarily involves 
the relationship between body and Self in the context of everyday life, the latter 
involves relationships with healthcare professionals in the context of specific, time 
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limited encounters.  Therefore it made sense to split the presentation of the data and 
make lived experience the focus of this chapter and focus upon relationships with 
healthcare professionals in chapter eight.  The style of management, the choices and 
constraints faced by disabled people in dealing with the impaired body is integral to 
both chapters.
My next challenge was to analyse further the lived experience data in a way which 
incorporated both the influence of social structure and the agency of disabled people.  
Reading through it, what participants seemed to be telling me was that lived 
experience incorporated a doing with and for impaired bodies in a disabling world. 
This is illustrated in the following passage from my second interview with Thomas:
‘It has always been a struggle to do anything; I have usually been able to put 
my socks on okay because I have always been able to work out how to do it. I 
have been able to work out where I should sit in order for my body to be at the 
right angle to do it. It has sometimes been a problem when I have gone away 
somewhere, like a hotel for a day or two, and I have found that they have 
furniture, particularly beds that are different height and I can’t reach down far 
enough. That has happened in the past’ (2nd interview) 
How did we get from questions about health care to the putting on of socks?  What 
did it tell us about Thomas’ relationship with his body that he could recount these 
details to me, a stranger?  Is sock putting-on usually a taken-for-granted activity 
which most people would struggle to explain about how they did it?  Is it only when 
Thomas is putting his socks on in an unfamiliar place that the task is no longer taken-
for-granted?
These questions only occurred following another round of coding which involved 
“asking the data questions”. These questions were formulated by re-visiting my 
research questions to remind myself how they related to my interview topic guide.  I 
then refined these in the light of what I knew about the data.  My first set of 
questions was too detailed: in effect interpretation of the data was required in order 
to code it.  This made it difficult to ensure consistency across all the transcripts and it 
felt as if I wasn’t listening to what participants told me.  I realised what I needed to 
know was how, when and why participants talked about the body.  I did this by 
reading through the transcripts again and coding to these much simpler questions:
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 In what circumstances did disabled people talk about the body?  
 How did people talk about the body?  Why?  Who didn’t?  
 What forms of relationship or modes of awareness did people have towards 
their bodies?
 What tasks comprise the daily doing and management of impairment?
The data coded to these questions form the basis of this chapter.  Recognising that 
writing is an important part of the analytic process, and having completed a draft 
chapter, I then re-read all the interview documents, to look for evidence which shed 
new light upon or questioned the interpretation of the data presented.
Analytic Frameworks
My next challenge was to find an appropriate framework or context to facilitate 
further interpretation of the data. The substantive part of the body talk data 
comprised descriptions of what people did to, or felt, about the impaired body in the 
course of everyday life.  I started thinking about this using Tighe’s concept of 
disability as work, reviewed in chapter two, which highlighted the disability related 
tasks which the disabled women in the study had to do every day and the additional 
tasks they did in response to pressure they felt to conform to non-disabled standards 
of health. As useful as this was in capturing this extra dimension of lived experience 
that disabled people may face, it seemed to lack any sense of impairment related 
work.  Yet this seemed to feature in my participants’ body talk, along with a sense of 
how they lived with and through an impaired body in a disabling world.  In other 
words, it lacked any sense of embodiment, of the ‘perceptual experience and mode of 
presence and engagement in the world’ (Csordas, 1993:135).
At this point I came across Mol & Law’s (2004) study of living with diabetes.  They 
argue that as well as having and being a body, we also do the body through daily 
practices.  An essential ingredient of this doing is self awareness: it is self knowledge 
of the body-I- am that enables us to act upon the body-I- have. From this starting 
point, Mol & Law examine the daily practices that people with diabetes do to avoid 
hypoglycaemia.  This doing has many levels, for example people have to learn from 
healthcare professionals about diabetes and the tasks and skills that the body-I-am 
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has to do to the body-I-have in order to manage it.  People then have to do the 
measuring of blood sugar levels which involves the ‘doing hand’ pricking a finger on 
the ‘being done to’ hand, placing the strip into the monitoring machine, reading the 
level and deciding what further action they need to take.  This and other doings 
become incorporated and infused into lived experience, so for one of Mol & Law’s 
participants, avoiding a “hypo” meant sitting on the kitchen floor at night eating 
yoghurt with sugar in it, having forgotten to eat before going to bed.  Bodily “doing”
is also constrained by social roles and relations; for another participant, a road 
digger, finding a hygienic place necessary to monitor blood sugar levels was 
extremely difficult.
One of the strengths of Mol & Law’s concept of doing the body is that it facilitates a 
multi-level and embodied analysis.  They specify the detail of doing, paying attention 
to the phenomenological experience of the body acting upon itself, they show that 
having a disease requires agency to do the necessary physical and cognitive tasks to 
the body.  The doing of these tasks is shaped and shaped by lived experience and the 
broader social context.  Thus we come to see how diabetes is enacted: we come to 
understand diabetes as the activities people do in response to their bodily condition in 
the context of their everyday lives, constrained by social roles and relations.
There is some similarity between Mol & Law’s concept of doing the body and 
Crossley’s (2006) concept of reflexive body techniques (RBTs).  They both require 
reflexivity, the body-I- am becoming aware of the body-I-have in order that the 
former can act upon the latter.  However, Crossley’s concern is with the daily tasks 
everyone does to maintain or modify the body, not just those associated with a 
particular condition.  Hence RBTs range from washing one’s hair to having a tattoo 
and all have as their purpose ‘to work back upon the body so as to modify, maintain 
or thematize it in someway’ (104).  RBTs are relevant here to highlight the 
ordinariness the body reflexively doing upon itself.  While doing impairment may 
comprise some tasks that non-disabled people don’t have to undertake, the act of 
reflexive doing in everyday life does not of itself mark out disabled people from their 
non-disabled counterparts.  This suggests that if an analysis of doing impairment
proves useful then consideration should be given to mapping a range of impairment 
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related RBTs in a similar fashion to that which Crossley has done for non 
impairment related ones.  
The concepts of RBTs, and especially doing the body, provided the framework in 
which the body talk data was analysed as it seemed to negotiate through tensions 
found in the literature. It enabled me to acknowledge that impairment can be an 
important explanatory factor (Shakespeare, 2006) in some aspects of disabled 
people’s lives, yet never in a way which assumes that impairment is pre-social 
because what is done to the body is always mediated through the social and cultural 
(Crossley, 2006).  It also enabled me to explore similar ground to that covered by the 
medical sociology literature on coping and adjusting to chronic illness/impairment 
but in a way which is embodied and enmeshed in social relations.  So for example, 
Kelly & Field (1996) argue that ‘the physical problems which chronic illness 
generates’ are the epicentre of the ‘coping experience’ while attending to social 
relations and the reconstruction of self is secondary (247).  By contrast, my 
contention is that ‘coping’ is actually management and that management is mediated 
through social relations and social roles.  Coping is pejorative and suggests 
something that one puts up with, whereas management implies agency and purposive 
action.
However, not all the body talk data comprised examples of doing impairment.  A 
small proportion described the circumstances in which participants became aware of 
the body for an impairment related reason. This awareness differed from doing in 
that it didn’t require the participants to immediately act upon the body.  Rather it 
caused them to reflect or contemplate certain features of it or, indeed, on some aspect 
of doing impairment.  In presenting this data my aim is somewhat perverse. By 
looking at the circumstances in which disabled people become aware of the body I 
hope to demonstrate the impaired body, as with the non impaired body, is often 
taken-for-granted. I will also highlight the different levels of taken-for-grantedness: 
for example, at some points it is the body itself which is taken-for-granted and at 
others it is bodily activities. This provides a useful backdrop for the doing 
impairment analysis for two reasons.  First it is a corrective to any impression that 
the extent and scope of doing impairment suggests that disabled people are always 
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aware of their bodies.  As we saw in chapter two, this impression is sometimes given 
in the phenomenological and medical sociological literature but challenged by 
Disability Studies literature (see, for example, Hughes & Paterson, 1997, N. Watson,
2000).  Second, in many instances doing impairment emerges as a result of this 
awareness.  
I will now present the data on the impaired body and taken-for-grantedness, followed 
by the data on doing impairment.  The final section will discuss the implications of 
the analysis.
The Impaired Body and Taken-for-Grantedness
During the interviews, one of the occasions which prompted participants to talk 
about their bodies was when they described the onset or progression of their 
impairment.  This is perhaps not surprising given the arguments that we become 
aware of our bodies when they change in some way (Cunningham Burley & Backett 
Milburn, 1998), and that illness disrupts the lived body (Toombs, 1988).  One 
notable feature of this form of body talk was how deeply the functioning of the body 
is embedded in the minutiae of everyday life.  This is best illustrated by the 
experience of Carol, a former nurse who has a progressive neurological impairment:
‘I would be tripping and falling while walking my dogs for no apparent 
reason... I couldn’t clap you know if you went to the theatre ..because the pain 
in my hands was so sore...so I just said to my friend “well I am not applauding 
because I can’t do it”…’(1st interview)
Here we see how routine bodily activities such as walking and clapping which are 
usually done in a taken-for-granted manner become problematic in a particular time 
and space: tripping while walking the dogs forces Carol to become aware of her 
body, albeit momentarily.  In a reflexive mode, Carol realises that the sensation and 
the act of tripping suggests something is wrong.  The effects of impairment, the 
bodily doing of impairment if you like, emerge from fractures in the relations 
between the body and the world of objects. It is during these fractures that the body 
ceases to be taken-for-granted.  This suggests that the biological aspects of 
impairment cannot always be separated from the social context in which they are 
experienced and so challenges one of the main principles of the social model of 
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disability.  A further point is Carol’s need to account for her body’s behaviour, for 
not clapping.   The physical movements involved in clapping have no intrinsic value 
and meet no functional need but comprise a symbolic cultural act.  To avoid Carol’s 
not clapping being misinterpreted as a cultural transgression, she brings her friend’s 
attention to her strangely functioning body.  In doing so Carol avoids another 
moment of pain filled awareness that she experiences when clapping.
Peter, a former oil rig worker with a degenerative neurological condition, described 
becoming aware of the usually taken-for-granted act of walking through observing 
the walking of another.
‘… I got off the bus, took off from the bus stop at the same time as a mother 
pushing a buggy. She just totally sauntered past me. I thought I am going as 
fast as I can, pushing nothing, and she wasn't even breaking a sweat. And yet 
she is away.’(2nd interview) 
What is not clear here is the content of Peter’s awareness: was it his body as an
object, the bodily sensation of ‘going as fast as I can’ or a comparison between this 
and ‘going as fast as I used to’?  At this stage, Peter did not know that through 
walking he was doing impairment, enacting it step by step.  Later, he gets a sense of 
this, feels it, irrespective of whether he had a diagnosis:
‘…walking along a bend, you have to make sure you know where you want to 
walk, where you want to place your feet.’ (1st interview) 
Here Peter displays an unusual awareness of a taken-for-granted activity, walking.  
However, this does not necessarily imply that for Peter (impaired) walking is no 
longer taken-for-granted, just that in reflexive mode he knows that his walking has 
changed and consequently sometimes he has to be aware of where he places his feet.
To go back to the sauntering mother, Peter’s interpretation of being overtaken was 
culturally mediated.  He assumed that as a man he should be able to walk faster than 
a woman, especially one pushing a buggy.  When it becomes apparent that he can’t, 
Peter reflects upon his body’s properties and performance.  As this was the 
culmination of a series of moments of awareness of strange happenings and bodily 
sensations he decided to seek medical advice.
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As we saw in chapter four, Shildrick & Price (1996) argue that one of the many ways 
in which disability and impairment is constructed is through the claim form of the 
welfare benefit Disability Living Allowance (DLA).  This is demonstrated by 
Elspeth’s account of completing her DLA form with the help of her Occupational 
Therapist (OT).  It also provides insights into circumstances where the doing of 
routine daily activities becomes modified by impairment, and how this happens 
without the person being aware of either the modification or the bodily change which 
precipitated it.  Elspeth described herself as ‘one of the walking wounded with MS’.
Elspeth:  ‘…my OT asked the relevant questions…because if someone had said 
are you still managing to cook a meal…I would say, “of course I am”…and 
then [she] said…”do you peel the potatoes” and I said, “well no, I can’t hold 
the potato peeler anymore”…”what happens when the pan is heavy?”... “well 
I get [my partner] to lift it”… you don’t actually realise what you’ve done is 
necessary…It’s not a choice…’
RB: ‘So you actually make these adaptations without being aware?’
Elspeth: ‘Yes…there’s a bigger adaptation that you have to make that’s 
noticeable you know…like when we got the set of wheels [i.e. 
wheelchair],that’s noticeable…but when you stop buying big potatoes for 
baking and we buy the wee ones with the skins on so you don’t have to do 
anything with them …that’s a detail…’ (2nd interview).
Elspeth (and her partner) had changed their cooking routine so easily and with so 
little awareness that Elspeth’s taken-for-granted body had seamlessly incorporated 
changes in her arm and hand function.  It was only when the OT asked very specific 
questions that Elspeth became aware of changes in her upper body function and how 
that influenced what happened in the kitchen.  The fact that the OT knew what 
questions to ask so that Elspeth’s bodily experience could be made visible and 
shaped to meet the eligibility criteria of DLA, is a good example of Shildrick & 
Price’s argument, that impairment is constructed.  It is also an example of how 
external bureaucratic factors can return awareness to the body.  
To go back to why Elspeth was able to incorporate bodily changes in her taken-for-
granted body, this seemed to be contingent upon two factors: Elspeth being able to 
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change the kitchen environment and the type and degree of bodily change. Looking 
at the former, it is as if Elspeth implemented the social model in her a domestic 
situation: for example, getting her partner to lift heavy pans removes one of the 
barriers which Elspeth faces when cooking.  This process of barrier removal was 
influenced by Elspeth’s social circumstances: having a partner who was able to help 
and being able to afford to change her diet and kitchen equipment to suit her
impairment related needs.  Gender issues may also have been at work.  Elspeth 
appears to want to take an active role in the kitchen.  Equally, Elspeth’s partner is 
willing to buck traditional male roles by assisting in the kitchen.
The second factor which enabled Elspeth to take her changing body for granted was 
the form that these changes took.  Elspeth describes how some changes require 
adaptations that are ‘just detail’ and others changes that are very noticeable.  So the 
need to purchase a wheelchair cannot be taken-for-granted in the way that buying 
small potatoes can.  Different types of impaired function have very different social 
and cultural connotations as well as different practical consequences.  This is a point 
not recognised by the social model of disability.  Yet the detail cannot always be 
taken-for-granted either: at certain moments the type of potatoes on the shopping list 
becomes no longer a choice, but a necessity and one which emerges from awareness 
of the condition of the impaired body.
The final point I want to make here concerns Elspeth’s feelings about being made 
aware of bodily changes through bureaucratic means:
‘Oh it’s horrible…It’s absolutely horrible...I hated it…I really really hated it 
[filling in the forms]…but it’s good in a way that it forces you to look at your 
true position as well…and there are an awful lot of people who are in denial 
and you know’ (2nd interview) 
Being able to incorporate bodily changes in the taken-for-granted body hides the 
‘true position’.  But which sense of the body is the ‘true position’?  As we have seen 
it’s not the taken-for-granted body, but invariably neither is it the reflexive body.  
Given that there is a to-ing and fro-ing between the taken-for-granted and reflexive 
body, Elspeth would have had many reflective moments prior to completing the DLA 
form.  It is only through a very particular form of interaction with a healthcare 
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professional that reveals the extent of functional impairment, and that revelation is 
mediated by Elspeth’s reflection upon the body in a very particular context, not upon 
the body per se.  But then there is a further complication: the process of revelation 
provokes the emotions, emotions which I take to be embedded in Elspeth’s hating the 
process.  These emotions influence how the body is experienced, so are these 
emotions part of the ‘true position’?  If so, will the ‘true position’ change as these 
emotions become muted over time even if impairment stays the same?  What I would 
suggest is there are many ‘true positions’ and each one comprises different elements 
of embodiment experienced in a number of different environments and sets of social 
relations.
I now want to move on to my final example of how awareness can be shifted to the 
impaired body as a result of having a condition which is fluctuating. Carl, a welfare 
advisor who retired on health grounds, described how he became aware of his body 
by comparing elements of his lived experience from one day to the next:
‘I have good days and bad days.  Today is a relatively good day and so I was 
able to walk to the door and get the door for you.  That was quite good.  But 
there are other days when I really struggle to get from here to the lift.  It’s a 
long plod.  But today it’s not too bad.  Sunday it was rubbish.  But that’s just 
the way it is.’ (1st interview)
The pertinent question here is do significant daily changes to the performance of 
body ever become taken-for-granted? Unfortunately, I didn’t think to discuss this 
with Carl hence it is difficult to discern from the rest of the interview.  However, 
Carl did say he would find be useful if
‘there was some sort of check up.  They can say, well, “last year your mobility 
90% and now this year its 60% or whatever” …a bit more sort of scientific 
rather than me just going well  before I could walk that far and now I can only 
walk that far’. (1st interview)
This suggests that Carl wants to counter or legitimate his reflexive awareness of his 
ever changing walking performance by having it objectively measured and 
monitored by others.  This may reflect dominant biomedical discourses that imply 
the body can be measured and therefore controlled. But it also suggests that repeated 
moments of awareness of bodily changes have an impact in addition to their
163
immediate impact on physical function.  This is supported by the following comment 
from Ed when recalling his (slightly tongue- in- cheek) reply to someone who had 
said he looked well:
‘my life is never boring. I said “imagine the excitement of lying in bed in the 
morning when you have just woken up and speculating on what part of your 
body is not going to work today. It may have worked yesterday and it may work 
tomorrow but it may not work today”. I said “ but then once I have gathered 
up enough courage to get out of bed and set foot on the floor at least I know 
what the whole objective of that day is”. She said, “Oh what’s that [Ed]”. I 
said, “to avoid falling over.”’(2nd interview)
This suggests Ed has incorporated a reflexive sense of his ever changing body into 
his daily routine.  Each morning Ed goes through the ritual of getting a sense or 
gaining self knowledge about how his body will work today.  In other words what Ed 
takes for granted is that he can no longer take-for-granted his bodily performance.  
This is something many people experience especially as they age (Cunningham 
Burley & Beckett Milburn, 1998). But there is another level of taken-for-grantedness 
here.  The person Ed is addressing who said he looked well has taken-for-granted 
that how someone looks is an indication of how one senses the body.  Either that or 
she had not expected Ed to give an authentic, bodily grounded response.
In this section I have discussed some of the circumstances in which disabled people 
become aware of their impaired bodies. These included the nature of the physical 
environment, casual remarks and bureaucratic procedures. The degree of significance 
that the individual gives to that awareness will vary depending upon both individual 
and social factors.  Carol and Peter each described one of many moments which 
indicated that something was wrong and they needed medical advice.  The moment 
of awareness Ed described enabled him to voice his bewilderment, and perhaps 
frustration, with his ever changing body.  Of course, when participants described 
moments when they became aware of their bodies, they were also implying the 
opposite, that they experienced many moments when they were not aware of their 
bodies, when they took the body for granted.  In this they are no different from non-
disabled people.  Nonetheless, as we shall now see, impairment and disability 
influence lived experience. 
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Doing Impairment 
This chapter will now proceed by presenting the analysis of body talk in the form of 
a number of examples of doing impairment.  In selecting these examples I aimed to 
include a range of instances of doing impairment by participants with different types 
of impairments and life circumstances.  To ensure a multi level analysis (Mason,
2002) as implied by Mol & Law’s approach for each example of doing impairment 
presented I aim to consider:
 Why it can be interpreted as an example of doing impairment
 How doing impairment is integrated (or not) in lived experience 
 The agency involved in doing impairment 
 How it is connected to and shaped by social structures 
The first of these is necessary to pin down and explore what I mean by “doing 
impairment” and whether it is a useful way of understanding disabled people’s 
experiences.  By making this exploration explicit readers should be able to judge this 
for themselves.  These levels are best conceived as dimensions, with the need to “do”
impairment in a particular way emerging from and influencing one or more of the 
dimensions. Nonetheless, each example will start with the individual’s description of 
doing because that is where doing is initiated and experienced.
The Body Doing to the Impaired Body 
Many disabled people have to incorporate medical tasks into their daily routines
(Strauss et al, 1982).  This was the case for Betty, who had an autoimmune condition 
and had to use an oxygen/air machine at night.  The process and experience of using 
this machine involved a number of different tasks.  It is these tasks which I am now 
going to analyse as three layers of doing impairment.
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The first of these layers was the learning the “technical doing” of setting up and 
operating the machine   Betty’s account of this suggested it was inexpertly handled 
by hospital staff: the machine – an ‘old metal contraption’ - was ‘dumped’ on Betty’s 
bed without explanation, nursing staff on the ward didn’t know how it worked, she 
wasn’t told about cleaning the filters which increased the risk of bronchitis, and the 
doctor ‘literally jumped down’ Betty’s throat, blurting out ‘“you can go to sleep and 
not wake up!”’ (1st interview).  It sounded as if the biomedical context only 
objectified Betty’s body.   Also its day to day practice disrespected Betty’s body and 
her sensibilities towards it.  Further, while the prescribing and designing of medical 
equipment requires medical knowledge, in a hospital setting the practice of using it is 
often dependent upon local conditions of who did what in each instance of its use.
One can speculate that this inexpert teaching contributed to Betty’s anxiety about 
using the machine when she first went home from hospital:
‘I tell you it was midnight, after midnight, before I went back through to my 
bedroom because I was frightened that I wasn’t going to set it up properly and 
it was not going to work. You know I was just so frightened.’ (1st interview)
This brings us to the second layer of doing, which involved Betty acting upon her 
body in what Crossley would call a RBT.  When setting up the machine, Betty had to 
touch her face, tolerate the sensation of the mask round her head and get use to the 
noise the machine made.   She also had to do this whilst experiencing the fear of not 
being able to set up the machine and feeling the responsibility of having to do a 
nightly life or death task alone.
While this ritual of nightly doing continues, Betty’s attitude towards it has changed. 
She has a new machine
‘… that is easier to cope with and I know about it now, you know four years 
down the line I’ve got to grips with it.’ (1st interview) 
Getting to ‘grips with it’ suggests that using the machine has become part of her 
lived experience: it has been incorporated into her nightly routine of RBTs, a routine 
that most of us do but in individual ways.  Thus doing impairment can become part 
of the ordinariness of everyday life. Betty is still doing, but perhaps having got used 
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to the bodily sensations experienced when using the machine and setting it up, the 
situation is now less emotionally charged.  Betty has also developed expertise in
using the air machine, perhaps becoming more technically accomplished than the 
nurses at the hospital. 
The third layer of Betty’s doing of the air machine concerns the administrative tasks, 
the bureaucratic doing, that is required.  The machine is inspected every quarter, so 
Betty has to be around for that, she has to arrange for a machine to be delivered to 
her mother’s house or holiday venue when necessary, and she has to deal with the 
NHS cheque which is a contribution to the higher electricity bills which are the result 
of using the machine all night.  Betty observed
‘…you need to find out yourself what to do. I’ve had to phone up and ask what 
you do, so there is a procedure it’s a few phone calls to get everything in 
place’  (1st interview)
While this bureaucratic doing may not be particularly burdensome and may become 
integrated within lived experience, it nonetheless has to be done.  It is part of the 
experience of impairment for Betty.
What do we gain by using the concept of doing impairment in order to understand 
Betty’s experience of using the oxygen air machine?  On the one hand it enables us 
to break down and specify one of the tasks that has to be done in order to live – in 
Betty’s case quite literally – with an impairment that is embodied in a very particular 
way.  On the other hand it enables us to show how impairment doings are an integral 
part of lived experience.  The concept helps to hold the tension between these two, 
between impairment being just a part of lived experience, yet also requiring the 
doing of additional tasks.  We can also lay down a marker here of one of the 
ambiguities of the concept:   does doing impairment refer (just) to the bodily task and 
associated bureaucratic tasks needed to use the machine successfully?  Or does it
also, or just, refer to the process of doing, the way in which it is enacted? Or both?  
In this example the focus is on the former but this is something I will monitor as we 
look at further examples.
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Doing Energy for the Impaired Body 
The next example of doing impairment I want to explore concerns the tasks 
associated with energy /pain management – an issue discussed by six participants.  
These tasks constitute one of the most obvious forms of doing and have the most 
distinct boundaries. Energy /pain management is also an aspect of impairment 
management which has been discussed in the Disability Studies literature, usually to 
make the argument that the social model of disability has limited scope for analysing 
the array of barriers and impairment related difficulties experienced by people with 
ME (Myalgic Encephalomyelitis) (see, for example, De Wolfe, 2002, Wendell 1997,
2001).  As we shall see, my findings suggest that energy management is an issue for 
people with several different types of impairment.  Further, the concept of doing 
impairment can analyse both the impairment and disability elements of energy 
management in a unified way.
The first layer of doing energy management involves a cognitive doing based upon 
‘knowing your body inside out’ as one participant put it.  One has to be able to sense 
how much energy one has, how much is needed for a given activity in a particular 
circumstance and what quality of energy needed: for example reading a book 
requires a different quality of energy than a walk around the garden. Energy 
management also requires a certain bodily attitude towards itself, one that it is 
willing and able to prioritise the body’s energy needs.  Again, energy management 
can be seen as a form of RBT insofar as most people “do” energy management, 
particularly given the fast pace of contemporary life (Wendell, 1997), but perhaps in 
a more intuitive, less calculated way.  However, for some disabled people, as for 
those in middle years (Cunningham Burley & Backett Milburn, 1998), the process 
has to be deliberate, requiring self discipline and skill to “pace” activities, 
interspersing them with adequate time for resting.  Furthermore, for these people the 
consequences of not doing energy management can put health and bodily well-being
in jeopardy. 
For George, who has a rare bone condition, energy management meant taking 
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‘…concentration off other things…it can be quite tiring…you have to sort of 
allocate time to do not very much…just relax…’ (1st interview)
It may seem perverse to argue that allocating ‘time to do not very much’ is a “doing”. 
Yet for George the well- being of his impaired body required him to structure his 
lived experience around this.  The “doing” then is the need to repeatedly make a 
decision in favour of resting rather than doing other activities which maybe more 
enjoyable or satisfying.  Here, by considering the consequences of doing – less time 
for other activities - we trace the ripples of impairment effects in lived experience.  
But does this lead to a greater understanding of the experience of disabled people or 
does it risk overstating the effects?  A further point to note is that doing energy 
management influences embodiment. Bodily sensations, such as tiredness or feeling 
rested, in turn influence one’s emotional and cognitive attitudes, both in general and 
in particular, towards having to make decisions in which energy management has to 
be a key consideration.
For other participants, making decisions about energy management was much more 
of an ongoing struggle than it appeared to be for George.  Interestingly, this struggle 
was often expressed in a way which evoked a dualism between the mind and the 
body.  For example, Halley commented:
‘…to start with it would be 70% me [i.e. the mind] that won the argument. Now 
I would say that I would be lucky if I get 40% me. ‘(1st interview)
What’s apparent here is that “doing” energy management offers no guarantees of 
success.  In the past, with careful management, Halley could do the activities she 
wanted 70% of the time but now it’s down to 40%.  It is Halley’s progressive 
neurological condition that places constraints on the success of her doing energy 
management.  Una also talked about the doing of the struggle to ‘pace’ her activities 
but, in terms of what happens if she doesn’t pace, she doesn’t “do”:
‘I get lazy and I can’t be bothered to pace and then I pay the price…but that’s 
just living, that's just being a human being and thinking “oh sod it I can’t be 
bothered to be good all the time”, it’s boring its really boring!’ (1st interview)
This demonstrates a further value of the concept of doing in that it allows for the fact 
that people do have choices, that they exercise agency about whether and how they 
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do energy management, albeit that those choices are constrained in ways which will 
become clearer below.  The importance of agency was made very explicit by Diane, 
who has an autoimmune disease which makes her joints stiff and painful:
‘When I was first diagnosed I would always think “Oh I cannae do that 
because that would really hurt…or I would be so tired or that’s too much 
effort”…Now I will just go do it and then I will worry about the pain later, you 
know but at least I’ve had a good day.’ (1st interview) 
It took Diane ten years to shift her approach because 
‘it took that long to work out that there wasn’t going to be a cure and that it
[i.e. her condition] wasn’t going to go away. I thought “if I’m stuck with this 
let’s make the best of it”’ (1st interview)
So Diane does energy management by (sometimes) choosing additional pain and 
tiredness as a sacrifice for “having a good day”.  This suggests Diane has a degree of 
confidence in her ability to live through or do the pain and tiredness made worse by 
having a good day.
A second layer of doing energy management is the “doing” of the social relationships 
and consequences which emerge as a result of the interaction between social 
structures and disabled people who have limited energy.  Una often has to do a 
certain form of social relationship because her impairment is hidden, and it is hidden 
precisely because she “does” energy management successfully. Sometimes Una is 
superficially judged as ‘being well’ by others, including representatives of social 
institutions such as the Benefit Agency and members of the public.  This leads them 
to question the legitimacy of her disability status and her claims for appropriate 
support services, especially Incapacity Benefit. Una described how she responds to 
this:
‘I’ve said to people come and live with me for a week and see what my week is 
like, see what I am like after a day’s work and why I have to be flat on my back 
for a day after. You report this stuff and you can see them looking at you 
thinking “sure you are fine”. But why on earth would you make it up?  Why on 
earth would you go through that process if you didn’t have to? I just see it as 
trying to educate people now’. (1st interview)
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Una “does” the task of educating others by describing how her doing of energy 
management structures her lived experience.  This suggests that people’s lack of 
insight into the day to day reality of disabled people, into their day to day “doings”, 
is a source of prejudice and suspicion about disabled people.  Yet there is a balance 
that needs to be struck: what’s important is that doing is acknowledged and seen as 
one of many elements of doing the mundane in daily life.  This is a point which I will 
return to in the discussion below.
Meanwhile for George, one of the consequences of having to do energy management 
and healing from fractures was that he had to take ‘time out’ from both university 
and employment. What could be an issue here is the temporal structures of these 
social institutions and their inability to be sufficiently flexible to take account of 
those who “do” energy management.  I omitted to ask George about the “doing” of 
negotiations to take ‘time out’ and whether he was given different options to 
accommodate his needs.  However, what George did hint at was the emotional doing 
of lost opportunities:
‘…you think back saying…I could have done that I could have done this…but 
you just don’t have the time…because that time has gone…because you have 
spent time healing…’ (1st interview)
Here, George reflects upon his bodily condition and its influence on his biography 
and does so through making the body a theme of consciousness.  This contrasts 
somewhat with George’s comments above which suggested that he, unlike other 
participants, was able to do energy management with a minimum of reflexivity.  
Perhaps in the past George’s energy management required greater reflexivity because 
it also involved learning the capabilities of his embodied self, given his bodily 
condition.  Everyone has to learn this and indeed repeatedly so, as such capabilities 
change through the life course and with what one wants or needs to do.  The 
difference for George is that such learning was an isolating experience as the rarity 
of his condition meant he would have had few role models, external benchmarks or 
social relations in which he could compare his bodily performance with that of others 
on a like with like basis.  This point will be picked up below when considering 
emotional solidarity. 
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Giving Time to the Body 
The issue of giving time to the body as a way doing impairment was also an issue for 
Iris.  This was not to do with energy management, but personal care needs which 
require the District Nurses to visit twice every second morning.  This takes up 
‘a big chunk of time so that time is not available for other things’ (2nd 
interview)
Again there are several layers of doing which Iris has to do to make this part of 
everyday life. The first of these was “doing” of the negotiation with the nurses over 
the time and day of the visits.  Iris emphasised how easy this had been as the nurses 
had gone out of their way to be flexible and work around her commitments.  
Nonetheless, it is a relationship which has to be done and its ease or otherwise is 
contingent upon the bureaucratic system within which District Nurses operate, as 
well as the attitude of individual nurses.  
The second layer of doing here is an emotional doing, evident when Iris commented
‘it’s obviously something that I’ve just got to be stoical about, …I just have to 
arrange my schedules so that I am not trying to give myself an impossible task 
to say get out at half past ten in the morning and cause myself stress’ (2nd 
interview) 
The need to be ‘stoical’ suggests a resignation, a need to make peace with having to 
set aside ‘a big chunk of time’ to dealing with bodily functions and incorporating this 
within daily life.  This involves Iris’ acceptance that the rhythm of her lived 
experience is now at odds with usual temporal structures.  To avoid the stress this 
may induce, Iris’ doing will include explaining that an appointment before 10.30 is 
infeasible.  Whether Iris’ rhythm becomes an access barrier depends upon how others 
respond to it.  Here impairment doing slips almost imperceptibly into an instance of 
disability.
What’s missing here is any mention of the level of impairment doing that explores 
Iris’ experiences of the nurses’ practices, the way they work, touch and tend Iris’ 
body.  This was not something which was spoken about during the interview.  
172
Nonetheless, the concept of doing could be usefully deployed in this context.  It 
could help to capture the mental and emotional doing of disabled people in situations 
where their physical bodies are repeatedly handled by healthcare professionals or 
Personal Assistants.  Usually it is assumed that disabled people in this situation are 
passive recipients.  While this may be the case physically, it may not be so mentally 
and emotionally.  One participant, Diane, did hint at this when describing her 
technique for preparing for repeated surgery:
‘…when I go in for surgery, I kind of put my body in there but I dinnae put my
mind in there. I kind of disassociate myself from it a bit and its like, just go in 
let them do what they have to do to me and then I get out again. It’s not like it’s 
me they have in there I don’t think. It’s a car going into a garage for a service 
kind of thing. I try not to personalise it too much.’ (1st interview) 
There is an emotional doing here, in which Diane evokes the mind/body dualism to 
demarcate her self in order to protect it from the way in which the surface and inner 
reaches of her body will be handled by healthcare professionals.  Diane is also doing 
the body by developing a narrative that her body is ‘a car going into the garage’ 
which assigns meaning both to her present and past bodily feelings and sensations.  
This equips Diane to deal with ongoing surgery.
The doing element in this becomes clearer when Diane explains how she has become 
able to disassociate her mind from the body:
‘…the last twice I’ve had surgery its been, maybe in the last three times its 
been a conscious thing [i.e. the dissociation of the body] because I’m older, 
I’m a lot older and I’m a lot more confident and I am better at saying to 
doctors and nurses how I feel and what’s going on. Otherwise I’d probably cry 
a lot more and get quite upset’ (1st interview) 
Here, doing then is something that has to be developed and learnt.  As such it is 
contingent upon one’s social status, biography and experience, enabling one to be 
confident and reap its rewards.  Without this confidence, doing comprises distress.  
The broader implication here is that, for Diane at least, is that it is not desirable, 
perhaps not possible to undergo regular surgery without embodied doing.
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Enactment of Impairment 
Earlier I asked the question whether the concept of doing impairment could usefully
be expanded to include the enacting of impairment through physical movement, 
emotions and senses.  In this section I want to explore this question.  In doing so it 
will also become clear how the enactment of impairment is influenced by the 
availability of different types of knowledge.  Knowledge is embodied when a 
conscious decision is taken to enact a particular type of knowledge through the 
impaired body.
For some disabled people, the process of enacting impairment is explicitly and 
formally learnt through rehabilitation, which is rooted in biomedical knowledge.  
This was the case for several participants including Fraser who had ‘to learn how to 
live again’ (1st interview) following the traumatic onset of a spinal injury.  This 
learning involved 
‘… more just coming to terms with living really. Transferring on and off toilets 
and into beds and standing in a standing frame. There was nothing wacky like 
learning how to crawl up and down stairs. Things which they don’t expect you 
to do’ (1st interview)
It is possible to draw out two aspects of enactment.  The first refers to the way an 
everyday physical activity is accomplished.  So for example Fraser enacts getting 
into bed by transferring from his wheelchair to the bed while most people will enact 
this by walking over to the bed and sitting on it.  The second aspect of enactment is 
only implied in the above quotation.  It comprises the quality, form and technique of 
movement necessary in order, for example, to transfer on and off the toilet.  The 
movement required will be contingent upon the effects of Fraser’s injury, his 
orientation to his body, the physical environment and nature of the toilet and the 
knowledge and practice of the therapists working with Fraser.
There are tensions between these contingent factors.  It is biomedical and healthcare 
professionals which set the agenda for what and how Fraser was taught to enact his 
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impairment.  Of course, learning how to transfer was vital, but having mastered the 
basics through rehabilitation, Fraser went on to teach himself ‘wacky things’.  This 
could be interpreted as a form of embodied resistance (or perhaps insistence) and/or 
demedicalisation. In other words, Fraser refused to limit the way he enacted his 
impairment and the activities he did to those prescribed and taught by healthcare 
professionals. 
This was facilitated by Fraser’s reflexive approach to his body:
‘…you’ve got to live life and enjoy yourself. I don’t do anything I think is 
overtly stupid, but I am prepared to take a few risks’ (2nd interview)
On the one hand Fraser wants to maximise his activities done through his body,
whilst on the other hand respecting its limits and well-being.  This seems to be a 
continuation of Fraser’s pre-injury approach when he did ‘things that would stretch 
me’ including ”adrenalin rush” sports such as cave diving but only ever taking 
calculated risks.  It is through the working out of this tension between risk and 
excitement that Fraser did, or attended to, his mind / body relationship.  This 
involved research and consultation in order to calculate the risk to his impaired body.  
For example Fraser had to undergo a medical before diving again.   The doctor 
placed restrictions upon the depth to which Fraser should dive. Suspecting this 
wasn’t based on sound evidence, Fraser consulted a ‘doctor friend who is a cave-
diving GP’ (2nd interview) who agreed with Fraser’s suspicions.  An interesting 
point here is how Fraser assesses and negotiates between different sources of 
knowledge and how this informs his enactment of impairment.
This suggests that the way any particular individual enacts impairment through 
bodily doing is influenced by a number of factors including the biological (the nature 
of injury), biography (sports background), social position (having the resources to do 
adrenalin rush sports) as well as rehabilitation.  
Perhaps more mundanely, Fraser also had to develop a knowingness and practice 
towards his body in order to maintain his health.  In the absence of sensation or 
movement below a certain level, this meant knowing how to do body surveillance 
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and interpreting and acting upon what it reveals.  For example, through experience 
Fraser has learnt that his leg spasms are
‘…quite a good indicator that something’s wrong. I fell out of my chair once 
and bent my toes and didn’t realise that my leg was bouncing up and down and 
didn’t realise that until I took my shoe off that I’d bent all my toes back. It 
probably hurt a lot’. (2nd interview) 
Fraser also needs this knowingness to avoid the complications associated with having 
a spinal injury. So, for example, he does his impairment by drinking a lot of fluids 
because the doctor at the spinal unit is
‘…worried about kidneys and things, because that is clearly what is likely to 
kill me in the end’ (2nd interview) 
Here we see that doing impairment which is related to keeping well and dealing with 
illness, is a collaborative act which relies upon Fraser’s accumulated bodily knowing, 
a knowing which comprises experiential and biomedical knowledge gleaned from 
healthcare professionals.  It also involves the doing of negotiating through the NHS.
In this way Fraser also gains more knowledge of what doing is possible through his 
body.  This process is still ongoing. Fraser still has ‘firsts’: this year it was dealing 
with a long-haul flight and wandering around in a different country.  One of his first 
‘firsts’ was transferring when he was at home alone:
‘I think it was interesting being sat in the house and when you transfer [i.e.
from bed to chair] you’ve got to think about it because if you fall you’ve got to 
be able to get yourself up, because there is no one there… there is no-one there 
to pick you up’ (1st interview) 
Fraser’s firsts seems to be about new situations where he cannot take his body for 
granted, where he has to “think about” his body - both in order to do the task and to 
learn from the doing.  He enacts knowledge and, through enacting learns and 
expands his knowledge.  Now transferring is taken-for-granted and firsts are ‘dealing 
with jet lag and long flights and things like that’ (2nd interview).
Rehabilitation following a spinal injury is often considered the stereotypical and well 
defined process for learning the skills necessary to do impairment.  So I now want to 
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contrast Fraser’s experiences with those of Martin whose impairment was complex 
and unfamiliar to me.  Hence Martin’s doing and enactment of impairment was 
largely self taught.
Martin has a history of mental health issues and has had more than ten brain 
surgeries to treat hydrocephalus.  As a result of the surgery, Martin has learning 
difficulties, poor memory, visual impairment and urinary urgency.  Martin’s doing of 
his urinary urgency is made more difficult by his memory problems:
‘I’ve got this way of focus now about the urgency problem, … I don’t go and 
wait until I need to go I mean I go and of course it happens with all the systems 
because when I arrive somewhere or when I leave this place… I pee and then I 
make a tiny note and that of course helps and compensating for the disability’
(1st interview) 
Martin has developed a routine to do urinary urgency which structures his lived 
experience.  As with other forms of impairment doing, using the toilet is something 
everybody does but for Martin it has to be a more considered, less instinctive 
process.  If Martin doesn’t do in this way the consequences can mean embarrassment 
and changing and washing clothes.  Moreover, Martin has to reinforce this routine by 
making ‘a tiny note’.  More generally Martin has a series of notebooks which he 
always carries with him and uses to expand the capacity of his memory.  So the act 
of physically writing in a note book and referring back to it is another way in which 
Martin enacts his impairment.
Another way Martin enacts his poor memory became apparent when I compared the 
transcripts of his two interviews.  In each the same incidents and events were 
described using more or less exactly the same words. I realised that Martin was doing 
his memory problems by re-presenting narratives that he had told over and over
again.  This is how Martin explained it
‘…my f*****g disability is so hidden you know, because it is very deceptive 
because a) I am relatively quite articulate and b) what I’ve said over and over 
again I can say relatively quite smoothly but only because I’ve said them over 
and over and over again… people take for granted like you know if you were 
asked what you did last weekend. Most people it’s not just a memory function 
matter but it’s also this ability to tell a story which most people do without 
thinking where they are completely unconscious of … maybe you bumped into 
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someone or you had a meal out and most people can do that and access it and 
verbalise it quite smoothly. I can’t do that’ (1st interview)
As we saw with Una earlier, Martin’s doing of his (memory) impairment is so 
effective that it obscures the effort involved and the limitations he experiences.  He 
finds this very frustrating
‘because it’s so hidden it’s like I am screaming out’ (2nd interview)   
The problems Martin and Una face because their doing masks their impairment,
point to the dilemma of “coming out” as a disabled person of whether to draw 
attention to a non visible impairment or to “pass” as non-disabled.  Passing involves 
withholding or concealing details or signs of impairment (or other stigmatising traits) 
to avoid being socially discredited (Goffman, 1990) or experiencing disablism.  
While Martin and Una may have the possibility of passing in some social contexts, 
the price they pay for this is that the doing is masked and others assume that Una and 
Martin can take the body for granted.  As a result their lived experience is 
misunderstood.  Interestingly, Giddens (1991) makes a similar point about 
maintaining “normal appearances” of the body in everyday life: such appearances 
require ‘immense care, even though the seeming absence of such care is precisely a 
key feature of them’ (58).
However, for Una and Martin, revealing impairment and thus coming out as a 
disabled person doesn’t guarantee that one’s situation nor their need to do 
impairment is understood. As we saw in Una’s case, her claim to be disabled is often 
discredited.  Passing and disclosing are equally problematic and both require forms 
of impairment doing. 
In this section I have explored how the concept of doing could be used to capture the 
enactment of impairment and how this is manifested as people go about the mundane 
activities of everyday life.  There are, I think, two reasons why further research on 
impairment enactment would be useful.  First it would facilitate an understanding of 
the bodily (the physical, sensory, emotional and cognitive) expression of impairment 
in a way which is non-normative.  In other words, it would offer a way of focusing 
upon what is rather than what should be.  As Fraser’s experiences illustrated, the
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bodily expression of impairment is not purely biological.  Rather it is influenced by 
different forms of knowledge, by cultural expectations of what a body should do and 
how it should be managed.  So the second reason why further research would be 
useful is that it would provide insights into the bodily nature of impairment.  Rather 
than seeing impairment as a bounded entity or pathology in the body as the UPIAS 
definition of impairment implies (see chapter one), it regards impairment as quite 
literally a condition of the body.  This condition influences certain aspects of the 
bodily doing involved in everyday activities and in its relationships with the world of 
objects.
Emotional Doing 
In the examples explored so far, a number of instances of emotional doing have been 
suggested as secondary to another form of doing. Here I want to look at examples 
where emotion is the primary “doing”.  I want to pay attention to the notion that 
emotions too are embodied and thus ‘structure ongoing lived experience’ (Williams 
& Bendelow, 1998:139).  Hence emotions both influence and are influenced by our 
engagement with the world.  More significantly for my purposes, within the 
sociology of emotions there has been discussion of “doing emotions”: for example, 
Hochschild uses the term emotional work to refer to how “deep emotions” are 
deliberately managed to ensure they are appropriately expressed in any given context 
(Freund, 1990).  
Within Disability Studies, Sapey (2004) has challenged the idea that the onset of 
impairment necessarily results in the individual going through a cycle of grief.  He 
suggests that feelings of loss (or anger) may be provoked by experiencing social 
barriers and disablism as well as impairment.  Using Thomas’ (1999) concept of 
psycho-emotional effects, Reeve (2004) has explored how the disablist practices of 
health and other care professionals can undermine the self-esteem and well-being of 
disabled people.  In doing so she has uncovered another dimension of the oppression 
disabled people face in everyday life.  This emotional dimension, along with 
emotions which disablism evokes, form an integral part of the experience of 
disability and impairment and may also require doing, as I will now show.
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Doing Grief and Loss 
Carol and Halley both spoke about experiencing episodes of grieving related to 
deterioration in bodily function.  For Carol the doing of grief seemed to be connected 
with tackling the practical problems related to that deterioration, suggesting that 
there is a relationship between emotional doing and agency.  This begins to become 
apparent in the following passage:
‘Well it takes a wee while to acknowledge that you have admitted to having lost 
something…like I mean it would be a year come May since I had my car 
converted to hand controls and …so that took me about six months to a year to 
think I really need to do this and then once I had…so again it was me who 
initiated that with the GP because he had to refer me to be assessed…it’s 
just…it takes time you know…’ (2nd interview) 
Here emotional doing consists of acknowledging loss and engaging with one’s 
feelings about bodily changes. These changes mean Carol’s doing of impairment will 
alter.  Carol will need to get used to driving using her hands instead of her feet.  Also
as Carol loses control over her legs her phenomenological experience of her body 
will differ: indeed Carol said she could feel her walking deteriorating each day.
Interestingly, in the quote above, Carol prioritises emotional doing, admitting loss, 
ahead of the bureaucratic doing, contacting the GP. A speculative interpretation of 
this is that feelings of loss can be energy sapping and require inward focus, which is 
incompatible with bureaucratic doing.  The latter requires a certain robustness of self
in order to deal with procedures in which the impaired body may become objectified 
and with the fear and/or reality that one will not always be treated with appropriate 
sensitivity.   Bureaucratic doing also requires energy to make the necessary 
arrangements and attend appointments.
This interpretation is supported by the fact that Carol also talked about the emotional 
doing which emerged from doing bureaucracy
Carol: ‘I get upset [pause] obviously [pause] you know [pause] then I give 
myself a shake [pause] you know maybe a few days…I never say “why 
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me?”…I really have never said that…and I am more likely to say “why not 
me?”…
RB: You mean…
Carol: Meaning…I am of the nature to deal with it’…(2nd interview) 
Having allowed herself to be upset, Carol changed the quality of emotional doing by
giving herself ‘a shake’.  This enabled her to shift into a more pragmatic orientation 
towards the body in order to ‘deal with it’.  This meant another round of doing: 
gathering information, consulting mainstream and alternative health practitioners and 
building up a support network.  In other words, ‘dealing with it’ means doing what is 
necessary to care for and live through a constantly changing body.  This was the 
main theme of both Carol’s interviews, caring for her body had become a body 
project (Shilling, 2003).
As with Carol, Halley also talked about the need to grieve and acknowledge her 
losses. For Halley these losses were as much disability as impairment related.  This 
was evident in Halley’s comments about giving up driving when she could no longer 
move her arm:
‘I had that bout of depression after I came here after about a year…I just 
thought I couldn’t cope with being stuck in this house…and not being able to 
go out when I wanted to go out…I had to sort of either make arrangements and 
rely on somebody to say they will come and get you or something like that and 
you know that really depressed me…and this when I talk about grieving…you 
know all of a sudden you have lost something and you know you are not going 
to get it back…  (2nd interview) 
There appear to be two forms of doings here.  The first of these is living with and 
through depression.  This may involve embodying feelings of sadness which dampen
both emotional and physical energy.  In turn this affects how one feels and does daily 
activities and the associated relations one has to form or sustain in order to do them.  
We see here a spiralling relationship between emotional and energy doing. 
Emotional doing reduces available energy, making energy management more 
necessary and simultaneously harder because one has less of it to manage.  But 
reduced energy levels can in themselves provoke negative emotions because, for 
example, it is hard to feel happy when exhausted.  Further, reduced energy also 
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makes it more difficult to do activities to distract one’s self or do the negative 
emotions that one is feeling.
The second form of emotional doing Halley describes in the quote above is her 
feelings about being dependent upon others in order to go out.  This was particularly 
evident when Halley talked about the fear of having to “do” everything through 
others to the extent that she had
‘… discussed with my children about…about taking an overdose of pills…when 
the time comes when I really cannot do a thing for myself…’ (1st interview) 
A social worker added to Halley’s fear of dependence by saying that if Halley 
needed care at night the only option would be to move to a residential care home, a 
prospect that ‘horrified’ Halley.  This example confirms Reeve’s (2004) argument 
that the attitudes of healthcare professionals, in this case a Social Worker, can 
undermine the psychological well-being of a disabled person.   Halley’s experience 
suggests that it is not only professionals who do this undermining but also the 
implications and interpretation of social policy.  The final point to note here is that 
Halley told me that one of the worst things about her condition was ‘living with it in 
your head’ (1st interview).  This suggests that a large part of doing both disability 
and impairment takes place through reflexivity and engagement with the emotions 
which provoke and are provoked by these states
Thus far exploring emotional doing has enabled us to consider the negative feelings 
disability or impairment may provoke, without giving the impression that these are 
inevitable, an inevitably that Sapey (2004) found embedded in the literature.  More 
significantly the emphasis on the doing of emotions has cast disabled people as 
active agents in the process of moving through different emotional states, rather than 
as passive victims of these emotions.  It also shows how emotions are part of the 
environment of the body and thus influence the enactment of impairment.
Impairment Solidarity and Taken-for-Grantedness
My final example of emotional doing concerns what several participants referred to 
as feelings of isolation related to having an impaired body.  As we shall see, for some 
182
participants these feelings were “done” or attended to by meeting others who have 
similar impairments - something I will call impairment solidarity.  The basis for this 
solidarity is linked with the earlier discussion about the taken-for-grantedness of the 
impaired body. 
This isolation was expressed clearly by Diane, who as a teenager developed an auto-
immune disease normally associated with ageing.  She felt she
‘… was the only person in the world that had this so young. And there was 
absolutely no one that knew anything that could help so you felt pretty much on 
your own’.  (1st interview) 
Amongst other things, there is a sense of bodily or embodied loneliness here. Perhaps 
part of what it means to take the body for granted is being able to check with others 
what’s normal, what needs to be worried about and so forth.  It seems likely that 
Diane wasn’t able to access such feedback or include everyday body matters in her 
conversations with others.  This increased her sense of isolation and differentness.
This interpretation is supported by Diane’s description of attending an impairment-
specific group some 10 years after being diagnosed with the condition 
‘…it is definitely cathartic …to see someone round about your same age that’s 
going through exactly the same as what you are going through and they just 
know, and you know and they know you know and you know you can talk to 
them and you know they are not going to think you are moaning. If you are 
really concerned they know they’ve been through exactly the same and can say 
oh yeah that happened to me or yeah I was on that medication or I got that side 
effect, and yeah I got my hip replaced and this is what its like and just knowing 
that there is going to be somebody out there that if they’ve not already
experienced it they are gonna experience it. And you can call each other for 
support that way.’ (1st interview) 
So for Diane, attending the group was a rare opportunity to share and explore similar 
bodily experiences. Certain common bodily experiences could be taken-for-granted 
so group members could talk about the detail of impairment specific doing, such as 
what it feels like to have a hip replacement.  This point was also made by Una
‘…speaking with others with [condition] you can take it for granted that there 
is a whole layer of things they will understand without having to say it’ (2nd 
interview) 
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However, for Diane being with others with the same impairment wasn’t enough.  The 
first group she attended one was
‘just awful. Everyone was so depressed and moaning about aching joints and 
stuff. And I didnae need that’ (1st interview) 
What was different in the second group was that participants were of a similar young 
age but had an impairment associated with older people.  Instead of ‘moaning’, in the 
second group members were able to engage with and processing the emotional and 
physical issues arising through having a particular form of impaired embodiment.  In 
other words for Diane impairment solidarity was also a form of emotional doing.
However, the experiences of Ed and Elspeth suggest that impairment solidarity 
doesn’t always result in emotional doing.  Rather they derived support from “being 
with” or feeling part of an impairment specific group
Elspeth: ‘… emotional support they don’t give you as such…but I suppose 
being part of the community if you like is emotional support in itself…you 
know…just the very fact that you are there with other people’  (1st interview) 
Ed: ‘there is very little said about each individual condition because we all 
know how each of them must be feeling without saying it’ (2nd interview) 
This “being with” suggests two senses of taking the body for granted. The first of 
these is similar to that described above: while participating in the meeting Ed and 
Elspeth are living through the body, unaware of it because they no longer felt as if 
they were ‘the only one’, the Other or and did not have the fear of experiencing
prejudice based upon bodily difference. The second sense of taken-for-grantedness is 
that the particularities of impaired embodiment are taken as read, not commented 
upon by others.  However, with either meaning, the interpretation that it is the taken-
for-grantedness of the impaired body which is one of the bases of impairment 
solidarity is at best partial.  Account also has to be taken of Ed’s feeling when he first 
went to a meeting
‘ I went to the meeting and the view was terrifying… no offence meant… 
everyone was in a wheelchair except me’ (2nd interview) 
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This suggests that there is perhaps an emotional and/or cognitive process that has to 
be undergone before experiencing solidarity from being with others with the same 
impairment.  Impairment solidarity is not therefore just a question of having the same 
impairment label.  It is also about the circumstantial details.
While the concept of impairment solidarity may be new, the ideas it conveys are not.  
In their study of people with arthritis, Williams & Bendelow (1998) noted that 
attending a support group provided a “safe” haven in which people could explore 
their feelings about living with an impaired body.  Further, as with Diane, Williams 
& Bendelow’s participants spoke about the importance of learning you’re “not the 
only one” which was key to accepting one’s changed and changing body.  More 
generally, Goffman (1990) notes the ‘special piquancy’ and sense of ‘ease’ that 
emerges when people with a common stigma meet each other (103).  In this section 
deploying the concept of emotional doing has provided the means to start teasing out 
the varying ways in which participants derived emotional support from doing 
impairment solidarity.
Psycho-Emotional Effects 
One of the strengths of the concept of doing impairment is that it highlights that 
disabled people are continually exercising agency about how they act through the 
body and how they negotiate disability.  However, as I have tried to show, that 
agency is always constrained by social factors.  With my final example I want to 
reinforce this point by drawing upon the experience of Nathan, who talked a lot 
about not doing disability and impairment and the implications this has on his lived 
experience.  
Nathan has had a neurological impairment since birth and a history of mental health 
issues.  However, at the time of the interview he felt his biggest problem was his 
large size.  Thus one has to be alert to how all of these facets influence his 
embodiment and hence his doing of impairment and disability.
During the first interview, I realised that my topic guide was based on the assumption 
that all disabled people use health services as it  hat emerged that Nathan was “not
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doing” of disability and impairment, particularly where dealing with bureaucracy 
was concerned.  For example,  Nathan said he ‘should have investigated that before 
now’ when asked if another GP in the practice would take him on now his regular 
GP had retired and he ‘should have contacted the social work department’ about 
getting equipment that would make it easier to put on his left sock because this had 
been a struggle for months.  He had also decided not to appeal when his claim for 
Disability Living Allowance (DLA) was refused despite knowing that a large 
proportion of such appeals are successful.
One interpretation of this “non doing” is that it is an example of resistance, of 
refusing to let his condition be medicalised.  This interpretation is suggested by the 
reason Nathan gave for not appealing the DLA decision:
‘I didn’t appeal because I felt why should I jump through hoops all the time to 
get what I need?’ (1st interview) 
If this is resistance it comes at a price: he can’t get a bus pass without a GP certifying 
his impairment and loses out financially not just on the monetary value of DLA but 
on all the other benefits and services for which it acts as a passport.  It probably also 
contributes to his social isolation because without DLA and a bus pass, transport 
becomes problematic, especially as Nathan cannot walk very far.  However, 
Nathan’s explanation for “not doing” was that he was just ‘drifting’.  Hence, when I 
asked Nathan whether there were any services he felt he needed but didn’t receive he 
said 
‘… someone to help me focus on issues that need to be dealt with there and then, like 
the GP issue’ (1st interview) 
This is a telling statement, indicating some of the more subtle, less intangible 
“doings” that are necessary to bureaucratic impairment doing: for example being 
organised, articulate, confident and persistent.  Yet, in contrast with other 
participants, these skills didn’t come easy to Nathan perhaps because of his limited 
“special education” and/or his social position.  (Indeed, throughout the interviews, he 
kept questioning whether he was ‘the right person’ for me to talk notwithstanding my 
assurances).  
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A further and related barrier was Nathan’s low self-esteem some of the roots of 
which appeared to be instances of what Thomas (2006) calls psycho-emotional 
disablism (see chapter one). For example, Nathan’s experience of special schools led 
to
‘…under valuing myself and that led other kids into heckling my, my verbally 
undervaluing myself, it caused a vicious circle. My under valuing myself 
vocally, they agreed with me and it reflects back to me’ (1st interview)
It seems as if simply being sent to a special school was stigmatising and devaluing 
for Nathan, and this was compounded by other pupils whose verbal bullying 
appeared to go unchecked.  A further type of psycho-emotional disablism Nathan 
endured was the attitude of doctors.  They tended to assume that Nathan’s 
neurological impairment adversely affected his intelligence, rather then taking time
to talk to Nathan to find out his intellectual level. This problem is a common 
experience for many people including those whose intelligence may be impaired.  
However, perhaps Nathan experienced this more acutely as a result of a childhood 
incident when he and his mother bumped into a GP who had been involved with 
Nathan’s impairment related care.  
Nathan: ‘The GP said to my mother “ Oh he is still here, I thought he would 
have died a couple of years ago”.
RB: I can’t imagine what that was like for a 5 year old.
Nathan: It still annoys me now’ (2nd interview) 
Here we can begin to see how psycho emotional disablism influences lived 
experience and the doing of impairment long after the event.  We see how such 
disablism becomes embodied: it means that Nathan has to struggle to get his left sock 
on each morning, it constrains the social spaces he can inhabit due to lack of 
economic resources and lack of confidence, it also constrains his health options.  It 




In this chapter I have presented a multi dimensional analysis of participants’ body 
talk primarily using Mol & Law’s (2004) concept of “doing” the body.  This has 
enabled me to put disabled people’s embodied and situated lived experiences at the 
centre of the analysis and then consider how these experiences have been shaped by 
this relations of ruling (Smith, 1988).  This was done by paying close attention to 
evidence of the dynamics between social structures and relations on the one hand and 
embodied agency on the other.  How has this approach helped in the task of 
understanding impairment?
The first and perhaps main benefit of my approach is that it reveals what some 
disabled people have to do to and for the impaired body on a daily or recurrent basis 
in order to live well.  We have seen, for example, how Betty has to set up and endure 
the air/oxygen machine each night, and how each morning Ed wonders what part of 
his body will work today.  The reflexive body tasks highlighted here are many and 
varied and include those that are physical, cognitive, intimate and emotional. Yet the 
examples presented barely scratch the surface of what has to be done.  There were 
more in the data but limited space prevents them being explored here.  Further, as 
mentioned above, I did not ask participants directly about the impairment related 
tasks they do and suspect that more would be revealed had I done so.  But doing so 
would have raised theoretical and methodological issues: would one want to explore 
impairment related doings which were no longer reflexive doings but taken-for-
granted ones such as the manner of transferring from bed to chair or cleaning one’s 
teeth with limited hand control?  If so, how would one access this, given that by 
definition people are unaware of the taken-for-granted?  Given the amount of 
scrutiny to which disabled people are often subjected to as a result of medicalisation 
(see chapter four) would questions about intimate doings such as managing 
incontinence be justified in a research project which would have little benefit to 
participants themselves?
Revealing even a limited amount of impairment doing raises some interesting 
tensions which underpin the experience of disability and impairment.  One of these is 
between the ordinariness and extraordinariness of disabled people’s everyday lives.  
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On the one hand, there were several points in the analysis where examples of doing 
impairment comprised tasks similar or identical to those done by most non-disabled 
people, albeit that the disabled person did tasks in a different or more reflexive, not 
taken-for-granted way, for example, Thomas and Nathan’s sock putting on.  In this 
context, Crossley’s concept of RBTs is a useful tool for further exploration because it 
stresses the ordinariness of reflexive body work. It would also help to ensure that the 
ordinariness of RBTs includes the experiences of disabled people.  Stressing the 
ordinariness of doing impairment also provides a useful corrective to some of the 
Medical Sociology literature, reviewed in chapter two, which considers how disabled 
people cope with their condition. 
On the other hand, however, exploring the doing of impairment draws attention to 
the extraordinariness, to the quite literal extra dimension of reflexive doing which 
usually has to be done in addition to routines.  For example, Iris must have visits 
from nurses every second day, Diane has to do pain and tiredness if she is to have a 
good night.  It is this extraordinary nature of doing which I think provides a 
significant challenge to the orthodoxies of the social model of disability. It suggests 
that impairment can cause restriction which hampers social engagement and the 
adoption of social roles, a point a number of scholars have made as discussed in 
chapter one.  For example it would be difficult for Iris to get a regular job given that
she cannot get out before 10.30 am because of the District Nurse visit (together with 
other doings not mentioned here).  Even with all social barriers removed it remains 
true that impairment doing takes time, energy and ingenuity.  So too doesthe need to
manage one’s healthcare, which will be explored in chapter eight.
The third benefit from considering the doing of impairment is that it provides 
insights into the nature and experience of impairment in a disabling world.  We begin 
to see that impairment needs to be understood as a condition or quality of the body 
the manifestation and meaning of which is always context dependent.  On the one 
hand this accords with Shildrick & Price (1998) who argue that categories such as 
disability and impairment are fluid, not fixed.  So Thomas has to struggle to put his 
socks when in the unfamiliar surroundings of the hotel, but had little difficulty in 
doing so at home.  Fraser is a full time wheelchair user but has taught himself how to 
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do ‘wacky’ things such as climbing stairs on his backside.  As well as being fluid 
impairment is also very much a matter of the materiality of the body, something that 
can be difficult to hold on to in the postmodern accounts of Shildrick & Price and 
which more generally often lacking in sociology of the body (Shilling, 2003).  
In taking a middle path through several theoretical tensions which surround the 
academic understanding of disability and impairment, does the concept of doing 
impairment lack bite because it tries to be all things to all people?  There were times 
when I felt that everything could be interpreted as doing, which would dilute the 
explanatory power of the concept.  To avoid this it was necessary to keep coming 
back to the reflexive element of doing, to keep asking “is this the body doing to the 
body?”  However I did stray from my focus on reflexive doing when highlighting 
bureaucratic doing.  My justification is that I did so only when it seemed to be an 
integral or necessary part of reflexive doing; for example Iris’s negotiations with the 
district nurses as part of doing her personal care and Nathan’s resistance to contact a 
Social Worker which made his sock-putting-on much more difficult.  
The significance of reflexivity to doing is not an explicit feature of Mol & Law’s
concept of doing.  Rather I ‘borrowed’ it from Crossley’s (2006) concept of RBTs 
and Csordas’ (1993) concept of somatic modes of attention.  Both authors emphasise 
the significance of culture in reflexivity, arguing that how we regard and attend to 
our bodies is inexorably linked to the society and times in which we live.    RBTs are 
culturally embedded and thus their meanings can be symbolic, normative and (are 
often) contestable.  They also change over time and vary with different subgroups of 
the population.  So it was not surprising that culture was apparent in many examples 
of doing impairment considered here.  For example, the context in which participants 
needed to do energy management was culturally shaped: the pace of life, the need to 
be reliable, to turn up for an appointment notwithstanding one’s energy level, being 
active in one’s leisure time are all reflections of contemporary cultural norms.
Similarly, Csordas’ (1993) concept of somatic modes of attention refers to the 
‘culturally elaborated ways of attending to and with one’s body in the surroundings 
that include the embodied presence of others’ (138).  One implication of this concept 
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is that the ways in which attention returns to the body and influences social 
interaction.  For example, if a non-disabled person stares at a disabled person in the 
street, the latter may become aware of her body and in response “do” impairment by 
pretending not to notice and/or deal with the emotion that the staring provoked.  
Another example of a somatic mode of attention was described above when Carol 
felt she needed to explain to her friend her reason for not clapping.  Doing becomes 
part of our intersubjectivity.  In some ways then, the concept of somatic modes of 
attention offers a much broader framework for looking at doing impairment.  It can 
take account not just what the reflexive body does to itself, but also what others do to 




Disability Access in Health Care Settings
This chapter is about disability access in the context of health care settings.  The 
concept of access barriers has been a key political and analytical tool used both by 
disability activists and scholars to deconstruct the apparent neutrality of the built 
environment and the social practices that occur within them (Freund, 2001). This 
deconstruction has revealed myriad social barriers which systematically discriminate 
against disabled people and restrict their life chances (Barnes, 1991).  It has also 
revealed that these barriers are neither an inevitable outcome of impairment nor 
simply an accident of poor environmental design (Imrie, 1996).  Rather, barriers are 
socially created by and ‘reflect the wider complexity of socio-cultural and political 
processes’ (Imrie, 1996:25).  At an abstract level, these processes include the mode 
of industrial capitalist production (Oliver, 1990a).  They also include the cultural 
privileging of certain forms of embodiment, namely that of the young, fit, white 
male.  It is with that group’s embodiments, abilities and aspirations in mind that 
social spaces have been designed (Imrie & Kumar, 1998, Hastings & Thomas, 2005).   
Those with body types outside this cultural norm experience varying degrees of 
bodily inconvenience and exclusion.  This includes but is not restricted to disabled 
people.  To overcome this inconvenience and exclusion it is argued that universal 
design principles need to be adopted to create an environment which is ‘safe, 
aesthetic and comfortable’ for the widest possible range of embodied agents (Freund,
2001:704). 
Having demonstrated that access barriers are socially created, the disability 
movement campaigned for barrier removal.  One of the fruits of this campaign has 
been the Disability Discrimination Acts of 1996 & 2005 (DDA).  Amongst other 
things, this legislation has placed a statutory duty on service providers to remove 
access barriers by making “reasonable adjustments” to the physical environment, 
policies, practices and procedures.  This duty is anticipatory, that is service providers 
such as the NHS have to anticipate disabled people’s access needs and address them 
in advance of any particular disabled person using the service.  In addition, as a 
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public body the NHS needs to “actively promote disability equality” by scrutinising 
all its policies and practices – not just those which explicitly deal with disability - to 
ensure it does not unwittingly disadvantage disabled people.  
It is against this understanding of disability access and the accompanying legislation 
that the purpose of this chapter must be considered: to explore disabled people’s 
experiences of negotiating access barriers in a health care context.   We know little of 
disabled people’s ‘interaction with the physical and/or built environment, although it 
is clear that they experience it in multiple and differentiated ways’ (Imrie, 1996:12).  
By deconstructing examples of such interaction, I want to join Freund (2001) and 
Hughes & Paterson (1999) in offering an embodied approach which focuses upon 
what happens when disabled people encounter barriers, how they handle them and 
the extent to which these barriers are shaped by the context in which they occur.  By 
implication, this will challenge the idea that access barriers are just “out there”, 
divorced from the ‘attitudes and emotions we [i.e. disabled people] hold inside 
ourselves about our experiences of discrimination’ (Finkelstein, 1996:2).  However 
my challenge is to the academic understanding of access barriers, where a more 
sophisticated and more nuanced approach is possible.  It is not my intention to 
undermine the usefulness of the social model in achieving widespread barrier 
removal.  Indeed I hope that my approach will provide useful insights into access 
barriers and thus enable those delivering health services to effect change. 
Analysing Access
The substance of this chapter will be the analysis of data derived from two sources: 
the Project’s participants and my autoethnographic writings (see chapter five).   My 
writings preceded the main period of data generation and helped to clarify that my 
interest in access issues lay less with the identification of access barriers per se and 
more with what happens in the moments of an access encounter.  My interest also lay 
with whether what happens during access encounters influences and is influenced by 
impaired embodiment.  Autoethnography has a useful role to play here because it
provides a depth of personal detail and emotional intensity that it is not always 
possible to generate during a one hour interview.  To capture this detail and intensity, 
I decided to present the autobiographical data as two scenarios, each of which is a 
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reconstruction of an access encounter I experienced in a hospital setting.  These 
reconstructions include inner dialogue as a means of capturing the emotional and 
psychological dimensions integral to the negotiation of complex and situated access 
barriers.  The description of the scenario begins the process of analysis and is 
followed by further deconstructions and insights.
Autoethnographic writing can be strengthened by comparing and contrasting the 
experiences it documents with the experiences of other people.  This is what I will do 
here.  Of course there are dangers with this:  interpreting one’s own experiences is 
less speculative than interpreting interview data, because it is only with data about 
one’s own experiences that one can confound or substantiate it by adding new detail 
at any point. Further, one’s ego may intervene to favour one’s own story.  Perhaps I 
have added to these dangers by structuring the chapter around the two scenarios that 
formed the centrepiece of my writing.  However, after much experimentation, this 
somehow seemed more honest because it made transparent how my experience 
influenced my understanding of participants’ experiences.  It also made it more 
readable.  
The second source of data used in this chapter was generated from the participants’ 
interviews.  The initial broad brush coding of access data was relatively straight 
forward.  All participants were asked to describe any access barriers they had 
experienced when using the NHS and, in most instances it was the responses to this 
question which were coded Disability access and health care.   However, three
participants reported having no access problems, but elsewhere in the interview 
described what I would consider access problems, for example difficulties using the 
non emergency ambulance to get to hospital appointments.  I took their initial 
negative response to be an indication that handling access problems becomes part of 
taken-for-granted everyday life to such an extent that it is not remarked upon: it’s 
just something that’s done.  This meant, of course, that I looked for data on access
throughout the transcripts, not just in the answer to the access question.  
Interestingly, unlike with all my other codes, I did not have a working definition of 
access, suggesting that I too took for granted that I knew what I meant by the term!  
As will become apparent, my meaning is a broad one: it covers difficulties with 
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transport, getting into and around buildings and using equipment or “fitting in” to 
practices which take place within NHS premises.
Having done the broad brush coding, I then asked the data questions in the manner 
described in chapter five.  In keeping with my interest derived from personal 
experience, these questions concerned handling access encounters and the extent to 
which the health care setting influenced the nature of these encounters, how the 
barriers were dealt with and what were their implications.
The data which answered these questions comprised rich descriptions of participants’ 
embodied relationships with access barriers and the techniques used to handle them.  
To analyse this data further, I used the concept of doing impairment (described in 
chapter six) but with some refinements. I developed the concept of “doing access” to 
try to understand one of the embodied elements of access encounters, namely the 
relationship between the enactment of impairment and the characteristics of the 
access barrier experienced.  As with doing impairment, doing access involves 
reflexivity, a doing to the body, with the body, in a specified context.  It also 
involves embodied engagement with the physical environment and the world of 
objects found therein, an engagement which is often mediated through social 
interaction.  Then, at some almost imperceptible moment, the doing of access 
becomes access handling.  This concept describes the embodied action disabled 
people take to avoid, resolve or minimise the effect of access barriers in their 
everyday lives.  Again, as with doing impairment, handling access assumes disabled 
people’s agency, albeit an agency that is constrained (but sometimes enabled) by 
social structures.
I will present the doing and handling access data alongside the first autoethnographic
scenario.  This scenario was written before developing the two concepts of doing and 
handling access although they are implicit within it.  This posed a presentational 
dilemma: do I re-analyse my scenario using the concepts or do I treat it as a fixed 
text?  The latter has the advantage of showing how my thinking has developed from 
personal experience, through critical analysis of the literature, to the use of new tools 
to analyse the experience of others.  It is the latter approach that I have chosen.  
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However, sometimes I have used the concepts to clarify points in the analysis of my 
experiences.
The second and smaller half of this chapter will explore what I will refer to as
clinical access.  This is the subject of my second scenario where it refers to access 
issues that emerge during the process of diagnostic testing or treatment.   These 
issues were highly context dependent and required bespoke solutions.  Clinical 
access barriers did not figure greatly during the interviews: they were hinted at by 
two participants and formed the main topic of one of the pilot interviews.  One can 
speculate as to the reasons for this: it could be that clinical barriers are only a 
problem for a small number of disabled people whose impairments are enacted in a 
very particular way, because participants didn’t think this type of barrier was an 
access issue and thus did not mention them, or it could be that discussing these 
barriers required a level of detail that participants did not want to disclose.  The latter 
was true in my case and so it wasn’t something I spoke about when I was 
interviewed.
Scenario One: What’s in a Bed?
It’s a planned admission.  I’m sitting in the corridor of the ward with my PA 
(Personal Assistant).   The nurse, who’s just going off duty, points the way to 
the bay where my bed is now ready.  We find it easily and say a tentative hello 
to my three bay mates.
Arriving at my bed, my heart sinks. It has none of the features I need in order 
to transfer on to the bed and move around once in it.  A jumble of thoughts and 
emotions come to the fore: self chastisement because it hadn’t occurred to me 
to ring  the ward beforehand to check they could provide what I needed; 
sadness at the realisation that with my new more restrictive bodily ways I 
should no longer assume I could cope with less than ideal situations even with 
a PA. Yet I am buoyed too, knowing K and I make a good team when it comes 
to managing tricky access situations. But I’m worried that, while I know the 
nursing staff will help,   they may not do so in the way that I want.  I am 
unashamedly fussy about these things.  It is my body after all.
I sit silently with these thoughts until the night nurse comes in to introduce 
herself.  I take a deep breath and seize the moment.  It’s now or never I tell my 
self to get over my unease at having to ask for what some may consider too 
much. 
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The nurse ‘gets it’ straight away and goes in to action so quickly I almost don’t 
have time to be relieved.  She negotiates with my neighbour to swap beds. Her 
bed being electrically operated will enable me to sit up and to adjust the bed 
height to my chair for the purpose of transferring.  Then the nurse spots what I 
haven’t: my bed space has no curtains, a problem with the laundry apparently.  
No doubt realising I will need help in bed and therefore a degree of privacy, 
she asks a second woman to swap bed space with me.  I’m impressed and 
heartened, the nurse seems to be handling it all matter-of-factly, as if its part of 
the routine. Perhaps it is routine.  I do feel a slight awkwardness with respect 
to my bay mates.  Will they see me as grabbing the goodies, the electric bed, 
the curtained spaced, as causing upheaval just as they had just settled in a 
strange, anxiety ridden environment?  Somewhat ineptly, and probably more 
for my sake than theirs, I try to explain why I need these things and the 
precariously and often shadowy boundary between being able to cope with a 
given environment or not.
The first point I want to draw from this scenario is to consider how the bed came to 
be constructed as an access barrier.  The intrinsic qualities of the bed played some 
part of this.  Had it been an electrically operated bed, there would have been no 
access problems.  But context too played a role.  By context I mean the material 
features of the space and the social practices which happen within it.  These practices 
influence how the space is used, the purpose and structure of its routines, and the 
roles and relationships of the people within it.  Had I been a visitor or healthcare 
professional working in the ward the bed would not have been a barrier.  As a 
patient, I gradually became incorporated into the nursing routines: waiting outside
until the bed was ready, being shown to my bed, the night nurse coming with 
medication.  Amid all this purposeful activity, the decision to allocate one particular 
actual bed (as opposed to matching an abstract bed to an abstract patient by a bed 
manager) was probably totally arbitrary.  There were two electric beds in the four 
bedded bay so I had a fifty fifty chance of being allocated an inaccessible bed.
Another ingredient in the construction of the bed as an access problem was the way 
my impairment was enacted.  Had I been allocated the same bed two years 
previously there would not have been a problem. Now I do not have the strength and 
control over one of my arms so I can’t pull myself up.  But this was not the only 
aspect of my embodiment which played a role here.  My embodied agency was also 
involved and this had several elements; my (low) tolerance levels of the 
phenomenological experience of my body in less than average circumstances, my 
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confidence to articulate my needs and my expectation that access barriers should be 
removed wherever possible.   All these elements were shaped by my social position.  
Perhaps more significantly they were also shaped by my understanding of the social 
model, for how the body is experienced phenomenologically is influenced not only 
by bodies in spaces but also by (embodied) consciousness (Freund, 2001).   While 
the social model may be disembodied, its precepts and transformative powers can 
nonetheless be embodied.  Being embodied, it influences my perceptions of material 
features and practices within social space and enables me to identify some of these as 
barriers and then gives me a basis from which to handle them.
Nonetheless, it is with a certain degree of trepidation that I handle access, I transform
the interplay of these social forces - embodiment, the hospital context and its 
practice, as well as the non electric bed – into an access encounter.  The encounter 
then is the social interaction prompted by the naming of the barrier, a rare moment of 
foregrounding a feature of the environment and my relationship with it.  In the 
processing of doing so I bring (unwanted) attention to my embodied self, making me 
feel out of place, uncomfortable at having to disrupt the flow of events and the 
pattern of the relationships with my bay mates.  But the interaction between the nurse 
and me became the dynamic for change and resolution of the problem.  The nurse 
listened, responded to my needs with great sensitivity and removed the access 
barrier.  What was it that enabled her to do so: personal qualities, hospital policy, 
professional training or a combination of these?  Certainly the hospital context also 
played a part because the equipment I needed was readily available.
What I have drawn from this scenario is that some access barriers are contingent 
upon the coming together of a number of factors: the qualities of material objects, 
social spaces and the practices that happen within them, embodiment and agency.  At 
a critical moment these forces shape an access encounter in which social interaction 
occurs.  It is this social interaction which forms part of access handling.  At this point 
it is useful to recall Thomas’ (1999) social relational approach to the social model.  
This restates UPIAS’ definition of disability – the imposition of a restriction of 
activity – but emphasises that this is a specific form of an unequal social relationship 
between impaired and non impaired people.  Thomas goes on to point out that this 
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relationship occurs at a number of different levels and in a variety of social contexts.   
With regard to access, at the most abstract, access barriers emerge from a capitalist 
mode of production (Oliver, 1990a).  It is literally built into the environment through 
the interaction between land values, planning and building regulations and their 
enforcement (Imrie & Hall, 2001).  But it can also occur and be enacted at the 
moment when a particular disabled person, at a particular moment, encounters a 
particular access barrier, in a particular context.  The relationships between all these 
particularities are changed, re-ordered by the way the encounter is handled by each 
party.  In some instances, those changes are positive, the barrier, if not removed, is 
negotiated either physically or through interaction or through both.  The latter was 
the case in the scenario.  In other instances, the handling may be botched and so 
undermine systems put in place to facilitate access.  This can be illustrated by a 
participant who described how a nurse made ‘a right pig’s ear’ of hoisting her.  This 
was despite the fact the hoist was made available, that the staff said that they had 
been trained in using it and that the participant suggesting her PA could help.
This line of argument that access barriers are contingent and multilayered is much 
messier than the simplicities of the social model which says ‘we are disabled by 
society not our bodies’ (Shakespeare & Watson, 2001). As such, it is politically 
risky because it can blur the issue about who is responsible for resolving access 
issues.  If we admit that impairment has something to do with access then people will 
say “we can’t do anything about that” and so barriers remain.  But a way round this
is to identify two different types or categories of access barrier, the macro and the 
micro.  What distinguishes these is the degree of contingency and whether the 
solution required is general or individual.  This is best illustrated by example.  A
flight of steps can be considered a macro access barrier, constituting a barrier not just 
for me but for many with mobility impairments and in just about every social space 
in which there are steps.  Therefore they are not very contingent and they require a 
universal form of solution, the provision of a ramp, lift or alternative entrance.  But 
the same cannot be said about hospital beds which can be categorised a micro access 
barrier.  Although I am probably not the only disabled person who needs equipment 
attached to a bed, the configuration of equipment I need may well be particular to my 
needs. 
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Distinguishing between macro and micro access needs becomes pertinent when 
considering the NHS’s anticipatory duty under the DDA.  One can argue that macro 
barriers can always be anticipated and removed or bypassed by means of a 
reasonable adjustment.  Micro barriers too can be anticipated, but indirectly: it is not 
always possible to anticipate the actual barrier or the most appropriate way of dealing 
with it for any individual.  However, what can be anticipated is that some disabled 
people will have specific needs and systems ought to be in place to enable healthcare 
professionals to respond to these appropriately in the moment of the access
encounter.  This is exactly what happened in this scenario.  The question then 
becomes: what training and support do healthcare professionals need to enable them 
to respond in this way?
Anticipating Access Needs in Healthcare Settings
To further explore this point about what type and level of access needs should be 
anticipated in health care settings, I want to draw upon the experience of one 
participant.  At the time of interview, Iris had had a recent spinal injury, was a 
wheelchair user and had twenty four hour Personal Assistants. She was also a regular 
health care user due to ongoing kidney and bladder problems.  It appeared that one 
aspect of Iris’ doing of access was grounded in having to make an explicit judgement 
about the situations where it was necessary for her to alert people of a certain type of 
access need in advance of an appointment:
‘Within the NHS … I don’t ask questions like if they have a ramp because I 
always assume that there will be a way in …but they might not [have] other 
specialist things that I might need... when I go to the clinic for spinal injured 
patients …they’re always going to have a hoist somewhere lurking behind, but 
as I say the place at [the clinic] which is smaller…’  (1st interview)
Iris assumes all NHS premises will have wheelchair access but feels that a hoist is a 
‘specialist thing’ the availability of which depends upon the type of facility. 
Believing the clinic to be small, Iris handles the access by phoning ahead to request a 
hoist. What did Iris feel about having to do this?
‘Well in an ideal world you wouldn’t have to do that [phone ahead], in an 
ideal world somebody would say to me ‘don’t worry Iris [the clinic] will have 
the facilities for you’…but we don’t live in an ideal world…’  (1st interview) 
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Here, Iris foresees the possibility of the NHS being able to anticipate and meet her 
access needs, but only in an ideal world.  In the mean time she gets on and handles 
access.   
Gigi, another wheelchair and PA user, appeared to have higher and more general 
expectations about how the NHS should deal with access compared with Iris:
‘In a health care setting they think that the provision of facilities for disabled 
people will be x or y, but they never think about a, b,c ,d, e, or f, because we 
are all different. And some of us are more different than others…they should 
think of a way of accommodating anyone with any impairment.’ (2nd 
interview) 
Unfortunately, I omitted to ask Gigi whether she felt all disabled people’s needs 
should be anticipated and if so what ideas did she have about achieving this in 
healthcare settings.  .  In terms of the DDA, ultimately this is something that will be 
decided by negotiation and case law.  In the meantime, when handling access,
disabled people will have to judge where, when and for what they can rely upon the 
anticipatory duty. These judgements could become a collective force for change
because the more micro needs that disabled people expect to be anticipated and met, 
the greater the pressure on service providers to do so.
To turn back to Iris, although she rang to request the hoist when she arrived
‘I could see that they weren’t expecting me to be in a wheelchair… they didn’t 
make a big fuss, somebody just went whooshing off to find a hoist’.  (1st
interview)
The phrase ‘they weren’t expecting me to be in a wheelchair’ is interesting.  It could 
simply be a reference for her access needs.   But it could also suggest that Iris felt 
wheelchair users were unexpected, out of place.  However, it’s not clear whether this 
has anything to do with the hospital environment in particular or being excluded 
from social spaces generally.    Nonetheless by ringing to request the hoist, Iris
announces her (impaired) existence and avoids the awkward moment when others 
register that one is not what they expected.  Hence ‘they didn’t make a big fuss’ 
could have been a mark of relief.  This reminds us of the symbolic importance of the 
DDA requirement to anticipate: it indicates that it should be expected that disabled 
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people are out and engaging in the world.  More pragmatically, requesting the hoist 
can be seen as the outcome of doing access.  This involves reflexivity, the embodied 
self thinking about its bodily needs in a particular space and then taking action to 
ensure those needs are met.  The possibility of embodied agency means Iris can 
minimise her dependence upon the vagaries of the small clinic but she can’t escape 
that dependence altogether.  As Thomas (1999) pointed out, disability is 
characterised by an unequal power balance between impaired and non impaired 
people, which is weighted in favour of the latter.  Despite requesting the hoist, it 
wasn’t there when Iris arrived.  Iris’ effort was wasted, but she didn’t mention that: 
perhaps from her point of view all that mattered was that there was a hoist - the 
encounter was ultimately successful.
So far the access scenarios considered have altered or enhanced the environment 
through the provision of equipment.  However, for some participants it was the other 
way round, they had to “do access” by adapting the enactment of impairment to the 
environment in which they found themselves.  This was the case for Joel, a 
wheelchair user, when using his local health facility:
‘They have steep ramps. It is a compromise basically. So the access to the 
reception area of the dentist is brilliant. The access in the consulting rooms is 
appalling…the ground floor rooms are too small for the wheelchair and the 
dentist chair. I am fairly agile so I can sit and do the twists and turns necessary 
to transfer’.  (2nd interview) 
Here then, it is Joel’s agility which enables him to “do” access to the dentist’s chair.  
It enables him to twist and turn in contrast to his usual, probably less effortful, way 
of transferring from his wheelchair to another surface.  Joel makes clear that he sees 
this as a compromise: he decides to handle this access barrier by making his 
embodied self yield to it.  He does so by reflecting upon what his body can do in the 
situation and what he is willing to put his body through.    But this decision is 
constrained by the lack of alternative options due to the shortage of NHS dentists in 
Edinburgh, the lack of information about which dental surgeries are accessible and 
Joel’s preference to use a local surgery.  This example also demonstrates that access 
barriers are rarely “all or nothing” situations, rarely is a facility totally accessible or 
totally inaccessible.  Rather there is a huge spectrum between these two poles and 
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disabled people constantly make decisions about if and how to handle any particular 
access barrier.
Given this spectrum, it becomes important to acknowledge the embodied costs and 
consequences of access solutions which are a compromise or fall short of best 
practice.   This needs to become part of the process of assessing whether an 
adjustment or alternative service is reasonable from the point of view of the disabled 
person requiring access. I now want to consider one element of these consequences, 
namely those which influence the physical and emotional aspects of embodiment.  
This is an issue that has been discussed in the literature from several different angles.  
As we have seen in chapters three and six, Reeve (2002 & 2004) has used Thomas’ 
concept of psycho-emotional effects empirically to highlight the ways in which
disablism affects the psyche and erodes self-esteem.  More specifically in the context 
of access, Imrie & Kumar (1997) found that for some disabled people, feeling 
powerless when faced barriers, was given as a reason for not going out.  Hence 
feelings and memories of previous encounters become embodied and influence how 
barriers are handled in the future.
It has also been argued that barriers do not just restrict social participation but also 
serve as symbols of the exclusion and inferior status of disabled people in 
contemporary society (Anderson & Kitchin, 2000, Edwards & Imrie, 2003).  This 
symbolism is reinforced in the moment of an access encounter which forces attention 
back to the impaired body.  This awareness may also incorporate uncomfortable or 
painful bodily sensations which are caused as the body negotiates and compromises 
with the material world (Paterson & Hughes, 1999).  In some instances, such 
sensations become inscribed in embodiment to the extent that they become taken-for-
granted and only noted when they are absent, that is when some aspect of access 
relationship improves (Zola, 1991).  As a way of capturing and highlighting the 
embodied consequences inadequate access, Anderson & Kitchin’s (2000) use of the 
concept of dignity is helpful.  It can act as a marker, a reminder that access 
arrangements which compromise dignity must be challenged: an example of an 
“undignified” encounter from my own experience was having a long conversation 
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with the practice nurse about my incontinence on the pavement, as the GPs surgery 
had been made temporarily inaccessible.
In many instances the emotional impact of doing and handling access is subtle, 
fleeting and relatively easy to absorb into the ebb and flow of lived experience.  For 
example, in the hospital bed scenario, whilst swapping the bed and bed spaces was 
welcome physically, it nonetheless made me feel somewhat awkward towards my 
bay mates.  I feared they would see me as disruptive and demanding.  It also feels 
difficult to convey the critical importance of factors such as bed height to those for 
whom an insignificant detail because getting into bed is a taken-for-granted task.  
Similarly, Lesley, a family carer for Kate who is a wheelchair user and has learning 
difficulties, spoke of her irritation when the location of Kate’s appointments was
changed.  This meant a third person had to accompany them to appointments and had
to stay with Kate at the entrance while Lesley went to find a parking space.  What 
was hard, Lesley commented, was that no explanation was given for the change and 
that no-one realised the difficulties it caused.  Perhaps greater upset was caused by
the consequences of the ambulance service’s policy of refusing to take wheelchairs 
on board.  Frances’ impairment means that she has frequent emergency admissions to 
hospital and being without her wheelchair results in 
‘…negative reactions from nursing staff because I have had to ask for more 
help…It makes me feel much more vulnerable and much more tearful as well 
which isn’t me.’ (1st interview) 
One of the implications here is that in terms of the phenomenological experience of 
embodiment, a wheelchair has greater significance than the means of getting from A 
to B.  Wheelchairs are highly individualised to meet the needs of a particular user. As 
such they are the bases from which one engages with people and the material world.  
Thus they influence the physical, emotional and existential aspects of embodiment.  
Hence without her wheelchair, Frances ‘isn’t me’. In addition to the emotional cost 
of not having one’s own wheelchair, there is the sheer inconvenience of access 
handling.  Frances has to arrange for a friend to ferry the wheelchair to hospital.  
This also involves the expense of a taxi.  One of the strands which link Frances, 
Kate, and Lesley’s experiences is how one’s emotional well-being is contingent on 
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the detail of policy and practice.  Yet this is seldom realised, because the doing and 
handling of access is invisible from all except to those who do it.  Highlighting this 
doing and handling should be another criterion by which to assess the reasonableness 
of adjustments or alternative provision.
A final point I want to make is that the process of access handling itself can be 
emotionally demanding.  For example Iris, who we met above, hinted at this:
‘I kind of find that the way to cope with that is …. Don’t get wound up it’s not 
going to do you any good’. (2nd interview) 
Here it is as if Iris had worked out intellectually the best way to handle things …not 
getting wound up…and was now working on putting this into practice.  This suggests 
that another element of handling access is learning how to handle one’s embodied 
self, to protect it from the hurt and stress of repeated access encounters. In some 
instances the need for self protection is more important than handling an access issue 
in what sounds like the best way.  This was Elspeth’s experience when it came to one 
particular access issue in a health care context, namely managing urinary urgency if 
there is a long wait before being seen at clinic:  
Elspeth: [People] can’t know that if I need to go to the toilet…I need to go
now… I need to go RIGHT NOW…[I ask]  “where's the nearest toilet”…and 
they say.,…”its just away at the end of that corridor and just go up the flight of 
stairs”…and I am like…”NO you don't understand”…but then it’s not people's 
fault…if it is something that's invisible it’s not their fault…you have to be…you 
have to learn to be open and say…I require this because… 
RB: So it comes down on you to explain…
Elspeth: Yes I think a lot of times it does…because if we don't explain how do 
they know?…
RB: But once you explain do you usually get a helpful response?
Elspeth: I don't usually explain…
RB: So what happens?
Elspeth: I just struggle…
RB: And you don't explain because… 
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Elspeth: Because you don't want to look at the look in people's faces…or.. “Oh 
I am really sorry”…in a nice big loud voice…It's a very…it is a catch 
22…again it's a catch 22 situation…’ (2nd interview)
Elspeth felt it best to be open and frank about her needs, to make the invisible 
apparent, otherwise she couldn't expect help.  So Elspeth felt part of what she had to 
do to handle access was explain her access need to others in order to get appropriate 
help.  But doing this requires drawing attention to a bodily function in a way which 
may offend social convention.   For Elspeth, this also means revealing that she is a
disabled person since the enactment of her neurological condition isn’t always 
visible.  Elspeth prefers not to do this because it requires “emotional doing”, dealing 
with ‘the look on people’s faces’, the loud voices which makes her the centre of 
attention.  This is perhaps an example of Elspeth suddenly being read as The Other, 
of being all the more threatening because she appears to be ‘like them’.  Ultimately,
this threat and the attention are too much for Elspeth, so she decides to ‘struggle’, to 
handle the problem by relying upon her ingenuity in her moment of need.  This too is 
risky for if she doesn’t make it to the toilet, not only will her identity be discredited 
(Goffman, 1990) but also there will be much doing impairment to be done. 
In this section I have explored the ways in which disabled people do and handle 
access.  This exploration has challenged the idea that disabling barriers are just
objects ‘out there’, existing independently of any disabled person. Rather barriers 
always have an external and internal dimension because they are embodied.  The 
embodied element of access barriers and their associated encounters it not just a 
reference to the way an impairment is enacted, its relationship with space, and 
objects within it.  It also includes emotions, sensation, memory and agency.
Scenario Two: Clinical Access 
I had an ultra sound scan on my bladder to investigate the causes of my 
incontinence.  I had to drink a litre of liquid beforehand so worried about 
being wet but had planned for that eventuality as far as one can.  
I transferred on to treatment couch ok.  The nurse was helpful, moved 
machinery out the way and positioned the bed to the optimum height.  These 
little things make such a difference.  My PA assists.  Strictly speaking there’s 
no money in my care plan to cover assistance when I’m out during the day, yet 
206
it’s so essential. I wouldn’t want total strangers helping me with transfers in 
unknown territory.  It’s too precarious.
The radiologist did the scan.  I managed to get in a good position on the bed 
so was comfortable so didn’t start the spasm off.   Suddenly the radiologist tells 
me to go the toilet and then come back for a second scan.  I panic. I don’t know 
what’s happening and by the time I get it together to ask what’s going on, the 
radiologist has gone.  The nurse gets my PA from outside.  I begin to explain 
my difficulties to the nurse….
I can’t use a public toilet as can’t transfer on to it and no good hoisting me on 
because I wouldn’t have the balance to sit once on.  I use a female bottle when 
I’m out and in extremis but it’s tricky and not always successful.  And there’s 
another problem.  Transferring is energy intensive and my fatigue threshold 
low.  There’s no way I can get off the couch and then back on again for a 
second time. It might sound silly to say this, that I only have a very finite 
amount of energy but must do.  Pushing beyond that limit is to enter risky 
spasm territory.
The solution we come up with is to use the bottle on the examination couch.  
Nurse sits behind me so I can lean against her, PA holds the bottle.  It isn’t 
really a success, I’m too tense in this awkward position.  I will finish the job, as 
it were, once the scan is over. 
The radiologist comes back, does the scan… “here’s the problem”.  I brace 
myself.  There was a big notice outside saying radiologists can’t discuss 
findings, must make an appointment with your doctor for a fortnight’s time to 
get the results. Why is he telling me?  Does that mean it’s something serious? 
With all this in my head, perhaps it is not surprising that I didn’t really take in 
or question what the radiologist was saying: access issues so quickly 
overwhelm.  He said something about my bladder being too large and not 
being able to empty itself.   Back home it dawns on me: I knew my bladder 
wasn’t empty at the time of the second scan.  But that was an access problem, 
the result of using the bottle on the bed.  It wasn’t a medical problem just an 
artefact of the test itself… wasn’t it?
One of the most commonly mentioned clinical access issues is that of transferring 
from wheelchair to examination couch (Begum, 1996, Campion, 2003, Kinrade 
2003, Tighe, 2001, Thomas, 2001). However, this scenario suggests that clinical 
access can be more complex than not being able to transfer and that  one of its  key 
characteristics is uncertainty .  There are a number of layers of this uncertainty.  The 
first of these is the uncertainty surrounding the process of a diagnostic test or the 
procedure.  This uncertainty is something many people face when undergoing such 
procedures but I think this has particular ramifications for some disabled people.  In 
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my case, I was unable to plan to handle access because I didn’t know what the scan 
would involve.  When the radiologist told me to use the toilet, I panicked.  I was 
overwhelmed with anxiety about how I could do impairment, how through 
reflexivity I could plan a way to use the toilet in an unfamiliar environment.  I added 
to this anxiety by assuming it was my responsibility to deal with the access issue, 
perhaps in part because I did not want to discuss my intimate needs with a strange 
man.  Hence all this anxiety prevented me from having a conversation with the 
radiologist about the best way of dealing with the situation. With the benefit of 
hindsight – and to prefigure an argument I am going to make below – this was a lost 
opportunity to reduce uncertainty by giving the radiologist information about how I 
enact my impairment when using the toilet.  In terms of the emotional element of 
embodiment, what happened to me in this scenario is similar to Elspeth’s experience 
explored above: emotional reactions got in the way of handling access in the way we 
wanted.
The second layer of uncertainty was that neither the radiologist nor myself knew how 
my embodiment would respond to what the test demanded of it.  This is to enter 
cyborg territory, ‘the couplings between organism and machine’ (Haraway,
1996:83).  Previous certainties about the boundaries between the natural and the 
artificial become decentred and destabilised.  When the second scan revealed that my 
bladder had not emptied itself, was that revelation “natural” concerning the inner 
workings of my body? Or was it ‘artificial’, a revelation that appertained to the test 
situation, to my having to urinate into a bottle whilst being propped up?  Here we 
begin to see some of the ironies of the biomedical approach.  Diagnostic procedures 
are designed to increase the medical gaze, to bypass the subjectivity of the patient to 
reveal what’s “really” happening in the body.  Yet what “really” happens with the 
body is never experienced in the abstract, I can never empty my bladder outwith the 
enactment of my impairment and the environmental circumstances which together 
make it so difficult to use the toilet.  So perhaps the artificial was actually the natural 
here, the second scan revealing what happens to my bladder when I attempt to empty 
it in a particular environment.  
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The question then became whether the social barriers which influenced the internal 
workings of my body needed to be acknowledged, to be made explicit.  My fear was
that the radiologist would look at what happens when my bladder empties in situ, but 
interpret it as what happens to my bladder in the abstract.  In other words, my fear 
was that he would overlook the social.  But how could he have done otherwise 
because at no point in the procedure did he ask any questions?  To him I was little 
more than an aberrant bladder.  Hence I regretted not explaining to the radiologist my 
difficulty with using the toilet.  Had I done so, it may have been possible to discuss 
what role access issues played in my incontinence.  Later, I did discuss this with 
other healthcare professionals but I never felt I could adequately convey the scope of 
the difficulties I was experiencing.  Perhaps going to the toilet is such a taken-for-
granted bodily experience, and a private one, that it is hard to explain the detailed 
ways in which it can become problematic.   Everyone I spoke with insisted there was 
something ‘medical’ going on, but the basis for saying so was never clear.  The 
uncertainty continued.  There is another biomedical irony here.  As we saw in 
chapter three, biomedicine interprets the impaired body as abnormal.  However, 
throughout the procedure, indeed throughout the whole diagnostic process, it was as 
if I were treated as ‘normal’, no-one stopped to enquire as to my impairment needs, 
my ‘abnormality’ as they would see it, regarding using the toilet. 
There is another possible reading of the scenario, and that is as an illustration of 
Shakespeare & Watson’s (2001) argument that it is impossible to know where 
impairment ends and disability begins.  Was it disability or impairment that made it 
so difficult for me to empty my bladder on the bed?  Was it disability or impairment 
that caused my incontinence: disability because of all the years I had to ‘hang on’ to 
go to the toilet until a PA was around or traipse round to find an accessible toilet or 
impairment because something medical had happened  during my illness to cause the 
problem?  Did I want the problem to be interpreted as social so that it could be 
solved through barrier removal – a 24/7 care package and the installation of the 
equipment I needed to access the toilet – or a medical problem to be solved by 
medical means?  Perhaps the most interesting point to make about these questions is 
that they were on my mind throughout the time I experienced the problem.  Again I 
take this to be a sign that I had embodied the social model, it was part of my psyche 
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to analyse my own experiences with reference to the impairment/disability 
dichotomy.  In retrospect, this didn’t serve me well because there was no definitive 
answer to the questions I was posing.  Perhaps the social model offers certainties 
where none exist.
From my experience, clinical access issues entail two features: not knowing what a 
test might involve and the absence of any opportunity during the procedure for 
discussion of any disability concerns.  This suggests that it would be useful for 
healthcare professionals to be aware that clinical access needs may arise and to 
discuss these before the test begins.  They also need to be willing and able to 
problem solve with the disabled person at each stage of the test.
Clinical access was also an issue discussed by David, a wheelchair user.  For him 
these access problems occurred in many settings and seemed to emerge from the 
interrelationship of three factors: first, David’s enactment of impairment, which 
means he cannot intentionally control his movements and that lack of control can be 
exacerbated in unfamiliar situations, second, how this is interpreted and handled by 
the healthcare professional, and third the physical circumstances of the encounter.  
For example, David described the moments before being anaesthetised:
‘It's having to go in to a strange anaesthetic room and say ‘will you hold me?’  
But it can be read as a kind of baby's ‘I'm scared, hold me’ kind of thing.  And 
you're not, you're overcoming the practical problem of actually not being able 
to lie flat on a table of that width.  I mean my right arm was just as likely to 
shoot way out there unless it’s held in place and so on and yet it’s so often 
interpreted, unless you’re lucky, as a kind of “I'm scared of anaesthetics help 
me”.  And it’s not that at all.’  (Pilot interview) 
Here then, one layer of the barrier is the narrowness of the operating table and the 
effect it has on David’s movement.  With insufficient space for his arm, David loses 
control of it.  Similarly, being unable to lie flat, to yield to the table, increases the 
risk and fear of falling.  Taken together, these appear to adversely change David’s 
sense of embodiment.  There may be little that can be done about the width of the 
table, given the requirements of theatres.  Yet this is compounded by the second 
layer of the barrier: namely how David’s request for assistance for his body to be 
held to reduce the unwanted movement is misinterpreted as being scared and 
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childlike.  While being ‘scared and childlike’ may be how some adults are when 
about to undergo surgery, for these qualities to be (wrongly) ascribed to David 
implies a lack of respect for who he is, his embodied self and for what is involved in 
his doing of impairment.  It is another form of indignity.  In this situation, the option 
of David explaining what is going on is just not possible: you are ‘not exactly at your 
best when you're lying on a theatre table about to be put under’.  Perhaps David’s 
awareness was focused upon what was happening to his body and therefore talking 
might have been particularly difficult.
The way to remove this clinical access barrier, David feels, rests with the healthcare 
professional’s ability to assess what the barrier is:
‘Unless they can diagnose what's actually going on, you're not going to solve 
many of the actual disability issues…they must be able to diagnose “why is this 
man jumping around in this trolley when he shouldn't actually be doing that?”’  
(Pilot interview)
This diagnosis is not a medical one but a social one.  To remove the barrier 
healthcare professionals need to be able to interpret signs of David’s impairment, 
how it is likely to be enacted in relation to different physical spaces or objects found 
in hospital contexts.  Perhaps what prevents this happening is two fold: first that 
healthcare professionals will not have a (medical) understanding of many 
impairments and second, what understanding they do have may be abstract, an 
understanding of what is going on with the body but not of how this can be 
manifested in particular environments or circumstances.  This is similar to my 
experience with the investigation of my bladder problems suggesting that a 
characteristic of clinical access barriers is the general lack of understanding of the 
lived experience of impairment, something discussed in chapter three.
A second form of clinical access barrier David talked about was healthcare 
professionals’ attitudes towards disability.  Since the early 1990s, the General 
Medical Council (2003) has stated that respect for, and an understanding of, the 
social and cultural environments in which disabled people live as a necessary 
outcome of medical education.  Yet this lack of understanding still seems to pose a 
widespread barrier (see, for example, Campion, 2003, Scottish Consumer Council,
211
2005, Thomas, 1997 & 2001).  One example of this barrier occurred when David was 
undergoing a course of treatment and several of the healthcare professionals treating 
him had
‘tendencies to talk through my wife.  They would not talk to me.  And if she said 
“no talk to him”, they couldn't understand me.’  (Pilot interview) 
Whatever the intention, it is hard to interpret the result as anything but a failure to 
recognise David’s personhood, with all the implications that has for his dignity and 
well-being.  As David pointed out, the situation was made more complex because for 
some of the healthcare professionals, English was a second language.  This perhaps 
made it more difficult to understand David’s impaired speech.  But it is hard to see 
this as a language issue alone. If the professionals were unaware of his difficulty it 
would suggest a problem with her communication skills, she wasn’t considering the 
implications of being unable to talk with the patient.  Equally, had professionals been 
aware of the problem then presumably they should have taken action such as asking 
a colleague to assist or asking David if it would be acceptable for his wife to 
facilitate the conversation.  Moreover, it should have been regarded as an issue of 
management of the service to ensure that he was allocated an appropriately skilled 
professional.  All this impinged upon David’s treatment insofar as he was 
consequently unable to explain why he wanted and needed the treatment
‘… trying to explain that to someone who doesn't have any disability 
awareness is just not on.  And that was the fundamental problem’ (Pilot 
interview) 
When it came to handling clinical access issues, David felt
‘I think the ball really is in their court.  If they hit it off in the first minute well, 
then I can carry it on.  It's like a service ball in tennis, if they serve me a good 
one, I'll respond.  If it's a bad one, such as the dental hospital, it’s just going to 
get worse and worse.  So no, I don't think I'd say that I have a strategy worked 
out.  I know it’s going to be important, but I don't really know how I'm going to 
achieve it’. (Pilot interview) 
This highlights that the ability to handle access issues is always constrained.  For 
David, one of those constraints is the enactment of his impairment, that control of his 
movement is affected by other aspects of his embodiment such as whether he is 
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nervous or under stress.  This in turn is affected both by the context and the quality 
of the relationships available within that context and both of these factors are outwith 
the control of David in clinical arenas.  Indeed, perhaps it is the nature of clinical 
access barriers that they are often unpredictable and thus disabled people’s ability to 
handle them is circumscribed.  While the barriers are equally unpredictable to the 
healthcare professionals nonetheless they need to know that such barriers may 
emerge and be open and willing to respond creatively and with humanity.  This is an 
area where further research is needed to assess the scope and nature of the barriers 
which emerge and the strategies used to deal with them.
Discussion 
Drawing upon the data, this chapter has explored a small number of the many access 
barriers experienced in health care settings.  I have tried to identify the varying 
elements of such barriers and, through an embodied approach, considered how 
disabled people experience and deal with such barriers.  This breaks with the social 
model tradition which sees barriers as external and which the disabled person 
confronts in an isolated and isolating moment in time.  That tradition also locates the 
root of barriers at a high level of abstraction, namely the social and economic forces 
of capitalist production.  What can be learnt from a localised, embodied and context 
specific approach? 
The first learning point is that the relationships which emerge during an access 
encounter play a significant part in determining its outcome.  In both clinical and 
non-clinical healthcare contexts, many access needs are micro ones, that is, highly 
individualised situations which require health professionals to respond sensitively 
and creatively in the moment. As we have seen in this chapter, this already happens 
but perhaps consideration needs to be given to ensuring that this happens as a matter 
of routine.  As one participant pointed out, unless this happens, the DDA will only 
benefit the ‘fit male paraplegic’ whose needs are mainly macro ones requiring 
standard solutions.
The second learning point is that the impact of access barriers is sometimes more 
complex and personal than the exclusion from and loss of social opportunities which 
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the disability movement has been so effective in highlighting.  Thomas (1999) has 
drawn attention to the psycho-emotional effects of dealing with barriers and 
disablism.  The indignity that David experienced when healthcare professionals 
spoke to his wife instead of to him, Iris’ injunction to herself not to be stressed out 
and Frances’ upset because the ambulance would not take her chair can all be seen as 
examples of psycho-emotional effects.  But consideration also needs to be given to 
the role emotions play in shaping or constraining disabled people’s agency when 
handling access.  This was Elspeth’s experience when she decided not to ask 
directions to the nearest toilet.  That example also demonstrated that much can be at 
stake when handling access, that it is rarely just a matter of ensuring one’s immediate 
needs are met: what an individual has to do negotiate a barriers and the way the 
materiality of the barrier is changed, have consequences for the embodied self which 
go beyond the achievement of access in the moment of encounter. To ask for help 
meant Elspeth had to reveal her disabled identity which she was not prepared to do.  
Similarly, in the second scenario, access during the scan had significant implications 
for the management and treatment of my incontinence.  When much is at stake in an 
access encounter, its handling can become emotionally charged.
An embodied approach to access can be used to capture some of the subtle ways in 
which emotions both influence and are influenced by access encounters and 
handling.  It can also be used to investigate how bodily sensations and movement are 
implicated in access encounters.  This is something that I have barely touched upon 
here.  It is implicit in Joel’s ‘twisting and turning’ to get into the dentist’s chair and 
David’s difficulty in controlling his movement in unfamiliar or physically awkward 
circumstances.  It is also implicit in my second scenario where I do not dare to get 
off the examination table because I know I would not have had sufficient energy to 
get back on to it, as the test required.  As with emotions, bodily sensations and 
movement both influence and are influenced by doing and handling access.  As my 
questioning of the causes of my incontinence suggest, years of handling access 
barriers in using the toilet had literally shaped my bladder, making it overlarge and 
damaging its function.  The social had become the biomedical, disability had become 
impairment.
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A further and final learning point, and one I only became aware of during the writing 
of the chapter, is the difficulty of explaining access needs to others.  We saw this in 
Elspeth wanting to be open about her needs, in David having to rely on healthcare 
professionals’ interpretation of his uncontrolled movement and how it is related to 
the context, and my wishing that I had talked to the radiologist about my toilet 
difficulty. It is difficult to untangle what the issues are here.  One element seems to 
be straight forward; as far as micro access needs go, these often cannot be known
unless they are articulated by the disabled person.  But at another level it is also 
about one’s self being understood by others notwithstanding one’s bodily needs or 
appearance.  If David’s movements are misinterpreted he is seen as a frightened 
child, if Elspeth explains she needs the toilet ‘right now’ she will have to confront 
‘the look in other people’s faces’.  Without explanation there is a risk to identity and 
personhood.  But explaining, too, is difficult.  With regards my incontinence, I was 
desperate to be able to make the healthcare professionals’ understand the minutiae of 
my toilet access needs.  But as much as I tried, I never felt they really appreciated the 
situation.  This became a barrier in itself and a source of frustration.  There seems to 
be much scope for further investigation here.  Is this problem widespread, does it 
interfere with everyday relationships between disabled people and non-disabled 
people, is it rooted in the fact that access needs usually relate to activities in which 
non-disabled people don’t have to think about what their bodies are doing as both the 




This chapter will present an analysis of disabled people’s health care encounters.  It 
will explore how disabled people “do” healthcare, in other words how they manage 
the process of accessing and using the NHS together with the way they handle
relationships with healthcare professionals.  This will complement the analysis 
presented in chapter six by considering whether participants use or would like to use 
the NHS to support and enhance their doing of impairment.  Similarly, it will extend 
the analysis of the previous chapter by looking at how disabled people handle their 
micro access needs in hospital settings.
The data upon which this chapter is based comes from participants’ descriptions of 
their health care encounters.  These comprised a substantial chunk of data: as one 
would expect, when participants were asked about healthcare experiences they 
described and reflected upon particular healthcare encounters.  This revealed much 
of what is right about the NHS as well as highlighting where improvements could be 
made.  Deciding upon my angle of interest in this data was difficult.  Initially, the 
broad brush code “managing use” use.  
To analyse this further the technique of “asking the data questions” was used again.  
The questions related to participants’ development and use of expertise to access and 
utilise the healthcare they needed to do impairment.  These questions were informed 
by debates about the nature of patient expertise within the sociological literature 
generally (see, for example, Anderson, 1996, Oeseburg & Abma, 2006, Prior, 2003, 
Tyreman, 2005).  More particularly the questions were inspired by current policy 
initiatives aimed at supporting people with long term conditions or impairments to 
develop expertise in managing their conditions in particular (see below).  However, 
while the expertise questions revealed the different forms of expertise participants 
deployed, ultimately the concept of expertise as an analytical tool proved inadequate 
for gaining an understanding of participants’ use of the NHS.  I want to consider why 
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it was inadequate by discussing current policy about developing patient expertise.  
This will provide a useful backdrop to this chapter.
Recently, the Scottish government in conjunction with the Long Term Condition 
Alliance in Scotland (LTCAS) launched The Self Management Strategy for Long 
Term Conditions in Scotland (2008) (which I will refer to as the Strategy). This is 
broadly equivalent to the Expert Patient (Department of Health, 2001) initiative 
developed in England and Wales. Whereas the English version refers to expertise as 
a means of developing self management skills, the Scottish one focuses upon self-
management itself, seeing such management as a means of improving people’s 
quality of life.  Both these policies address the question, if somewhat obliquely, of
what the NHS can offer those with conditions which are chronic, incurable and often 
untreatable.  Similarly they acknowledge that often disabled people know more about 
how their condition affects them than healthcare professionals, particularly those 
within primary care (Jessop, 1996, Wilson, 2001)
The aim of the Strategy is to ensure those ‘living with long term conditions have 
access to the support they need to successfully manage their condition’ (LTCAS & 
The Scottish Government, 2008:7). The main form this support is to take is various 
forms of information giving and patient education.  Support will also be provided by 
improvements in the co-ordination of health and social care services and by making 
them more responsive to individual need.  It has been suggested that if self 
management is to be effectively encouraged then healthcare professionals’ practice 
must be rooted in a social medicine.  Further, such practice has to be capable of 
understanding and engaging with the lived experience of disabled people and the 
diversity of social contexts in which chronic illness and impairments are experienced 
(Bury, Newbould & Taylor, 2005, Tyreman, 2005).  
However, while the rhetoric of the Strategy is empowering this may be difficult to 
translate into empowering practice for two reasons.  These reasons also highlight 
why the concept of expertise is similarly problematic.  The first factor is that while 
the Strategy lauds self management and the expertise this requires, it may have the 
unintended effect of shifting such management further under the ambit of medical 
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control and surveillance.  Currently, many disabled people have developed their own 
self management skills, what I would call doing of impairment, outwith the medical 
gaze (Badcott, 2005).  Moreover, it could be argued that in some cases they have 
done so despite healthcare professionals: an example of this in the lack of instruction 
given to one participant, Betty, about how to use her oxygen/air machine (see chapter 
six).  To be successful, the Strategy will need to find way of building upon people’s 
self taught and contextual knowledge.  If this doesn’t happen there is a risk that 
people will be deskilled in the same way that Illich (1990) argues that healthcare 
service undermines self care. As it is, the Strategy assumes that healthcare 
professionals are the “real” experts as it will be they, for the most part, who will 
teach people how to self manage.  Just as the patient’s view is an artefact of the 
doctors gaze (Armstrong, 1984) which leads to the doctor creating the patient’s 
subjectivity, so too the self managing disabled person may become an artefact of 
health and social care professionals.  So while promoting self management may 
involve a flow of information between healthcare professionals and individuals, it 
will not necessarily lead to a transfer of power (Wilson, 2001). Hence disabled 
people may be ‘subtly coerced into self-care and self management processes, so to 
prevent deterioration and reduce the demand on resources’ (139). 
The second reason why the Strategy’s empowerment rhetoric may be undermined in 
practice is that while it talks of the need to form partnerships between healthcare 
professionals and disabled people, it asserts that self management is ultimately the 
individual’s responsibility.  So it considers neither the support someone would 
receive if they refused or could not self manage nor the impact of biographical or 
social constraints upon doing self management (Chapple & Rogers, 1999).  Yet self 
management without adequate resources and support can be profoundly 
disempowering (Wilson, 2001).  Similarly, there is no discussion of social changes 
which might facilitate self management and improve quality of life.  Unwittingly the 
Strategy does make this point.  It uses a full page photograph of a man on a mobility 
scooter accompanied by someone riding a bike, with both wheeling along the sea 
front.  On top of the picture there is a large heading “What is Self Management”.  
This picture and heading can be interpreted as a quality of life activity made possible 
through self management.  Yet while scooters may make a substantial contribution to 
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quality of life, they are not routinely provided through the NHS Wheelchair Service 
so have to be privately purchased.  Hence in this instance self management is 
contingent upon having sufficient private income to buy equipment.
From this overview of the Strategy, I want to draw out the reasons why the concept 
of expertise was inappropriate to drive my analysis.  As used in health policy, the 
concepts of expertise and self management are abstract, isolated from the context in 
which it is derived and exercised.  This obscures the questions of in whose interest 
expertise is being developed, its purpose and how it is mediated by social constraints 
and professional power.  More academically, for my purpose the concept is devoid of 
any sense of embodiment.  Yet implicit with policy documents is that expertise is an 
embodied skill exercised upon the body.
Having realised these short comings with using the concept of expertise as an 
analytical tool, I went back to my data.  Reading it through, I considered developing 
a concept comparable and compatible with doing impairment and doing access as 
used in the previous chapters.  The obvious candidate was “doing healthcare”.  
However, that too lacked any sense of the body and could be limited to looking at the 
administrative arrangements involved in using healthcare (there is much in the data 
about that!).  It also lacked any sense of purpose, of what motivated and constrained 
participants’ usage of the NHS, or develop relations with healthcare professionals in 
a particular way.  I then came across the perhaps obvious but often not stated 
argument that people consult a healthcare professional to take care of the body (Mol, 
2008) and, I would add, the self.  Hence people “do” healthcare to take care of the 
embodied self.  Here then was a tool which may facilitate an analysis of how 
participants used or wanted to use the NHS to support their own care taking of the 
body.  This would enable exploration of the ways in which participants access 
support for self management.  It would also provide a way of looking at what 
participants expected from the NHS in terms of the services it offered and the ways 
that it responded to disability or impairment related health needs.
Revisiting data revealed a great diversity of ways of doing healthcare to take care of 
the body (this will be abbreviated to doing healthcare for reasons of space).  The 
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examples of doing healthcare presented have been selected to explore, exemplify or 
refine the concept of doing healthcare.  This will help to assess its usefulness or 
otherwise.  The analysis of each example will try to take account of:
 The embodied reflexivity that may underpin the decision to use the NHS at a 
particular moment in their lives.
 What enabled or constrained participants to contact the NHS in the way that 
they wanted
 How participants handled the process of getting healthcare professionals to 
take care of the body in the way that the participants wanted
 The embodied consequences of participants getting or not getting the support 
they wanted
The analysis will be presented under three headings:
 Doing healthcare by accessing health services
 Doing healthcare in hospital wards
 Doing healthcare in relationship with healthcare professionals
These headings or categories are cross cutting.  For example, all doing healthcare 
occurs in relationship with healthcare professionals.  Yet the examples considered 
under that heading are those where the relationship itself is the focus of doing 
whereas in the examples explored under the other headings that relationship is a 
means to an end.
Some of the data demonstrated that participants wanted the NHS to support their 
doing impairment but did not constitute doing healthcare because the support they 
wanted was not forthcoming.  In other words there was no healthcare for participants 
to “do”. These data are clearly significant in relation to the support participants 
receive to do impairment.  It is this data will be presented first.  However, there was
also data about health care encounters where there was little doing of healthcare 
because the participant felt the care was timely, appropriate and accessed easily and 
barrier free.  This data isn’t presented because there is little to say about it.  The 
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drawback is that what follows extenuates the negative, but hopefully in a way which 
is constructive. 
Unmet Expectations of the NHS
A number of participants felt they did not receive sufficient healthcare support.  As 
we shall see, the type of support participants wanted was somewhat ill defined, 
nebulous.  Instead they had a general expectation that the NHS should support them. 
These expectations seemed to be grounded in their sense of embodiment and a 
medicalised culture in which the NHS is regarded as the obvious port of call for 
those with body troubles.
Burt, who experienced a sudden onset neurological condition in his middle years, 
seemed to expect that because of his impairment he would undergo regular medical 
surveillance.  Indeed the key motif of Burt’s interview was that following the acute 
stages of his condition he was effectively abandoned by the NHS: 
‘…once they had finished with me that was it, never again.  At the time I 
thought possibly, and maybe 6 months down the line they would ask me back to 
[hospital] for a progress report or a year, but never ever happened.’  (Pilot 
interview).
  There seems to be several layers of this expectation.  First it seemed to be linked 
with Burt’s sense of embodied experience following the onset of his condition.  Burt 
talked much about the physical enactment of his impairment: his dragging leg, his 
hand that ‘was more or less useless’, his difficulty with pronouncing certain words.  
To me, these enactments of impairments were almost imperceptible, invisible.
Perhaps in the moments when Burt was aware of his body, its feel and limitations, 
this invisibility was isolating and added to his frustration, which, for example, led 
him to be enraged by dropping a spoon. From this perspective, the expectation of 
surveillance may have been a hope to gain an acknowledgement of his bodily 
experience.  Yet Burt did have bi-monthly blood-pressure checks at his GP surgery 
but these clearly didn’t meet his expectation of being supported by the NHS..  A 
reason for this may be because his surgery is large and it hasn’t been possible for 
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Burt to get to know one particular GP or nurse.  This suggests that current 
prioritisation of improving access to GPs at the expense of continuity of care is a 
policy constraint which contributes to Burt’s feeling of abandonment.
A second and related layer to Burt’s expectation concerns his capacity, the possibility 
of improving function.  For eight months Burt had out patient physiotherapy.  Then 
he 
‘…reached a point where they had decided that they could do no more for me, 
and that was it, I was dropped.  I've never heard a word since.’ (Pilot 
interview)
Again Burt felt abandoned, perhaps powerless in the face of professional judgement 
irrespective of whether it was correct in terms of NHS policy and clinical judgement.  
Yet being an “old Labour” man Burt said he would never complain about the NHS.  
Doing healthcare is constrained by values and belief, but some forms of doing are 
more constraining than others.  Nonetheless Burt did healthcare by consulting a 
private physiotherapy notwithstanding a limited income because he felt the 
physiotherapy was still ‘doing a great deal of good’.  Perhaps for Burt this was a 
form of taking control, refusing to be passive in the face of what Burt experienced as 
bodily limitations.
However, I think there is a tension embedded in Burt’s feelings about ongoing 
physiotherapy.  On the one hand, Burt felt he had reached a stage in his recovery 
where his body functioning was ‘as good as it gets’.  On the other, five years on, Burt 
‘continues to do to this day’ the exercises the private physiotherapists gave him, 
along with other bodily activities which he devised himself.  Perhaps this continued 
reflexive doing to and with the body is now less about improving function and more 
about the embodied satisfaction of taking exercise.  Doing exercises could be 
interpreted as both a means of keeping well and as a way of reducing the chances of 
a reoccurrence of an acute episode of his illness.  Perhaps it is also Burt’s way of 
making health a pursuit (see chapter two).  At some points the boundaries between 
keeping fit, pursuing health, improving impaired function become indistinct.  There 
is also a danger that when a disabled person does these things they are seen through a 
medicalised lens
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A third layer to Burt’s expectation of receiving NHS support seems to be connected 
with his medicalised view of disability.  Burt commented
‘my wife…was never at any time given any advice, training or back up on how 
to deal with a stroke patient. But I felt later, that she should have been given 
some instruction, you know, about how to deal with what are quite a few side 
effects of the stroke.  One of them I'm afraid to say is uncontrolled rage at the 
slightest thing’ (Pilot interview).
By referring to himself in the third person, Burt seems to confirm the argument that 
with the onset of impairment or chronic illness, people tend to objectify their bodies.  
This can be a means of distancing the Self from the affected part of the body, a body 
which momentarily seems beyond control (Bury, 1982, Toombs, 1992).  However, 
Burt goes further, objectifying not only his body but also his Self.  He then casts 
body and self as the object and subject of the medical gaze.  From this position, Burt 
feels his wife needs medical support to ‘deal’ with him as if he were an object, rather 
than support to relate to him as a subject.  It is this, I think, that suggests Burt 
medicalises his physical and emotional bodily condition.  Speculating, this may be a 
response, a means of containing the fearful embodied experience of ‘uncontrolled 
rage’ and its implications for Burt’s partner.  Burt’s biography may have also 
inclined him to a medicalised view of disability. He grew up when disabled people 
weren’t a visible part of the community and disabled people were thought to be 
looked after by the medical establishment.  This view may have been reinforced 
when Burt was hospitalised.
Burt’s experiences hint at the embodied and cultural complexities which lay behind 
his expectation of greater support from the NHS.  As someone with an adult onset 
degenerative condition Peter, too had unfulfilled expectations.  He felt that the NHS 
‘…should have offered help to me. I shouldn't have had to request it. They 
should have been there to reassure me.’(1st interview) 
This suggests that Peter had a medicalised and culturally informed view that the NHS 
would be there to offer support for disabled people automatically, look after them 
without being asked.  Perhaps this view predated the onset of Peter’s impairment and 
shaped his expectation that the NHS should provide reassurance. The issue of 
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reassurance was a refrain during both of Peter’s interviews.  However, its meaning 
shifted and looking at these meanings gives insight to Peter’s expectations of the 
NHS.
At one stage, Peter seemed to use the term reassurance in connection with prognosis:  
‘They gave me the name of what the condition was. Didn't give me the 
background, or any reassurances as to what might happen. What to expect. Or 
anyone to contact.’ (2nd interview) 
We get a sense here of how Peter felt let down when given his diagnosis over the 
telephone by a medical researcher Peter had never met.  At one point Peter reported 
saying to the researcher ‘you can’t leave me like this’, which was a form of doing 
healthcare, of desperately trying to protect the embodied self in a moment of 
isolation and turmoil.  Without any information, Peter had and continues to have 
contradictory expectations.  He knows the doctors cannot tell him what to expect 
because his condition is rare and takes many forms. But the emotional need for 
knowledge, for reassurance as to the future remains.  Similarly, Peter wants a 
prognosis but doesn’t want to know about likely problems before they arrive.  This 
suggests that wanting reassurance through having a prognosis was a possible way to 
counter the profoundly destabilising experience of embodying the knowledge that the 
body will degenerate in the near future but knowing nothing more than that. 
Fortunately, by doing healthcare outwith the NHS Peter discovered two sources of 
reassurance: doing impairment solidarity (see chapter six) and using an alternative 
health practitioner.  The practitioner 
‘…was prepared to discuss and talk things through. He was just prepared to 
ask me how something affected me, not what it should affect.’ (1st interview) 
Like many who turn to alternative health practitioners, Peter found someone with the 
space and interest to engage with Peter about his embodied, lived experience.
A further meaning Peter imputes to reassurance concerns the lack of available 
treatment. For example 
RB:  Were there other ways that you would like them to be more reassuring? 
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Peter: In my opinion it is a double edge sword. I am really pleased that I am 
not on medication but in my opinion they were too quick to say that there is 
nothing that we can give you. (1st interview)
Again Peter recognises that what he wants is contradictory:  he is relieved that he 
doesn’t have to take medication yet wants his condition to be treatable.  By saying 
doctors were ‘too quick’ to rule out treatment suggests that he does not quite believe 
them, a point Peter reiterated several times.  At one stage he suggests that the reason 
they haven’t given him treatment is because he ‘gives off the wrong signals’ that is 
because his enactment of impairment isn’t always apparent, visible.  This resonates 
with Burt’s experiences and suggests an issue of legitimacy, of a fear of one’s 
embodied experience and anxieties being diminished or dismissed because bodily 
and emotional doing of impairment isn’t apparent.  Phenomenologists argue that the 
body is the ground level of all experience (Hughes & Paterson, 1997).  Thus to 
experience the world through an impaired body and for that to be hidden to others, is 
to have an inescapable risk of having one’s primary bodily experience of the world 
misunderstood by others.  Yet perhaps this doesn’t really capture the issue of 
invisibility because visibility of the enactment of impairment is no guarantee of 
understanding by others either.  
In one sense, Burt and Peter’s expectations beg an awkward question for me.  Are 
there clinical grounds for the support that they need and if so can that support be 
justified in the context of the NHS where resources are scarce and demands high? Of 
course I am not in a position to answer this.  However, what needs to be flagged up 
for further debate is whether Peter and Burt’s expectations can be interpreted as a 
desire to share responsibility for self management and if so what sort of services 
would constitute such sharing?  Before considering this I want to look at a similar 
strand of the data.
A number of other participants spoke about the lack of medical interest in them and 
their condition.  More specifically, six participants felt they would like a regular 
“health MOT”.  For example Thomas, who had a congenital neurological condition, 
repeatedly made the point that no healthcare professionals took any interest in him:
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‘the interest of the GP's has not improved at all because obviously they regard 
Cerebral Palsy as something they don't know much about, not much can be 
done about and therefore no point in spending any money on their patients’ 
(1st interview) 
It is difficult to understand fully if and in what ways Thomas felt his body would 
have been better cared for if healthcare professionals had taken greater interest.  
However, it may have been related to Thomas’ fear of his condition deteriorating:
‘I was told I was stiffening up, a GP once told me that although my condition 
was static, the effects of it would worsen over time and I would end up in a 
wheelchair. Not terribly reassuring.’  (1st interview) 
As a result Thomas felt that
‘it would be nice to be invited in for a check up occasionally’  (2nd interview) 
This check-up, Thomas felt, should involve a functional assessment because what lay 
behind Thomas’s fear was not deterioration of his bodily condition per se but the 
implications this would have on his quality of life.  In turn, these implications related 
to his struggle with his current daily doings of impairment and an assumption that if 
his impairment got worse he would still not receive any daily living support.  In this 
situation having access to social model thinking and indeed advocacy may provide a 
viable alternative to the lack of medical support and options.
This expectation for a health MOT may also be related to broader social trends.  One 
participant Betty, notwithstanding her six monthly check ups with the consultant, felt 
that if people had a serious illness 
‘someone could just follow up and make sure that you are eating properly, that 
you are coping properly, do you need more exercise you know, to arrange for 
you to go swimming or get you out if you are feeling depressed... I live alone 
…I am looking, I think, to the National Health Service to sort of give me the 
comfort and the care you know that I am looking for’.  (1st interview) 
The implication here is that with changing patterns of family life which result in 
more people living alone the NHS should share responsibility for self management 
and extend its reach into everyday life.
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In this section, an analysis has been presented that suggests some participants wanted 
greater medical input and had unfulfilled expectations of the NHS and healthcare 
professionals.  This may be related to aspects of their embodied experience 
interpreted through the deeply culturally embedded biomedical model of illness.  For 
my purposes this raises two questions.
The first of these is whether it is useful to interpret these unmet expectations as 
evidence that some disabled people want further medicalisation of disability and 
impairment?  On a simple understanding of medicalisation as the extension of 
medical power into more and more areas of everyday life (Zola, 1983) I think it does. 
On one level, this conflicts with the critique of medicalisation by some Disability 
Studies’ scholars, discussed in chapter four. However, this does not necessarily 
imply endorsement of medicalisation of disability in other areas: for example Peter 
was very critical of the way some doctors fulfil their gate keeping role.  Further, it 
could be argued that it is precisely because disability is medicalised that people turn 
to healthcare professionals for support even though such professionals may not be 
best placed to provide it.  In other words the impetus to medicalise a problem is no 
guarantee that it will be identified and resolved by the medical profession (Conrad, 
1992).  
This brings me to the second question, whether the NHS is best placed to meet the 
needs participants identified.  A number of commentators have argued that 
healthcare professionals find it difficult to engage with the emotion, isolation or 
suffering that some people with impairments or chronic illness face at some points in 
their lives  (see, for example, Cassell, 2004, Frank, 1997,2002, Kleinman, 1988).  
This seemed to be borne out by the experiences of several participants.  Further, it is 
not just disabled people who want healthcare professionals to listen and empathise 
with them and provide the reassurance and support participants identified (Green & 
Griffiths, 2003, Kleinman, 1988, Lupton, 1997a).  If the policy shift towards 
supporting and enabling people to take responsibility for self management is to be 
successful, consideration needs to be given to how the emotional needs generated by 
such management can be met (Mol, 2007).   One possibility is to increase access to 
proven alternative therapies that can offer body work which gives space to 
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embodiment, that is to an understanding of the body which includes the mind and 
spirit as well as the fleshy body (Twigg, 2000).
Doing Healthcare by Accessing Health Services 
Providing equality of access to health care is a major concern for all with an interest 
in health policy, with the challenge being to create a system which provides ‘the right 
service, at the right time, in the right place’ (Rogers quoted in Gulliford, 2002:187) 
for all citizens.  In this section, the focus on accessing healthcare is much narrower.  
In the context of exploring doing healthcare to take care of the body, it is about how 
disabled people’s impairment and embodied agency influences the ways in which 
they use the NHS.
For two participants, accessing healthcare was problematic because there were no 
specialist services dealing with their conditions.  For Una the only treatment for her 
condition was graded activity courses.  However, her GP said there were no such 
courses locally.  Hence Una had sole responsibility for managing her condition 
which mostly involved doing energy management and doing healthcare by accessing 
alternative therapies when she could afford it. For Agnes, a middle aged woman and 
former healthcare professional, things were more complex.  Agnes had health needs 
which were the cumulative effects of the enactment of impairment on her musculo-
skeletal system, as well as new problems associated with the re-emergence of her 
underlying condition acquired through an acute illness in childhood.  However, 
‘there is nothing’, no services or specialists in Agnes’ condition.  Moreover, in a 
resource and time limited system Agnes is never ‘assessed as a whole being’.  For 
example, she was referred to an orthopaedic specialist and physiotherapist for knee 
and hip pain but neither had the time or understanding of Agnes’ condition to do a 
holistic assessment or look at her back where the pain may have been coming from.  
How then can we understand the interacting layers of Agnes’ experiences?  The first 
layer concerns the impaired body: the very adaptability of the body which enabled 
Agnes to maximise function in relationship with the environment, has now become a 
problem.  Agnes has ‘moved abnormally all these years’ and now somatically 
experiences this as pain.  The second layer involves reflexivity, feeling and thinking 
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about the pain, doing the anxiety of not knowing where it comes from or what it 
means, and then deciding that to take care of her body she needs to seek help.  Third 
is the doing of healthcare.  While there are medical interventions which may benefit 
Agnes, none are available locally.  As a result Agnes has to carefully handle her 
relationship with the GP in order to secure appropriate referrals, by attending 
multiple appointments and by researching her condition.  Agnes also does health by 
being involved in an impairment specific group which lobbies politicians for 
appropriate services such as a multi-disciplinary clinic dedicated to her impairment.  
As well as the energy required to do healthcare in this way, there is the frustration of 
never being seen as a whole being, of being an anomaly within a medical system 
which thrives on identifying and treating abnormalities.  But there are moments of 
emotional connection too,
‘the orthopaedic man…I got a glimpse of somebody who did care and wanted 
more for his patients and couldn't get it’  (Pilot interview).
This also reminds us of the constraints healthcare professionals experience.
In contrast with Agnes, there are specialist health services for people with Fraser’s 
impairment.  However, for him doing healthcare has to begin with using reflexivity 
and accumulated bodily knowledge to decide whether the problem is related or 
exacerbated by his spinal injury.  This is not always obvious.  For example on one 
occasion Fraser’s leg became swollen so he went to the GP who diagnosed an 
infection and prescribed antibiotics.  However, Fraser 
‘didn’t trust the GP to have picked up that this was just an infection or 
something else and wanted to make sure it wasn’t a DVT or something to do 
with my spinal problem’ (1st interview).
Yet this lack of trust wasn’t absolute, the GP had given Fraser some reassurance:
‘He was down to earth and you know he explained why he didn’t think it was a 
DVT and thought it was an infection. And that seemed fair enough’ (1st 
interview) 
One gets a sense here of Fraser weighing up his need to be protective of his bodily 
well-being, his bodily knowledge and wanting to respect the GP’s expertise.  In the 
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end, he decided to obtain specialist advice from the spinal unit because he had to 
contact them about another problem:  Fraser sat with his leg elevated to help it heal 
but didn’t realise this put extra pressure on the base of his spine, damaging the skin.  
. Fraser was reassured when the consultant confirmed the GP’s diagnosis but also felt 
it was opportunity 
‘…just to get more knowledge. I think that is quite important. Because the 
internet is one thing…But you have people who are a lot more informed on 
these things’ (1st interview).
For Fraser getting more knowledge makes doing healthcare easier especially when 
that knowledge is personalised. The consultant uses expertise to interpret the 
knowledge to apply it to Fraser’s particular circumstances.  It is this expert 
interpretation that Fraser feels makes a significant difference between information 
from a consultant to that found on the internet which is abstract and not tailored to 
Fraser’s specific circumstances.
If Fraser’s doing healthcare is influenced by the nature of his impairment and his 
bodily knowledge, then Carol’s doing is influenced by being a former healthcare 
professional who has an explicit commitment to using the NHS proactively to ‘keep 
myself as well as I can’.  Keeping well is different from managing impairment or self 
management:  the former suggests striving for embodied well-being whereas the 
latter is disembodied and focused on the impairment as a discrete entity.  To keep 
well Carol took the advice of her colleague, a GP, to
‘…take ill health retirement and to look after myself… because he said nobody 
else will… and its very true...’  (1st interview).
The implication here is that working constrains the possibility of looking after one’s 
self, her embodied response to impairment.  Usually in this context, work is seen as a 
constraint because of the stress it causes or that it depletes energy and thus distracts 
from social life.  For Carol, however, work was seen as constraining because it 
would allow insufficient time to doing healthcare because she is ‘in contact with the 
NHS all the time’.  Not working meant Carol was able to do healthcare in a number 
of ways including: researching her condition, experimenting with alternative 
therapies, attending appointments and condition management courses.  This was in 
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addition to doing impairment and disability such as making her house accessible in 
anticipation of becoming a wheelchair user.
The ways in which Carol did healthcare were influenced by her biography, 
particularly her healthcare background.  It meant that she tended
‘…to look at or think of a way to get in touch with so and so before this gets 
any worse…’ (1st interview) 
In other words, Carol often interprets what’s happening to her body through a 
biomedical lens and combines this with her insider knowledge of the NHS to decide 
who and how to contact in any given situation.  For example, if Carol wants to see a 
neurologist she knows that
‘…if the GP makes a referral you go back to the bottom of file…whereas at 
least if we have a specialist nurse…that’s one way… its not jumping the 
queue…its getting to them sooner rather than later…’  (1st interview) 
Carol recognised that her insider knowledge gave her privileged access to health 
service and expressed concern for those who don’t know how the system worked.
In some senses, there is a tension between Carol’s intensive doing of healthcare and 
her knowing ‘conventional medicine has got nothing to offer’ those with her 
condition.  For example, Carol saw a rehabilitation consultant and although he 
wasn’t able to help, she wanted to remain on his caseload.   When the consultant 
refused Carol said:
‘I am not going to go away… you know…so who’s gonna look after us…’  (1st 
interview).
Carol too seemed to have an expectation of the needing to be looked after by the 
NHS similar to that of Burt and Peter.  However, it is different insofar that they had 
no contact with the NHS whereas Carol does.  Of course this difference may reflect 
different health needs for even though an underlying condition is untreatable, 
medical interventions may help with symptoms.  But there may be something else 
happening here as well:  that people gain security from knowing how or who they 
would contact in the event of having an impairment related health crises.  So for 
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Carol, being on the rehabilitation consultant books meant if her walking deteriorated 
in the way she felt it would, the consultant would arrange specialist physiotherapy.  
This argument about the security derived from knowing who to contact can be made 
by looking at the positive comments participants made about specialist nurses, whose 
specialisms are often condition specific, for example, the rheumatology nurse.  Carol, 
together with Ed and Elspeth, emphasised the accessibility of the nurses and the 
reassurance they gained from knowing that they could ring the nurses in the event of 
a crisis.  For example, Ed took ‘great comfort’ knowing he could ring the nurse 
whenever needs be.  This is consistent with an evaluation which found that one 
significant benefit of having MS Specialist Nurses was providing a named contact 
within the NHS (Forbes et al, 2002).  Interestingly, however, one participant with 
this condition gained the same sense of comfort from knowing her adult children 
would always get the healthcare she needed as quickly as possible.  This again 
highlights that family structures influence how people think about healthcare usage. 
Participants also valued specialist nurses because they could short circuit NHS 
bureaucracy, bureaucracy which was both one cause of doing healthcare and a barrier 
to it.  For example, Ed said:
‘…the last time I phoned up the MS Nurse I said, “I have got spasms” …she 
asked a few questions and said “I will have a word with the consultant and he 
will arrange an appropriate prescription via your doctor”. So that is a fast 
track you know’.  (2nd interview) 
The specialist nurses also seemed to be a source of practical advice.  Through home 
visits to people with the same condition specialist nurses built up an extensive 
knowledge about the everyday world of those living with the condition.  This 
enabled the nurses to provide people with a sense of what constitutes “normal” 
bodily doings for those with the condition.  Hence Elspeth commented that the nurse
‘doesn’t just deal with what’s happening, she gives you a probable scenario… 
[This means] you are not surprised when something happens…and also you 
can say well…that’s reasonably normal and there’s nothing to panic about’ 
(1st interview) 
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This sounds very similar to the reassurance the Peter wanted.  It also highlights that 
the combination of biomedical knowledge with that gained through insight into the 
lived experience enables specialist nurses to mitigate some of the bodily uncertainty 
which comes from having a progressive impairment.  Perhaps it is not surprising then 
that for Ed, the nurses played a similar role to impairment solidarity (see chapter six):
‘…it was wonderful to talk to someone who understands’. (2nd interview) 
This section has explored some of the factors which influence the way disabled 
people do healthcare in terms of accessing appropriate health services.   Impairment 
related health needs and the configuration of health services are obviously important 
in this.  But, as we have seen so too is participants’ bodily knowledge, their ability to 
research and personal resources influences their attitude towards seeking NHS 
support and enables them to make contact with it in quite a sophisticated way 
(Watson, 2003).  This inevitably begs the question of what happens to those people 
for whom social constraints and structural disadvantage make doing healthcare very 
difficult.  This was illustrated by the experiences of Alan, who has learning 
difficulties and a neurological condition, who was reluctant to go the GP due to the 
cost of paying for prescriptions.
Doing Healthcare in Hospital Wards
Being a hospital in-patient is rarely a pleasant or wanted experience for anyone.  
Sixteen participants talked about hospital stays, six of whom described negative 
incidents where their impairment related needs were ignored.  These could have been 
analysed in terms of handling access.  Such handling involves the participant 
negotiating with the aim of removing or reducing an access barrier during the 
moments encounter (see chapter seven).  However, the six incidents are particular 
cases of access handling, relating to nursing care practices in an institutional setting, 
the ward.  In this setting, one mark of professional nursing practice which 
differentiates it from other social care practices, is nurses’ ability to identify and 
respond to a range of needs without the individual having to articulate it (Davis, 
1988).  Where this occurs one would expect there would be minimum need for doing 
healthcare and this was the case for a number of participants.  The interesting 
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question is what happens when individual impairment needs go unnoticed in hospital 
wards, in what circumstances do participants have to doing healthcare in the ward 
setting?  More pertinently for my purpose, is there something about the relationship 
between a disabled patient’s embodiment, care practices and the ward environment 
which makes it different from access handling in general?
As a frequent healthcare user, Joel is used to doing healthcare and feels that this 
ensures his embodied self is appropriately cared for. But Joel did not feel this during 
a hospital stay after planned surgery unrelated to his impairment.  Joel used the pre-
admission appointment as an opportunity for doing healthcare, by discussing with the 
nurses what access equipment he would need on the ward.  Using his reflexivity and 
bodily knowledge, Joel also discussed the possible effects of the surgery on his 
impaired body.  These included not being able to transfer and balance in his manual 
wheelchair because the surgery involved cutting through his chest muscles.  
Unfortunately this doing had no apparent effect, a reminder that however much 
emotional time and effort put into doing healthcare, its success is always contingent 
upon the attitudes and acts of others and the systems within which they work.  While 
in Joel’s situation the problem may have reflected the communication difficulties 
within a large bureaucracy, it nonetheless jeopardises the hospital’s compliance with 
the DDA as Joel’s request for equipment could be interpreted as a claim for 
reasonable adjustments.  
This failure to respond to Joel’s requests for reasonable adjustments was 
compounded by an apparent neglect of his nursing needs immediately after major 
surgery.  For example:
‘I don't think they had any training on pressure, or pressure control. So I had 
to literally ask to be turned..’ (1st interview)   ‘I would have expected them to 
be more aware of the fact that I was more prone to pressure sores than Joe 
Public’ (2nd interview) 
To have to ask to be turned represents an instance of healthcare doing when the 
embodied self is subsumed by post-operative pain, medications and unfamiliar bodily 
sensations.  Yet this doing was necessary in order to protect the very integrity of the 
outer layer of Joel’s body.  The pertinent question here is what happened to nursing 
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practices? If professional nursing practice is about identifying need (see above) then 
one would have thought that nursing routines would include both pressure care for 
most patients after major surgery and a systematic way of identifying those who, like 
Joel, are ‘prone to pressure sores’.  Of course, one of the limitations of this study, 
which is very apparent in this section, is that it does not include the voices of 
healthcare professionals and the barriers to good practice which they experience.  
This is a substantial limitation here, particularly as another participant had a similar 
problem but in a different hospital. Fraser repeatedly asked the nurses for a pressure 
relieving mattress yet it never materialised.  Fraser raised the matter with the 
consultant who was
‘…quite keen that I complained. I didn’t because I’d got other things to do and 
I just wanted to forget about it.’  (1st interview) 
What’s interesting here is that the consultant passes responsibility to Fraser to 
complain, expecting Fraser to undertake further doing of healthcare.  Yet arguably 
had the consultant had greater authority over the nurses and could have dealt with the 
matter quickly, informally and discretely.   Fraser’s response, having other things to 
do, is a reminder of the need to set limits to disability and impairment doing so one’s 
life does not get subsumed it.
To return to Joel’s situation, on the fifth day after surgery he was told he would be 
discharged.  Yet when Joel was put in his in wheelchair he could not balance as the 
surgery had effected his enactment of impairment.  Joel had anticipated this may 
happen and discussed it during the pre-admission appointment.  Again this doing had 
no effect.  So Joel started doing healthcare again when he found out that no home 
care had been arranged.  At this stage Joel ‘had to literally stick up for my rights’ 
(2nd interview) and refuse to go home.  Had he not done so the hospital would have 
sent Joel home without being able to enact his impairment in his normal way, so 
unable to function.  In this situation, without support, Joel’s embodied self would 
have been vulnerable on the emotional, cognitive as well as the physical level.
Joel had an explanation for the apparent rush to discharge him:
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They just hoped that I would fall into the general category of an able bodied 
person and be out in five days to comply with government targets.’ (1st 
interview) 
If Joel’s interpretation of what happened is correct, it suggests that nursing practice 
was mediated by the pressure to meet targets to an extent that nurses did not assess or
meet his needs.  The implication would be that the very ways in which the fleshy 
bodies of patients are touched or left untouched by the equally fleshy bodies of 
nurses, are constrained by the structures through which health policy is implemented.  
More generally, these targets are likely to be grounded in a notion of a non-disabled 
person or “typical case”.  Subsequently there is a risk that disabled people may be 
regarded as problematic cases and this may adversely affect quality of care. 
Ironically, once staff realised Joel would not be discharged within the target time, 
attention was focused entirely on his impairment needs.  This has a positive outcome 
as Joel was transferred to a rehabilitation unit in which he found the treatment and 
care beneficial. 
Whereas Joel had his impairment related needs neglected, Ed experienced several 
incidents where his fleshy body was poorly and disrespectfully treated within caring 
practices. One of these occurred when two nurses used a hoist to get him out of bed:
‘…they started putting the strap around me and whatever and I said “you are 
catching my arm”. They did not hear me, they still kept hoisting me…and my 
arm was getting further tucked in…I said “don't do that”…she went buzz buzz 
[sound of hoist]…I said “d-o-n-'t…d-o…t-h-a-t”'…she did the third time and I 
said “if you press that bloody thing again” (2nd interview) 
It has been argued that care refers both to a set of tasks and a relation but the one can 
be present without the other (Watson et al, 2004).  In Ed’s experience there is a care 
task - hoisting - yet little evidence of a relationship to him as a person.  Hoisting 
would have involved Ed’s body being touched and physically manoeuvred through 
the body work of the nurses.  Yet it seems that the nurses were treating Ed as little 
more than an unfeeling object, ignoring his embodied self.  In this situation, Ed was 
doing healthcare, protecting his body by repeatedly trying to direct the nurses’ 
attention to his trapped arm.  But the nurses did not stop until another, more senior 
nurse, came to chastise Ed for shouting at the nurses. 
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In another incident it was Ed’s sense of appropriate bodily behaviour which came in 
to conflict with care practice.
‘There was a physiotherapist ...passed by and asked, “How are you doing?” I 
said, “I am not very well at the moment”. He said, “what's wrong?” I said, 
“Have you noticed what's in front of me?” He said, “Oh Dear, how has that 
come loose?” I said, “that's my urine bag in front of me and I have asked on 5 
occasions for it to be strapped to my leg, could you possibly arrange that” and 
he said, “certainly” and he bent down and strapped it and I said, “you know 
what? …I feel completely different now. I am dignified”’ (2nd interview).
For Ed, the visibility of his catheter bag offended his bodily dignity.  In the everyday 
world, the act of urination is done only in designated social spaces, away from the 
main public gaze.  Having a catheter transgresses the very boundaries of the body: 
urine in a bag but in front of the body is body matter out of place (Douglas, cited in 
Twigg, 2000).  Ed’s offence does not seem to come from concern with what others 
may think of him.  Rather it is about what he feels in relation to his sense of his own 
body.  This conflicts with Twigg’s (2000) argument that our disgust with human 
waste is limited and it is other people's dirt that is of most concern.   Ed responded to 
his offended sense of self by doing healthcare, by drawing attention to his feelings 
about the placement of the bag.  Perhaps what enabled Ed to be persistent in asking 
for help came from his biographical resources, having been a director of a large 
health-related public body.  
Speculating, one reason the nurses did not respond was that for them catheter bags on 
display was normal, part of the taken-for-granted world of medical objects which 
furnish the ward.  In this context, perhaps Ed’s requests came low down on the 
nurses’ list of care tasks for the day, tasks which become divorced from the 
individual and subsumed into the doing of the system as a whole (Frank, 2006).  The 
‘complicated network of dependency relations’ in hospitals means that time to give 
attention and non-medical care to individuals is scarce (De Swaan, 1990:38).  Hence 
it was care tasks and not caring relations which were attended to.
These incidents took their emotional toll on Ed causing psycho-emotional effects.  
To do or process these emotions eventually led Ed to further doing healthcare:
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‘I contained my anger for three weeks and in the end I rang up the patients' 
liaison officer at the [the hospital] and told him for 40 minutes and I am telling 
you’ (2nd interview). 
A number of participants talked about health care encounters which didn’t seem to 
involve any doing of healthcare.  In some instances, this was due to the beliefs that 
participants had about healthcare professionals.  This can be illustrated with Suki’s 
experience who was an administrative employee of the NHS.  As a patient however, 
Suki had very little contact with the NHS other than two episodes of emergency 
neurosurgery to unblock a shunt.  On these occasions, Suki felt
‘It was a bit frustrating for me when I couldn't do anything…But when you are 
in hospital, not working, but as a patient they [nurses] are obviously in the 
front line. Do as you're told.’ (2nd interview) 
.  
At first sight, this suggests that the opposite of doing healthcare is compliance with 
healthcare professionals’ strictures: for Suki this meant passively doing ‘as you’re 
told’.  However, the fact that Suki experiences being compliant as ‘a bit frustrating’ 
indicates a form of emotional doing of healthcare, of experiencing and dealing with 
her internal sense of frustration.  From a Foucauldian perspective, this could be 
interpreted as an instance of biopower creating her very subjectivity, her sense of 
what it means to be a disabled person in hospital.
One issue that has emerged here is that in some instances doing healthcare as an in-
patient is necessary to protect the body from the consequences of less than ideal care 
practices.  It could be argued that this indicates that having an impaired body in 
hospital is to be vulnerable and to risk compromising one’s dignity and self esteem.  
Yet the qualities of vulnerability and dignity do not reside in the body per se but in 
the context in which the body is situated.  So, for example, Joel was clearly 
vulnerable in the incident described above.  However, during another hospital stay 
Joel was not vulnerable because all his impairment needs were met.  This happened, 
Joel felt, because there was a system in place whereby nurses assessed and recorded 
his needs as soon as he was admitted.  Other staff referred to this assessment when 
caring for Joel.  However the point that dignity is context dependent is put most 
eloquently by another participant, Andrew, a wheelchair user with a progressive 
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condition.  As a child, Andrew had multiple hospital appointments and surgeries and 
frequently had to strip to his underpants so doctors could view his spine as he walked
‘at the time I didn't feel bad or small or self conscious.  But that's the weird 
thing.  What is it that I'm in front of 8 or 9 strangers and I don't feel self 
conscious?  I think one day I could probably walk out the front door and not 
notice because I’m just so used to being undressed in front of complete 
strangers.  But that is not a good situation.  It wasn't that I loss my dignity it 
was just removed completely, without my wanting it to be.’  (Pilot interview)
What Andrew describes here is the loss of the very possibility of dignity, of his sense 
of worth and preciousness about his embodied self.  It was if Andrew had 
incorporated the norms associated with clinical practice into his sense of embodied 
self.  In other words, being repeatedly regarded as an object of the medical gaze had 
colonised Andrew’s very subjectivity.  As a child, Andrew probably didn’t do much 
healthcare but was extensively “done to”.
Doing Healthcare in Relationship with Healthcare Professionals
French (1994a) notes that many disabled people ‘believe that the partnership and 
collaboration with professionals is important’ (115).  This was borne out by many 
participants who endeavoured to establish, reciprocate and sustain good relationships 
with healthcare professionals.  I want to explore how this involved the doing of 
healthcare by drawing upon the experiences of Frances and Gigi, who were 
interviewed together.  Frances had a rare condition which affected her mobility and 
was frequently admitted to hospital via casualty.  Gigi was a wheelchair user and had 
episodes of acute hospital admissions and ongoing medical support in the 
community.
Gigi did healthcare by developing relationships with healthcare professionals based 
upon a ‘partnership model’.  This model involves 
‘seeing me as the expert in my condition, my needs and my choices’.  (1st 
interview) 
What Gigi highlights is that patient expertise is not just a technical matter of 
experiential knowledge of how impairment affects the body. Rather it is about the 
embodied self, about how the individual’s preferences and values influence the way 
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the fleshy body is to be (medically) treated.  It is also about what the person wants 
and is able to do each day to the body and with body, given the social constraints 
they face and social resources they have.  To achieve this through doing the 
partnership model requires Gigi to ‘handle situations assertively’.  Similarly, for 
Frances doing good relationships with healthcare professionals is
‘…down to our ability to articulate and to be respected for our opinions.’  (1st 
interview) 
This communication is something to be worked at, to be developed by ‘learning from 
one’s mistakes’ as Frances put it.  It also, of course, depends upon the responsiveness 
of healthcare professionals.  Frances and Gigi both gave examples of situations 
where healthcare professionals weren’t responsive or respectful.  But they also 
described situations where it was the healthcare professional who initiated and 
sustained a strong partnership relationship.  When this happened it enhanced the 
healthcare they received.
Notwithstanding the benefits of partnerships, both Frances and Gigi hinted at the 
doing it required in the following exchange:
Gigi: ‘I kind of feel for... anybody else perhaps with a similar condition to 
myself… I do try to say that when I have opportunities, it’s not just about me.
Frances:  It’s the old pioneers’ thing.
Gigi: Of never being off duty.  (1st interview) 
Here then both women imply they have a connection with and a responsibility 
towards the wider community of disabled people.  By investing their time and skills 
into maintaining partnership relationships they are ‘pioneers’, what they do is new, 
beneficial to them, but also leading the way to make things easier for disabled 
people.  But the price of this is ‘never being off duty’ which implies not acting 
instinctively but doing by purposefully shaping their communication; in short, doing 
healthcare.
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A final point here is that Frances and Gigi had experienced policy and cultural values 
mediating their relationships with healthcare professionals.  For example, Gigi 
described a situation 
‘I had a discussion with one of the district nurses… [she] was questioning my, 
the quantity of supplies that I was requesting. And I think to be honest she got 
her sums wrong. But we spoke about it and whilst she was at pains to say, ‘I 
am really just concerned about how you are’. I knew that another kind of 
trigger factor for her would be, ‘we have to keep to a budget here…[I was] just 
irritated.’ (1st interview) 
Here then Gigi is made aware of how the equipment she needed for her daily doing 
of impairment could be construed as “too much” because there is a budget to be kept 
to.  While this was just irritating it also exposes how quality of life, and indeed 
support for self management can quickly become reframed as a question of budget, 
one’s embodiment being too expensive.  This intrudes upon the Gigi’s relationship 
with the nurse.  Fortunately the relationship is a strong one. But Gigi has to do 
healthcare by using her skills to speak with the nurse in a way which restated her 
needs without jeopardising the partnership.
Frances describes a more subtle, but perhaps more systemic, example of how cultural 
values about disabled people sometimes hover in the background of healthcare 
practices:
‘it’s the questions that you are asked when you go into hospital and they ask if 
you are working, what’s your job or whatever, and I will always say, I am a 
retired [professional]. And then now what I say is that I am a member of 
the[statutory body], but that’s a voluntary thing, but I don’t say that to them. 
Its almost like I am saying this to, dunno, to make them think that almost it is, 
quoting something from somewhere, a life worth living.’   (2nd interview) 
In Frances’ doing of healthcare she takes account of a potential grounds for prejudice 
embedded in the seemingly innocuous question about employment status.  Feeling 




In this chapter I have tried to understand disabled people’s usage of the NHS using 
the analytical tool of doing healthcare to take care of the body.  This variant of the 
doing tool has been less successful than those in the previous chapter.  It has made it 
possible to highlight disabled people’s agency, the variety of skills they develop and 
use to get the support they need.  However, it is somewhat cumbersome and difficult 
to always draw out the embodied quality of doing.  It has also been difficult to 
identify the different types of doing healthcare, if it is ever anything other than the 
ability to be articulate.  This may reflect the limitations of the data specifically in that 
participants were not asked explicitly what they felt that they had to do to secure the 
healthcare support they needed.
Despite these difficulties, the data analysis presented has highlighted two related 
surprises.  First, it has revealed that some participants have expectations that the 
NHS should provide more ‘reassurance’, should ‘look after us’ or ‘call me back for a 
progress report’.  These expectations do not seem easily translatable to a claim for a 
particular service or approach yet the provision of healthcare professionals who have 
the time to engage, listen and build up an ongoing relationship might help.   
However, more research is needed to understand how these expectations emerge, if 
they are widespread and how they are underpinned by social trends and cultural 
forces.
Second, the analysis has begun to unpick how embodiment influences the use of the 
NHS.  Experiencing certain qualities of embodiment such as frustration, isolation and 
profound uncertainty about future embodiment may at times incline people to seek 
support.  These qualities are akin to the existential anxiety (Bury, 1982, S.J Williams 
1996), which some have attributed to the onset of impairment. An interesting 
question here is whether such anxiety, as with qualities of dignity and vulnerability, 
can be context dependent.  Similarly, the analysis has hinted at how medical and 






In this concluding chapter, I want to bring together and reflect upon the various 
strands of this thesis.  This thesis set out to understand the social factors which 
influence disabled people’s use of healthcare, and to consider what this may reveal 
about disability and impairment as sociological phenomena.   As it has turned out, 
the arguments and empirical evidence presented have been somewhat skewed 
towards the latter aim, understanding of disability and impairment. In effect, 
exploring disabled people’s health care encounters became a case study, a means of 
exploring impairment in general by examining its meanings in a specific context.  
Perhaps this skewing reflects the contested nature of disability (G.Williams, 1996), 
which means one cannot adequately address any specific disability related issue such 
as healthcare, without first engaging in the more general debate about the nature of 
disability and impairment.  Indeed, Shakespeare (2005) argues that it is precisely 
because Disability Studies has eschewed impairment that it has had relatively little to 
say about the positive or necessary role health and medical care plays in disabled 
people’s lives.   This thesis has not eschewed impairment.  So I will now consider the 
contribution this thesis makes to Disability Studies by reviewing what has been 
learnt as a result of engaging with impairment.
Engaging with Impairment 
This thesis began by reviewing Disability Studies’ debates about conceptualising and 
theorising impairment. Although from different theoretical perspectives, work by 
Paterson & Hughes (1997, 1999), Shakespeare and Watson (2001) and Thomas 
(2007) all suggests that impairment should be understood as a bodily phenomenon
which becomes foregrounded, attributed with meanings, in particular contexts.  In 
different ways, these scholars intimate that impairment is something dynamic, 
something which emerges from the relationship between the body and social 
relations and which is never purely social or purely biological. This proposition 
connects with critical realist perspectives (Shakespeare, 2006, S.J Williams, 1999) 
which recognises the real, sensate body but also acknowledge that the way we 
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experience that body is through culture and social relations (Twigg, 2006).  But if we 
take as given that impairment is an emergent property – and I think there are grounds 
to do so - these is still a need to consider how this is experienced in the body, how it 
manifests in disabled people’s everyday lives.   Similarly, while the argument that 
impairment is embodied is a significant step forward from the social model which 
more or less ignores the body, there is still no adequate definition of embodiment, 
nor a list of its essential components (Turner, 2001). So there is still uncertainty 
about what constitutes impairment and a lack of fleshy detail about how impairment 
is experienced phenomenologicaly.
No doubt, in time refinements will be made to concepts of impairment to increase its 
specificity and to make it resonate with disabled people’s lived experience. Despite 
this, there will always be competing concepts and discourses of impairment both 
within academia and beyond.  These often have material effects on disabled people’s 
lives (see chapter four).  It was for this reason that I felt this thesis needed to review 
how impairment was conceptualised in the context of illness, health and biomedicine.
While Disability Studies scholars have already done this in part, this thesis provided 
an opportunity to do so in significant depth and detail.  It was also an opportunity to 
revisit the literature in the light of criticisms made by these scholars.  What then did 
this conceptual review contribute to the understanding impairment?
Chapters one and two highlighted that impairment, illness and health are all 
evaluations of bodily states which are mediated through culture and ‘modified by the 
social categories’ through which they are known (Douglas, 2005:78).  Therefore the 
boundaries between these states are overlapping, contested and negotiable.  
Somewhat paradoxically, the grounds where illness and impairment overlap are ripe 
for exploring subtle differences between these states.  For example, during the onset 
of both illness and impairment, most people reflect upon the body and its symptoms
provoking thoughts about “what’s wrong”, and having to deal with the intrusion of 
bodily experience in the activities of daily life. If an embodied and 
phenomenological approach is adopted, it may be possible to identify what enables 
someone to move from experiencing symptoms as disruptive and demanding of 
bodily attention to becoming taken-for-granted and unnoticed.  Conversely, such an 
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approach could also be used to explore whether some impairment symptoms, for 
example pain or fatigue, are not transformed in this way.  If they were not so 
transformed, one could then explore whether this is related to the bodily experience 
of the symptom, the restriction of activities they cause and/or other social variables.        
The most significant contribution which this thesis can make to understanding 
impairment, originated in the literature on the relationship between impairment and 
health. For my purposes, this literature held two important ideas.  First, that 
understanding impairment in the context of health is a source of positive evaluations 
of the bodily state of impairment.  This suggests that Disability Studies insistence 
that disability is not a health issue (Barnes, 2003) is something of a missed 
opportunity.  Second, and most importantly, it was the health literature which 
introduced me to the notion that for some disabled people (and indeed for some non-
disabled people), being healthy is something to be worked at, something that 
required body work. As a result, I eventually came across Mol & Law’s (2004) 
concept of doing the body, and it was from this that the concepts of “doing 
impairment” and the “enactment of impairment” were developed which and 
subsequently used to analyse my interview data.  I will discuss them in more detail 
below.
Engaging with Biomedicine 
In a thesis on disability and healthcare, it seemed important, obvious perhaps, to 
explore biomedicine’s perceptions of impairment and some of the ways disabled 
people’s lives become medicalised.  This was the purpose of chapters three and four, 
which also provided an opportunity to explore and contribute to debates about the 
appropriate roles of medicine in disabled people’s lives.   However, it was only when 
I came to analyse my data that I realised that one of the perhaps most significant 
consequences of biomedicine’s understanding of impairment as abnormality is that 
somet participants described how they felt strangely out of place within healthcare 
settings.  For example, despite Fraser’s and Joel’s best efforts, the nurses just treated 
them like anyone else and apparently had no procedures to enable them to respond to 
their impairment and disability related needs.  The same was true of the healthcare 
professionals who interpreted David’s movement as caused by childish fear rather 
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then the access problem of laying on a narrow table, and the doctor who told Andrew 
that the surgery he was about to undergo would have him ‘up and walking in no 
time’ yet there was no prospect of this outcome.  A common factor behind all these 
examples is that medical knowledge and healthcare practices seldom engage with the 
concept of a disabled person, of what it means to have impairment as a condition of 
embodiment in relationship with a disabling world.  Within the medical arena, 
disability and impaired embodiment are usually eclipsed by the view that impairment 
is an abnormality, and is so not only in the context of biomedical body, but also in 
the organisation and practices of healthcare.  For example, while there may be good 
reason for organising services around clinical specialities, in effect, as we saw with 
Agnes in chapter eight, the complexities of people’s conditions get overlooked as 
does an understanding of how the totality of someone’s condition impact on their 
everyday lives.  Similarly, some services which are provided for a cross section of 
disabled people, such as the wheelchair service, are often geographically 
marginalised on the hospital campus and under resourced: one participant 
commented that the wheelchairs the service provided him made him feel like a 
‘cripple’ and, although cheaper than the superior lightweight chairs, lasted a fraction 
of the time.  Looking to the future, it will be interesting to see if, when complying 
with the DDA, the NHS embraces the notion of a disabled person and ensures 
healthcare practices are inclusive and capable of responding to individual need.
Engaging with Impairment Again
I now want to engage with impairment once more, to consider how my research 
findings make it possible to elaborate what it means to embody impairment.  It is this 
that I think is one of the main contributions of this thesis to the understanding of 
impairment.  Integral to this elaboration are the concepts of doing and enacting 
impairment, which I will now discuss. 
My research findings suggest that the enactment of impairment refers to both the 
quality and mode of physical, sensory, emotional and/or cognitive activity.  For 
example, in chapter six we saw that one way in which Fraser enacts his impairment 
is when he transfers from his wheelchair to his bed.  This enactment comprises the 
technique he uses to transfer, sliding from one surface to another using the power and 
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strength of his upper body, and the quality of the movement, how his body has to 
perform physiologically in order to slide in this way.  
An interesting question here is whether the enactment of impairment occurs only 
when someone is actively engaging with the world of objects or participating in 
social interaction.  On the one hand, it could be argued that someone who has a 
spinal injury, as Fraser does, only enacts impairment when moving.  So, for example, 
when Fraser is absorbed in speaking or reading a book, his impaired embodiment has 
no effect.  This would suggest that impairment is always embedded in a body or 
cognitive activity, which is always done in relationship with a particularly material 
context.  On the other hand, however, for someone with a condition which results in 
involuntary movement, their enactment of impairment is continuous, in every 
moment and context influencing how the body is and what the body does.  Yet even 
if impairment is always enacted whatever the context, the context may nonetheless 
influence the enactment, for example how the impairment is enacted when eating 
will be different from how it is enacted when at rest.  A similar argument could be 
made about impairments where the main symptoms are pain or mental distress.  Of 
course, in enacting impairment, the individual will not necessarily be aware of their 
body: once the techniques and associated phenomenology of enacting impairment is 
mastered and accommodated, the body may be once more taken-for-granted.  Yet the 
quality of this taken-for-grantedness may not be the same as that experience of a 
non-disabled person when doing the same activity.  A non-disabled person may just 
jump in the shower, bracketing out all bodily awareness of the physical movement 
involved.  Yet, complete bracketing out movement may not be possible for a disabled 
person for whom showering is effortful, time consuming or who needs to makes a 
conscious effort to be aware of what bodily techniques are needed to avoid falling 
(Tichkosky, 2002).  There is scope for further research here to identify the different 
degrees and types of awareness of the body which people experience when enacting 
impairment.
One of the strengths of the concept of enactment of impairment is that it is 
descriptive rather than normative. It does not imply or require a biomedical 
understanding of the body yet it acknowledges that impairment influences how the 
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body can be and the ways in which it can act.  Indeed, the discipline of trying to 
describe or specify how impairment is enacted, how the embodied self experiences 
and shapes this enactment, distracts one from the temptation to compare the impaired 
body with a non-impaired one.  Further, whatever the particularities of impairment, 
its enactment is never just a matter of biology: it is always influenced and mediated 
by other facets of embodiment, and those facets are always socially and culturally 
mediated.  All this strengthens the case of those who call for a phenomenology of 
impairment (Hughes & Paterson, 1997, Watson, 2000, Wendell, 2003).  However, 
the danger of such an approach is that it neglects the social, is individualistic (Turner, 
1991) and becomes purely descriptive.  To avoid this, attention would need to be 
paid to how social relations mediate the enactment of impairment.
The second bodily process that is integral to embodying impairment is doing 
impairment, the embodied self reflexively attending to, and acting upon, the body in 
order to meet its needs.  The notion of doing impairment provides a means of 
specifying the bodily related tasks which disabled people have to do due to the 
condition of their body and the social and cultural relations in which their bodies are 
enmeshed.  Thus critical to the value of doing impairment is the need for 
deconstruction: for any given bodily task that impairment necessitates, it is 
imperative that the different layers of doing impairment are identified and explored.  
This ensures that the concept moves beyond the descriptive and starts to unravel the 
broader cultural and social influences on doing impairment.  These influences shape 
the need for bodily doing, how the doing is done and the constraints which limit or 
prescribe how the doing of impairment is done.  
The concept of doing impairment also enables us to specify that one facet of 
impairment is that it is a series of activities. The necessity to do those activities 
emerges from the relationship between the characteristics of the embodied self and 
the social and cultural world.  This specification captures disabled people’s agency at 
the same time as showing how that agency is circumscribed by social structures, 
relationships and personal biography. It does so by quite literally trying to pinpoint 
not only the physical tasks that the embodied self does to the impaired body, but also 
the emotional and cognitive ones.  In turn, this makes it possible to draw attention to 
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and explore the various types of body and disability related “work” that disabled 
people have to do.  This work begins with body work but, as we have seen, also 
includes bureaucratic doing, handling access and doing healthcare.  Acknowledging 
this work is important both theoretically and politically because it highlights that 
barrier removal alone does not necessarily lead to a level playing field between 
disabled and non-disabled people. This is particularly important in the context of 
debates about employment and what some may regard as schemes or services which 
some see as conferring “privileges” upon being disabled people.  A good example of 
the latter is the “Blue Badge” scheme, which in effect, compensates those that enact 
their impairment in a way which reduces mobility. In both these instances, policy has 
to have regard of how doing impairment in itself is restrictive for certain people, in 
certain social contexts.
Embodying Impairment 
Taken together, the concepts of doing and enacting impairment can be seen as two 
processes which constitute the embodiment of impairment.  Embodiment comprises 
both constraints and ‘opportunities which are endlessly elaborated through 
sociocultural and historical development’ (Williams & Bendelow, 1998:10).  
Similarly, both doing and enacting impairment constrains and provides the 
possibilities of who one can be and what one can do.  Thus they can be understood as 
conditions of embodiment.  The term “condition” here does not refer to the 
diagnostic labels used to describe or categorise a cluster of symptoms.  Rather, it is 
used in the legal sense of being subject to certain conditions.  Hence what the 
embodied self can be and do becomes subject to the proviso of impairment. So if 
embodiment refers to how we perceive and engage in the world through and with our 
bodies (Csordas, 1993), then impairment as a condition of embodiment influences 
that perception and engagement.  The form that influence takes will depend in part 
on the type of impairment, how it is manifested in and through the body, how it 
structures movement, communication, emotions and so forth.
Central to understanding impairment as a condition of embodiment is that 
impairment is always one of many possible conditions of embodiment.  Other 
conditions of embodiment include physicality, emotional state, the capacity to reflect 
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upon ourselves and chronological age.  So, for example, age conditions how the 
embodied self can be and do: a baby’s condition of embodiment means she has to be 
carried up the stairs, a youngster’s condition of embodiment allows him to bound up 
the stairs, perhaps two stairs at a time when exuberant, while an older person may 
have to take time and find the activity exhausting or unsettling due to the fear of 
falling.  Here then, the idea of impairment as a condition of embodiment facilitates 
consideration of the way any particular type or instance of impairment conditions the 
body, as well as how it interacts, how it influences and is influenced by other 
conditions of embodiment.  In short, conceiving of impairment as a condition or 
dimension of embodiment facilitates analysis of the diversity of impairment, 
diversity both in terms of different forms or impairment and other conditions of 
embodiment.  Therefore it allows for a subtle exploration of how a myriad of 
conditions of embodiment interact and produce a particular constellation of 
embodied experience. 
But embodiment isn’t just about the state of a body abstracted from the world.  
Rather, embodiment locates human beings as emerging from the intersection 
between the body and social structures (N.Watson, 2000).  So impairment as a 
condition of embodiment is always shaping and being shaped by the relationship 
between the embodied self and the social world.  This translates into an 
understanding of impairment which is similar to the critical realist position described 
above: in other words impairment as a condition of embodiment emerges from the 
relationship between the embodied self and the social world.  This relationship is 
dynamic insofar as the moment impairment emerges it becomes a somatic mode of 
awareness (Csordas,1993).  Hence embodiment is always an ongoing process and 
something that always has to be accomplished (Turner, 2000).  
For example, as a wheelchair user approaches a heavy door, a barrier created by the 
combination of her embodiment and the design of the door (see chapter seven), and 
thwarts her progress. As well as feeling excluded or frustrated, she also has to 
consider how to handle the access problem.  So she may attempt to open the door, 
feeling its weight against her arm, she may experience the awkwardness of moving 
the chair out of the path of the opening door, hear the noise of the chair’s footplates 
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banging against the door, evoking fear that the glass may break, with all the 
consequences that may have on both the physical and emotional embodied self.  Here 
then, we get a second sense of impairment as dynamic: the experience of disabling 
barriers has ramifications for a number of conditions of the body and shifts the 
experience of future embodiment.   This in turn will condition how people handle 
access on a subsequent occasion.  Indeed Imrie & Kumar’s (1998) research found 
that some disabled people avoid going out all together rather than face access 
handling.
The Limits of Doing 
Notwithstanding the benefits and potential of the concepts of enacting and doing 
impairment, an important question which requires further thought and more 
empirical research is how far to develop the concept of doing impairment and in 
what contexts it could provide useful analytic purchase.  In chapter seven, the 
concept of handling access was derived from doing impairment.  This concept made 
it possible to begin to specify the types and range of interactional work disabled 
people have to do when they encounter, or when they try to avoid encountering, 
disabling barriers in healthcare settings.  The concept also made it possible to 
consider the embodied consequences of access handling, including its psycho-
emotional effects, and how it impacted upon relationships with healthcare 
professionals and the wider public.  This, I think, makes a useful contribution to the 
understanding of access issues, firstly by exploring the barriers which are unique to 
healthcare settings and second by providing insight into how particular individuals 
experience and handle access barriers.  
Particularly important in this regard was clinical access.  Although this was identified 
as a problem for only two participants, it was here that the tension between different 
understandings of impairment in a medical encounter became particularly evident.  
What came to the fore here was healthcare professional’s apparent difficulty in 
recognising how the embodiment of impairment is influenced by the situation in 
which it is being enacted at any moment in time.  This led to misinterpretations of 
participants’ actions and a reluctance or inability to discuss the role environment and 
social context have in influencing the outcome of diagnostic procedures.  In part, 
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what lay behind these misinterpretations are the biomedical understanding of the 
impaired body, which was discussed in chapter three.
In chapter eight, I extending the concept of doing once more, this time looking at 
how disabled people “do healthcare” in order to take care of their bodies.  In the 
context of participants’ expectations of the NHS, this enabled me to touch upon the 
isolation and anxiety which can arise when impairment is a condition of embodiment 
and participants’ feelings that they wanted the NHS to look after them.  In some 
senses, these issues are anathematic to Disability Studies not least because of its 
opposition to the medicalisation of disability, leaving it instead to Medical Sociology 
to do so (see, for example, Bury, 1982, S.J. Williams, 1999).  For me, the advantage 
of the concept of doing healthcare was that it could capture not just the fact that 
participants had these feelings but also how they wanted to, and how they did, 
engage with them.    It also became apparent that the amount and type of healthcare 
doing required was nearly always contingent upon the practice of healthcare 
professionals: when a participant regarded a health care encounter as “good” it often 
meant that he did not have to “do”, they were content to be done unto.   This suggests 
there is a need for further research to identify what stops healthcare professionals 
responding to the impairment-related needs of disabled people, and the role policy 
and institutional context play in this.  There is also a need to explore how healthcare 
professionals’ understand and interpret disabled people’s doing impairment and 
doing healthcare and whether this influences professional practice.
Doing Impairment and the Bigger Picture
How then can the concepts of enacting and doing impairment relate to other 
theoretical approaches within Disability Studies?  Carol Thomas’ (1999, 2007) 
concept of impairment effects, especially as formulated in her later work, describes 
impairment related restrictions of activity that are contingent upon the biological 
together with social and cultural forces.  This is very similar to what I am proposing 
save that, as I use the term, condition is not medically rooted, which is not the case 
with impairment.   Nonetheless, the similarity forces me to consider what Thomas 
does not – if impairment emerges from the relationship between conditions of 
embodiment and the social space and interaction, what’s the difference between 
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impairment and disability?  To be honest, in writing this and the previous three 
chapters, I have often dithered about when to use impairment, and when disability.  
Clearly, it makes sense to talk about impairment when doing impairment involves the 
embodied self acting upon the body, such as checking skin on pressure areas.  
However, things become less clear when talking about doing bureaucracy or 
handling access: aren’t they doing disability by virtue of the fact that they involve 
dealing with social barriers?  My sense is that the advantage of calling these doing 
impairment, not doing disability, is that it makes it easier to emphasise the embodied 
nature of doing.  But I acknowledge that this argument is a hang over from the social 
model of disability, where impairment is related to body and disability to social 
structures.  However ultimately I think that if there is a difference between disability 
and impairment, it is a difference of degree rather than of kind.  That is, disability 
also emerges from the relations between embodiment and social space or interaction, 
but the barrier or restriction is one experienced by many, and which can be removed 
by a solution without reference to anyone’s particular embodied needs.  In effect, 
what I am describing here is the difference between macro and micro access needs, 
defined in chapter seven. Perhaps those concepts that can be used to differentiate 
doing impairment from doing disability.
There is also much theoretical work to be done to consider more deeply if and how 
doing and enacting impairment can be connected with social theory which considers 
the nature of the human embodied being and its relationships with society.  For 
example, Jonas (2005) argues that, as living organisms, human beings can be only if 
we do.  The work of both Elias and Mauss are concerned with the way we learn to 
use our bodies and the connection between body habits and behaviour (Williams & 
Bendelow, 1998).  Similarly, by drawing upon phenomenological traditions, it may 
be possible to understand better the bodily experience of physical, emotional and 
cognitive doing.  This may lead to more subtle understandings of the boundaries 
between impairment, health and illness.  
Final conclusion 
In some ways, these final concluding remarks feel as much like a new beginning as 
an ending.  What this thesis has done is to put down some markers for fresh ways of 
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investigating familiar but contested topics.  Of these topics, impairment as a 
condition of embodiment seems the most important, but that of the relationships 
between impairment and health and the nature of body work are significant too.  
Although this thesis has been weighted towards theoretical and conceptual issues, 
implicit within it are some implications for policy and practice too.  However, what 
is depressing is most of these have a very familiar ring to them, suggesting the need 
for creative thinking to come up with innovative solutions.  They include:-
 What training and support systems need to be in place to enable healthcare 
professionals to be responsive to disabled people’s micro or individual access 
needs?
 What services or support systems are needed by those who feel they get too 
little support from the NHS?
 Is there a need for advocacy services to support and encourage the 
development of true partnership relations between disabled healthcare users 
and healthcare professionals?
These and similar issues will be further explored and documented.  They will then be 
presented to ECAS who funded this PhD.   But the final word must go to one 
participant, Elspeth, who I asked what impact her impairment made on her everyday 
life:
“It does give you something else in your 'to do' list”. (2nd interview) 
Impairment then must be done.
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Appendix 1 – Channels of Recruitment
Impairment Support Group 7
Personal Contact 11
Snowballing 2
Edinburgh Council Equal Opportunities Group 3
Local Disability Group 1
Local Newspaper Advert 3
Total Number of Participants = 27
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disability & health 
Impairment 
hierarchy
How do disabled people talk about impairment/their body?
Are emotions implicated in an embodied impairment?  How?
Does medical care influence embodiment?
Does medical discourse and practice influence the experience 
of impairment?
How do disabled people talk about the relationships between 






Are disabled people ‘experts’ when it comes to handling 
relationships with health care professionals?  What forms does 
this ‘expertise’ take?  
What factors influence the development of expertise? 





Responsibility In health care encounters, is there a struggle to control the 
body? What are the boundaries between disabled people and 
health care professional control?
In the context of control struggle, what is the significance of 
diagnosis 






impaired body?  What does this involve?  Does it vary, if so, 
how?  
What roles do GPs play in helping disabled people to manage 
their impairment?  Do those roles meet disabled people’s 
needs?
Q3 tending
Q3 role of GP
Impairment 
solidarity
What is the importance of impairment specific 






For disabled people, what qualities make for a good health 




What is the range and type of access problems disabled people 
face in health care contexts? 
What factors shape access issues in the health care context?  
Are some access issues unique to health care context?
Who takes responsibility for dealing with access issues in 
health care contexts?  How? What does it involve?





Appendix 3 – Information Leaflet for Disabled People
Would you be willing to help?
What’s the research about?
The research is about disability and health care.  It aims to find out about disabled 
people’s experiences of using the NHS, particularly primary health care services 
such as GPs, Dentists and District Nurses.
What would be involved?
Being involved would mean agreeing to be interviewed by Ruth Bailey, a disabled 
student at Edinburgh University.  The interview would be like an informal 
discussion, with Ruth asking you about your experiences of using the NHS and 
whether you feel disability has influenced those experiences.
The interview would take place on a day and at a place which is convenient for you.  
It would take about 1-1½ hours and, if you give your permission, would be recorded.
Who can take part?
Any disabled person living in Edinburgh who is aged between 18 – 65.
What’s the research for?
The research is being done as part of Ruth’s PhD, funded by ECAS (Equality 
Choices Action and Support).  The results of the research will be made available to 
disabled people. 
How can I find out more?
Contact: Ruth Bailey
By email: R.Bailey-2@sms.ed.ac.uk
By phone: 07944 056197 / 0131 650 3990
By post: Room 119, Adam Ferguson Building,                            
E                                                            George Square, Edinburgh, EH8 9LL
296
Appendix 4 – Consent Form
Please read the statements below.  If you agree with the statement, please tick the 
appropriate box.  If you disagree, please leave the box blank.
I agree to take part in this study of Disabled People’s Health Care  Encounters 
and am happy to talk with Ruth Bailey about my experiences of using the NHS.
I agree that Ruth Bailey can inform my GP that I am participating in this study 
using the letter that is attached to this form,
I understand that I can withdraw from the study at any time and that I don’t have 
to answer any questions I don’t want to. 
I know that any health care services I use will not be affected in any way whether 
or not I take part in the study.  
I understand that anything I say to Ruth Bailey will be treated in the strictest 
confidence.
I understand that if any comments or views I express are quoted or referred to in 
any report of the research, my name and my personal details will be changed so 
that my identity won’t be revealed.














Appendix 5 – GP Letter
Community Health Sciences (Public Health Sciences Section)
Teviot Place
Edinburgh     EH8 9AG
Email:  R.Bailey-2@sms.ed.ac.uk
Telephone: 0131 651 3977
Dear 
Disabled people’s health care encounters
I am writing to inform you that one of your patients has agreed to be interviewed for 
a research project exploring disabled people’s experiences of using primary health 
care.




Date of birth …………
The research project is part of my PhD studies at the University of Edinburgh.  It 
aims to explore some of the factors which influence disabled people’s experience of 
using Primary Health Care in Edinburgh.





Appendix 6 – Topic Guides
FIRST INTERVIEW 
Q1: MAPPING USE OF HEALTH SERVICES
AIMS: 
To encourage people to talk about their healthcare experiences 
To find out range of services used and what influences / constrains pattern of use
MAIN QUESTION:
When did you last use the NHS? 
PROBES:
For range of experiences
Have there been times in your life when you have had a great deal of contact with the 
NHS?  Are there any NHS services which you use regularly?
For range of services used
GP, practice nurse, district nurse,  physio, dentist, opticians, alternative health 
practitioner,  preventive health screening, pharmacy, OTs, counselling
For depth
What happened?  How did it feel?  What was that like?  What made it good /  bad?  
What about other times?
ROUND UP QUESTION:
Are there any types of health service that you want but are not currently getting?




To identify range of access problems disabled people experience, how the problems 
are handled and whether Disability Discrimination Act has reduced problems.
MAIN QUESTION:
Have you ever had access problems when using the NHS?
PROBES:
For types of access problems
Transport, parking, getting in to building, getting round the building, getting 
information, transferring/getting on to examination couch, in diagnostic setting, in 
the ward?
For depth
What happened? How did you manage?  What was it like?  Did you talk to someone 
about this?  What should have happened?  Did you complain? Have you come across 
that before / since?  Did it affect your use of services / the quality of service / type of 
treatment you had?  Did it affect the relationship you had with health care 
professional?
ROUND UP QUESTION
Has access improved since the DDA?  In what ways?
Is there anything else you want to say about access?
Q3: RELATIONSHIPS WITH HEALTH CARE PROFESSIONALS
AIMS:
To understand what sort of relationship disabled people want with a range of health 
care professionals and what helps and hinders the formation of such relationships.
300
MAIN QUESTION:
How do you get on with your GP?
PROBES:
For depth:
What’s good / bad about the relationship?  Has it always been like this? Is it 
important to you to have a good relationship?  Why?  Has it got anything to do with 
being disabled? Is there one particularly good relationship you have had with a health 
care professional either now or in the past?  What made it good?   
For range of health care professionals:
What about relationships with other health care professionals – example consultant / 
nurse / OT / physio?
SECONDARY QUESTION:
Some disabled people say some health care professionals have negative attitude 
towards them.  Is that something you’ve experienced?  Can you tell me about it?
Is there anything else you wanted to say about health care professional relationships?
Q4: MEDICALISATION
MAIN QUESTION:
Some disabled people say they often have to see the GP for administrative reasons, 
example to sign a claim for benefit form or to get ‘proof’ of their disability status?  Is 




How did you feel about having to do that?  Do you think it should be like that?  Was 
the Doctor OK about doing that?
ROUND UP QUESTION:
In your experience have healthcare professionals told you about other services or 
sources that you may need?
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SECOND INTERVIEW 
Q1: MANAGING HEALTH 
AIMS:
To find out what support disabled people receive to enable them to manage their 
health / impairment and whether they think it is adequate / appropriate.
MAIN QUESTION:
What do you do if you have a health problem which is connected with your 
disability?  Who would you go to for help?
PROBES:
For depth about type/nature of support:
Is it important to you to have regular check-ups? Why? Why not? Who with? In what 
ways are they helpful? / unhelpful?  Is there one specialist who you know you can go 
to if there is a problem?  Ideally, would you want more support than you’re getting?  
What type of support?  Have you discussed it with anyone? Has there been a stage in 
your life when you did get regular support?  What was that like?
How often do you get these problems?  Does it mean you on-going contact with the 
NHS?  How is that?  In what ways does it influence the rest of your life? 
Q2: MANAGING HEALTH
MAIN QUESTION:  
Some disabled people say that when they get sick, health care professionals assume 
that it’s something to do with their impairment.  Is that something you’ve 




What did you think about that? What did you do?  How did it make you feel?  Have 




Who has expertise about your condition?
PROBES:
For depth
Can you give me some examples of expertise? What’s important about that?  What 
about your own expertise?  How have you developed that?  Is your expertise 
recognised?  How?  Has it caused conflict between you and health care 
professionals?  What happened?  How did you handle it?
For scope
What about with other health care professionals such as OTs, physios?  Have you
been in a situation where they’ve told you ‘they know best’?  What happened?  How 
did you feel about that?

